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ABSTRACT  
   
In Latin America food insecurity is still prevailing in those regions where 
extreme poverty and political instability are common. Tseltal communities are 
experiencing changes due to religious conversions and the incursion of external 
political institutions. These changes have diminished the importance of traditional 
reciprocal and redistributive institutions that historically have been essential for 
personal and community survival. This dissertation investigated the impact that 
variations on governance systems and presence of reciprocal and distributional 
exchanges have on the food security status of communities. Qualitative data 
collected in four communities through 117 free lists and 117 semi-structured 
interviews was used to elaborate six scales that correspond to the traditional and 
civic authority system and to inter-community and intra-community reciprocity and 
redistribution. I explore the relationship that the scores of four communities on those 
scales have on the food security status of their inhabitants based on their results on 
the National Health and Nutrition Survey 2012. Findings from this study suggest that 
in marginalized communities that many scientists would described as experiencing 
market failure, participation in inter-community reciprocal, intra-community 
reciprocal and intra-community redistribution are better predictors of food security 
than enrollment in food security programs. Additionally, communities that 
participated the most in these non-market mechanisms have stronger traditional 
institutions. In contrast, communities that participated more in inter-community 
redistribution scored higher on the civic authority scale, are enrolled in more food aid 
programs, but are less food secure. 
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
Today, one in eight people worldwide are deeply affected by food insecurity, 
understood as limited or uncertain access to sufficient, safe and nutritious food that 
meets dietary needs and food preferences for an active healthy life (FAO, 2013). 
Food insecurity occurs virtually everywhere (Misselhorn, 2005). Despite an overall 
decrease in food insecurity in the last decade (FAO, 2013), in Latin America food 
insecurity is still prevailing in those regions where extreme poverty and political 
instability are common (Roman-Ruiz & Hernandez-Daumas, 2010). In Mexico, 
indigenous inhabitants of southern states like Chiapas suffer from food insecurity at 
disproportionately higher rates than the rest of the Mexican population (Juarez & 
Gonzalez, 2010). Among those regions Los Altos (the highlands), Chiapas is one in 
which food insecurity is widespread. 
Extensive research shows that an effective coping mechanism against food 
insecurity is to engage in reciprocity and redistribution (Broughton, Janssen, 
Hertzman, Innis, & Frankish, 2006; Frankenberger & McCaston, 1998a). In much of 
Latin America institutions such as cooperation and reciprocity are essential for 
personal and community survival (Cohen, 2010). In Los Altos, ongoing changes to 
the structure of many communities due to migration, religious conversions and 
political conflict have diminished the importance of traditional reciprocal institutions 
(Gossen, 2013; Perez-Enríquez, 1994; Urbalejo Guerra, 2003; Veltmeyer, 2000). In 
many cases these changes have altered existing redistributive and governance 
systems, replacing traditional institutions with new ones or causing 
adaptations.When under stress, a society’s capacity to adapt and cope resides in its 
ability to act collectively and while decisions to adapt are made at different levels –
individual, society, government – vulnerable groups are often excluded from the 
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decision making process (Adger, 1999). However, this exclusion does not imply that 
the vulnerable will not come up with institutional arrangements by themselves (Adler 
de Lomnitz, 1975; O. Lewis, 1961; Ostrom, 2002). In fact, research shows that 
actors who have autonomy to design governing rules for their institutions frequently 
achieve better economic and more equitable outcomes than when others design 
them (Ostrom & Basurto, 2011).This dissertation explores how four Tseltal 
indigenous communities in Los Altos, Chiapas, Mexico have transformed their 
traditional reciprocal and redistributive institutions and their governance systems and 
how those transformations relate to their food security status. 
Background of the Problem 
Over time, indigenous groups in Mexico have developed reciprocal and redistributive 
institutional arrangements to cope with food scarcity (Adler de Lomnitz, 1975) by 
engaging in food transfers (Quijano, 2006; Vázquez Estrada, 2006) that act as an 
insurance mechanism in lean times (Chance & Taylor, 1985; de León de Santiago, 
Ma Guadalupe & Carvajal Godoy, 2005; Monaghan, 1990; Stern, 1983; Utrilla & 
Prieto, 2009; Van den Berghe, Pierre L, 1978; Wolf, 1986). Reciprocity, the 
exchange of goods based on symmetrical relationships between social entities 
(Polyani, 1944), and redistribution, the relocation of resources through a central 
agency (Polyani, 1944), were an important part of existing informal relations that 
influence the food security status of a social entity (Castillo Escalona, 2000; de León 
de Santiago, Ma Guadalupe & Carvajal Godoy, 2005). Partaking in these institutions 
could impact the amount of food that is accessed as well as the diversity of the food 
consumed.  
Recent changes in the structures of the communities as well as external 
factors have decreased the use and importance of these traditional arrangements. 
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Lately, functions of traditional redistributive and reciprocal institutions have been 
taken over by modern institutions (i.e. comites, basketball, protrestant churches 
etc). Cohen (2010) states that these new institutions invent new relationships and 
practices in response to global forces. In many cases these new institutions while 
novel are still buot on the foundation of reciprocity and redistribution (Cohen, 2010; 
Feinberg, 2003; Springwood, 2006). One of the motivations of this dissertation is to 
explore if these new mechanisms still have the same importance on the food security 
status that traditional arrangements have. 
Reciprocity and redistribution occur through institutions that are embedded in 
society. Institutions evolve over time to respond to internal and external 
disturbances by adapting (Janssen, 2006; Ostrom, 2009). For instance, reciprocal 
ties change and adapt throughout time to internal disturbances like fluctuations in 
the status and wealth of the partakers reacting to the response rate of the 
participants. Reciprocity and redistribution also adapt to external disturbances such 
as the incursion of new religious groups, new government policies and new cultural 
values and patterns that come with them. 
Customarily, in southern Mexico institutions through which redistribution and 
reciprocity of foodstuffs occur in communities are part of a traditional political-
religious system (López Meza, 1996). In Los Altos, this complex system is based on a 
syncretic form of Catholicism and a traditional governance system that links 
community and municipal level authorities and institutions through a cargo system 
(Cámara Barbachano, 1952; López Meza, 1996). Traditional institutions are 
transformed in modern settings. Changes in the configuration and governance 
system of communities prompted by government interventions, religious conversion 
and migration have altered the way in which these non-market and governance 
institutions function and the importance they have (Cancian, 1994Dow, 2001). This 
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study focus on these changes in four study communities with the intent of showing 
what are the implication of these changes for food security. 
Throughout this dissertation I show that these changes occur in the four 
study communities on their own terms. Institutional change is a collective choice 
process in which rules are altered (Kingston & Caballero, 2009), thus each 
community takes part in the way that governance, reciprocal and redistributive 
institutions respond to perturbations. Actors that are vulnerable to food insecurity 
are active agents that respond to stress in diverse ways and food security is one of 
the many objectives that they have to balance with other competing interests such 
as retaining social status or maintaining assets (Frankenberger & McCaston, 1998).  
Redistribution and reciprocity are considered the outcome of collective actions 
and choices, made within communities that are used to negotiate, adapt and cope 
with social, economic and political changes (Cohen, 2010). Cancian (1994) found 
that in the municipality of Zinacantan in Los Altos, cooperation, redistribution and 
reciprocity still take place in some communities where there are external 
disturbances such as migration. In Santa Ana, Oaxaca the disuse of the traditional 
cargo system prompted new patterns of cooperation and reciprocity still have the 
same functions, but occur in new social settings such as basketball tournaments 
(Cohen, 2010). 
In addition to community organized redistributive institutions there are also 
government sponsored redistribution programs. At the time of the study, there were 
eight programs that were being implemented in Los Altos. In our framework these 
programs are considered external disturbances. The effectiveness of these programs 
solving food insecurity is contested (Behrman & Hoddinott, 2005; Rivera, Sotres-
Alvarez, Habicht, Shamah, & Villalpando, 2004).They may overlook the importance 
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of existing informal relations and exchanges between households and among 
communities. Local community governance systems may play a role in these 
relationships since there remains a link with outside institutions. Interventions that 
neglect or undermine this “social infrastructure” can fail (Putnam, 1993), reduce the 
effectiveness of those interventions or reduce the performance of existing local 
institutions. These relations may be more critical to understand in contexts of market 
failures and the poor reach of official programs (Kranton, 1996). Thus understanding 
the evolution of traditional practices for food access can provide insights into how 
communities respond in face of formal institutional failures (public programs) and 
how evolution of local institutions interacts (or not) with public programs, affecting 
their ultimate success. 
Food security is a public good, thus participation in government programs 
that aim to increase food security among marginalized households have an impact in 
non-participating households and could either “crowd out” traditional community 
transfers (Dercon, 2004) or be used to expand existing risk sharing networks 
(Angelucci & De Giorgi, 2009) altering the institutional landscape of the 
communities.  
Statement of the Problem 
Despite extensive research on the state of food security in southern Mexico and the 
constant use of resources on food insecurity alleviation through government 
programs, indigenous inhabitants of Los Altos are still among the most food insecure 
groups in the country. Limited understanding of the institutional landscape of Tseltal 
people and the disturbances that they face has prompted a social consensus in which 
the government attributes their food insecurity to poverty and culture. Focusing their 
efforts on increasing food access (getting food to them) and blaming program 
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failures on their ethnicity. This myopic approach neglects the importance that local 
institutions have on food security. While the ethnographic records shows that 
redistribution and reciprocity directly impact food security it is still unknown how 
local governance systems impact food security.  
This dissertation specifically studies how changes in the institutional 
landscape of four Tseltal communities impact the food security status of their 
inhabitants. Throughout the dissertation I will present how some traditional 
institutions are transformed as new religious groups and government institutions 
become part of the four study communities. I use previous ethnographies of the 
region and the communities in an effort to understand the changes that the 
institutions in these communities are going through.  
Research Question and hypothesis 
The inhabitants of communities in Los Altos like many other communities around the 
world are increasingly facing the effects of ongoing long term processes such as 
migration and religious conversion that affect their traditional governance systems. 
These communities are also experiencing a recent economic shift characterized by a 
greater market integration and a change in power and social norms. This dissertation 
asks: What is the role of inter-community institutional arrangements in coping with 
threats to food security? Based on the literature on new institutionalism, social 
capital and reciprocity I expect to find: 
H1. Communities with a greater (frequency and amount) presence of inter-
community reciprocal institutions will be more likely to cope successfully against food 
insecurity. 
H2. Communities with stronger (frequency) local institutions are more likely to 
secure outside resources from governmental programs, therefore their inhabitants 
are less food insecure. 
  7 
To test the hypothesis (H1) that communities with a greater presence of 
inter-community reciprocal institutions are more likely to cope successfully against 
food insecurity I ask three questions: (1) Are patterns of reciprocity and 
redistribution different between the studied communities? and (2) How do these 
mechanisms affect the communities’ population’s capacity to achieve food security? 
And (3) How have patterns of reciprocity and redistribution changed? 
I ask three questions to test hypothesis (H2) that communities with stronger 
local institutions are more likely to secure outside resources from governmental 
programs, therefore their inhabitants are less food insecure: (1) Are governance 
systems (civic and traditional) present at different rates in the communities? (2) Is 
there a relationship between the kind of prevalent governance system in a 
community and the amount of food aid programs in which its inhabitants are 
enrolled? and (3) Is there a relationship between the kind of prevalent governance 
system and the ELCSA (Latin American and Caribbean Food Security Scale) median 
score in a community? 
Research Design 
Data presented in this dissertation were collected simultaneously in four different 
Tseltal communities of Los Altos, Chiapas through team-based multi-sited 
ethnography. Free lists (n=135), semi-structured interviews (n=117) and participant 
observation took place during fieldwork. I accessed anthropometric measurements, 
and an EBFSS (experienced based food security surveys) that were collected as part 
of National Health and Nutrition Survey 2012 (ENSANUT 2012). Qualitative and 
quantitative methodologies were used in a comprehensive approach to analyze the 
relationship between institutions and food security. 
Free lists were analyzed using cultural consensus to determine the saliency 
and frequency of each type of reciprocity present in each community. Interviews 
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were coded using grounded theory. Qualitative data was used to elaborate six scales 
that correspond to the traditional and civic authority system and to inter-community 
and intra-community reciprocity and redistribution. I explore the relationship that the 
scores of four communities on those scales have on the food security status of their 
inhabitants based on their results on the National Health and Nutrition Survey 2012. 
Significance of the Study 
In recent decades, studies about reciprocity and redistribution have focused on the 
role these elements play on household food security. The present research attempts 
to go beyond the study of food security as a household phenomenon to include 
higher level institutions such as the governance system. I move to the community 
level by studying food security as a nested phenomenon. 
Another significant contribution of my study is that it expands the 
ethnographic record on community heterogeneity as a variable in collective action. 
Empirical research has identified a large number of contextual variables that affect 
endogenous collective action. Community heterogeneity is one of the least 
researched variables (Ruttan, 2006). This dissertation focuses on the religious 
heterogeneity of the communities because it has direct impact on the way that the 
traditional political-religious system functions.  
One of the findings of this study is that despite the growth of public 
interventions to support food security among these four Tseltal communities 
participation in inter- and intra-community reciprocity and/or intra-community 
redistribution is a better indicator of experience based and anthropometric 
measurements of food security than participation in government programs. 
Qualitative data collected in the field and anecdotes shed light into probable causes 
of this result. Current government programs tend to use money or food transfers to 
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enhance access to food stuffs. For instance there is a lack of monitoring and 
enforcement by the government on proper use of the resources given to the 
beneficiaries of the programs. Some of the causes of inappropriate use of these 
resources is a lack of knowledge of what is considered culturally appropriate food, 
how non-market exchange strategies work and how the governance systems of the 
communities act and redistribute some of these foodstuffs based on a different set of 
values. This study is a first attempt to understand these variables in a specific 
geographic area. 
Additionally, this dissertation research contributes to the ethnographic record 
of Los Altos by giving a detailed account of the current state of local governance 
systems. Combined with previous ethnographies this account gives a baseline on 
how institutions are changing in Los Altos.  
Limitations  
The results presented in the next chapters were collected in four Tseltal communities 
(villages) and are not representative of the rest of the indigenous communities in the 
region. However, they open a window to understanding the institutional change 
processes that are taking place in other communities. Additionally, these results offer 
good insight into the shortcomings in implementation (monitoring and enforcement) 
of some of the state-run programs and offer qualitative explanation on the results of 
the Latin American and Caribbean Food Security Scale in the region. 
General Overview of the Dissertation 
This document is divided into seven chapters. The first chapter is an introduction to 
the research question and hypothesis. Chapter two offers a revision of the theoretical 
approaches used to study food security, the measurements used to calculate food 
security and the food security scales. It also contains a section on vulnerability to 
food insecurity. Chapter three focuses on the research design section includes the 
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sampling strategy, general materials for data collection and analyses. Chapter four 
introduces the research setting of Tenejapa and Oxchuc in Los Altos of Chiapas, 
Mexico. It includes information about the political history of Tseltales and recent 
demographic data of the municipalities and communities. Chapter five addresses 
institutional change with a focus on how reciprocal and redistributive institutions 
have adapted. Chapters six presents a discussion on the links between food security 
and the current institutional arrangements in the four study communities. Chapter 
seven offers a brief general discussion of the key findings, limitations of the 
research, potential areas of further research and a conclusion addressing the 
question of inter-community reciprocity and food security. 
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CHAPTER 2 
INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE AND FOOD SECURITY 
A primary pursuit of the social sciences, particularly economics, in the past decades, 
was to uncover the market mechanisms at the national level that made food 
available and the ways in which market exchange worked. The limitations of this 
focus, known as Food Availability Decline (FAD), came to light during the African 
famines of the mid-1980s, making it clear that adequate food availability at the 
national level does not translate in food security at the household or individual level. 
As a consequence the focus shifted to study those situations in which food was 
available, but people could not access it.  
Amartya Sen’s entitlement theory—which argues that an individual’s capacity 
to access food is based on their ability to transform his assets into food—also 
prompted an increased focus on how individuals and households acquire food 
through non-market exchange. Researchers became rapidly aware that reciprocal 
and redistributive exchanges are an important part of existing informal relations that 
influence the food security status of a social entity—individuals, households, 
communities.  
New to that approach was the realization that vulnerable populations 
responded to economic stress, that they are not passive, but active. Social scientists 
found that food security cannot be treated as a fundamental need, but as one of the 
many objectives of a poor household and that it is related to other livelihood 
considerations (Frankenberger & McCaston, 1998b). Thus, there are diverse ways in 
which individuals, households, communities and even nations self–organize to 
respond against food insecurity. Some of these responses are in fact the result of 
coordination among several units of people that have evolved overtime.  
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Reciprocity, Redistribution and Institutional Change 
Traditionally, modern Mesoamerican indigenous groups have developed reciprocal 
and redistributive institutional arrangements to cope with food scarcity (Adler de 
Lomnitz, 1975). Reciprocal arrangements, understood as informally enforced 
exchange of goods based on symmetrical relationships between social entities 
(Polyani, 1944), consist mainly of inter-household exchanges and the use of safety 
networks. Redistribution refers to the systemic movement of goods from a local level 
to a hierarchical center that reorganizes and sends the goods back to the local level 
(Polyani, 1944).  
I analyze two types of redistribution: government and non-government. In 
non-government redistribution the collectors and redistributors are chosen by 
community members and the resources are collected through monitoring and 
enforcement of rules within the community and outside donations. In government 
sponsored redistribution the government acts as a collector and re-locator of 
resources. This kind of redistribution is understood here as the targeted relocation of 
government funds through cash or food rations that are aimed at food insecurity 
reduction. Such transfers can be made by any level of the government and any of 
the governmental institutions (Coady & Harris, 2004). I study government programs 
that aim to reduce food insecurity by giving bimonthly stipends or food aid. The 
programs that I focus on are OPORTUNIDADES and the Chiapas DIF food security 
programs.  
According to Sahlins (1972) there are three kinds of reciprocity. Generalized 
reciprocity includes a system of giving things without taking into account how much 
has been given with the assumption that in the future something will be given back; 
it takes place between the closest social relations (Sahlins, 1972). Balanced 
exchange consists of a direct exchange in which something of equal value is 
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expected back in a short amount of time; it may occur at a social level more distant 
than the family (Sahlins, 1972). However, without reciprocation in the appropriate 
time frame, the relationship ends and the system is terminated. Generalized and 
balanced reciprocity foster trust among the entities that participate in the exchange 
(Wilk & Cliggett, 2007). In contrast, negative reciprocity is an attempt to get 
something for nothing and does not foster trust nor cooperation, thus there is no 
reciprocity system fostered (Wilk & Cliggett, 2007) and I do not include it in this 
research. Generalized and balanced reciprocity constitute important parts of the 
exchanges that occur within and among the study communities. I will present 
specific examples of balanced and generalized reciprocity in chapters 5 and 6.  
Generalized and balanced reciprocity build social capital. For Coleman (1989) 
social capital is based on obligations, expectations, and trustworthiness; basically the 
same qualitative relationships that are established by reciprocity. Social capital is 
self-reinforcing when reciprocity increases connectedness between people, leading to 
greater trust, confidence and capacity to innovate (Pretty & Ward, 2001). 
Interpersonal relationships give form to social capital and are a site and outcome of 
reciprocity. They can be categorized as bonding and bridging:  
“Bonding ties are shared between co-identifying individuals typified by ethnic 
or religious groups. Bridging ties are used to describe social relationships of 
exchange, often of associations between people with shared interests or goals but 
contrasting social identity. A sub-category of bridging ties have been termed linking 
ties, these describe relationships that cross group boundaries in a vertical direction, 
for example, between social classes, or community groups and donors” (Pelling & 
High, 2005, p.310).  
Redistribution and reciprocity happen among (inter-community) and within 
communities (intra-community) through socially embedded institutions. 
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Redistribution and reciprocity happen in the study communities through various 
settings such as basketball, religious groups, cargo systems, kinship, etc. As seen on 
Table 1, I study four kinds of exchanges in this dissertation based on their 
geographic extent and the type of exchanges. I use these categories to better 
represent the diversity in institutions and strategies used by community members. 
Understanding the balance between these different kinds of interactions can help us 
understand how adaptations and responses to stressors work.  
Table 1.  
Type of exchanges studied. 
 Reciprocity Redistribution 
Among community Inter-community reciprocity Inter-community 
Redistribution 
Within community Intra-community reciprocity Intra-community 
Redistribution 
 
Exchange is an institutional arrangement. Thus, I study the different types of 
exchange from an institutional perspective. Institutions are the repetitive rules, 
norms and strategies that govern interaction between people (Janssen, 2006; 
Ostrom, 2007). Institutions reduce uncertainty by providing structure to human 
interactions and include formal and informal rules (North 1990). Formal rules or rules 
in form are written rules that are enforced by actors with specialized roles. Informal 
rules or rules in use are implicit rules that are used de facto even if they are not 
written or if they differ from formal rules. Rules are often enforced and monitored by 
either actors that occupy specific positions (i.e. police officer) or by other participants 
that occupy the same position as the actor obeying or disobeying the rule (i.e. gossip 
through the rest of the community). An actor disobeying rules can be sanctioned (i.e. 
with a speeding ticket, or a low reputation). The use of rules helps order 
relationships because, when in use, rules rule out and rule in certain behaviors.  
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Rules and institutions are not static. They evolve over time (Janssen, 2006). 
There are different processes through which institutional change occurs and various 
reasons why it happens. Institutions can change as a response to external 
disturbances internal disturbances or to increase outcome efficiency (Janssen, 2006; 
Ostrom, 2009). Internal disturbances “refer to rapid reorganization of the ecological 
and social system induced by the subsystems of the ecological or social system 
(Anderies, Janssen, & Ostrom, 2004)” External disturbances include biophysical 
disruptions (i.e. climate change, floods) and socioeconomic changes (i.e. population 
increases, economic change, and major political changes). While it is understood that 
institutional change aims to achieve efficiency, not all changes make institutions 
more efficient. For instance, inefficient change can be caused by actors that hold 
incorrect beliefs about the effects of institutional change (Ostrom, 2009). 
Institutional change occurs through rule change, but there is no scientific 
agreement on the process of rule change (Ostrom & Basurto, 2011). In this 
dissertation I use a collective choice and evolutionary framework that has been 
associated with works produced at the Workshop in Political Theory and Analysis at 
Indiana University (Ostrom, 2010). I utilize this framework because it uses a non-
exclusionary approach that can be used to explain most real world institutional 
changes (Kingston & Caballero, 2009). Under this framework institutional change is 
seen as a collective choice process in which actors engage in collective action to try 
to change rules for their own benefit. This approach also acknowledges that 
sometimes actors that are experimenting with institutional change attempt to imitate 
successful institutions observed elsewhere (Ostrom, 2009). I use this framework to 
analyze the current state of the governance systems in each study community. 
Understanding local governance as it relates to food security is important 
since the kind of governance system used affects resource allocations in 
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communities. One of the lessons learned through institutional analysis of irrigation 
systems is that “resource users that have relative autonomy to design their own 
rules for governing and managing common-pool resources frequently achieve better 
economic (as well as more equitable) outcomes than when experts do this for them” 
(Ostrom & Basurto, 2011, p. 219). Thus, one of the objectives of this dissertation is 
to analyze if those communities that have a governance system that sits towards the 
most traditional end of the governance spectrum are in fact those in which the 
reported food security status of its inhabitants has less variation. 
Reciprocity, Redistribution and Food Security 
The existence of reciprocal institutional arrangements to cope with food 
scarcity has been documented at various levels of the food system in urban and rural 
areas throughout the world (Adler de Lomnitz, 1975; Baro & Deubel, 2006; De Waal, 
2004; D. G. Maxwell, 1996; Watts, 1983). At the community level, scholars have 
pointed the existence of reciprocal inter-community institutions that serve to engage 
in food transfers (Quijano, 2006; Vázquez Estrada, 2006). Watts (1983) points out 
that among the African Hausa, various networks, institutions and exchanges that 
existat the intra and inter-village levels acted as shock absorbers spreading the 
possibility of food security further. In Mexico, many authors have pointed out that 
one of the functions of Cargo systems (religious offices occupied on a rotating basis 
by the men of the community) and Mayordomias (Catholic institutions that help to 
organize religious festivities) is to redistribute wealth and food among community 
members and among communities acting as an insurance mechanism in lean times 
(Chance & Taylor, 1985; de León de Santiago, Ma Guadalupe & Carvajal Godoy, 
2005; Monaghan, 1990a; Stern, 1983; Utrilla & Prieto, 2009; Van den Berghe, Pierre 
L, 1978; Wolf, 1986).The importance that reciprocal institutions have on community 
food security is undeniable since food security is a nested phenomenon. For Maxwell 
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and Smith (1992) all the sources of risk to household food security at the community 
level reside on the breakdown of reciprocal institutions. 
Social capital fostered by reciprocity has a positive impact on food security in 
rural households in developing countries and even in low income households in 
developed countries (Martin, Rogers, Cook, & Joseph, 2004; Oni, Salman, & BO, 
2011). However, social capital is not a panacea for all problems relating to rural 
poverty. Ali (2005) found that as proposed by Putnam (1993), social capital is less 
accessible to poor people and those who have social capital tend to accumulate 
more. Really poor people, who do not own land or assets, have difficulties in 
accessing social capital and they are less likely to find support. Social capital is 
crucial to enhancing food access and coping with food insecurity as long as the social 
entities rely on using some type of resource that can be used in reciprocal exchanges 
in the future or has already been used in the past. Protestantism, increased market 
integration expressed in migration, and reliance on a money economy can undermine 
reciprocal institutions (Cancian, 1994; Cohen, 2010; Dow, 2009).Yet, cooperation 
and reciprocity still take place in communities like Zinacantan (Cancian, 1994) and 
Santa Ana (Cohen, 2010) where these phenomena occur. New patterns of 
cooperation and reciprocity still have the same functions, but occur in new social 
settings (Cohen, 2010).  
Food redistribution is key in solving the most urgent needs of the food 
insecure as it addresses inequitable distribution of food. However, there exist 
contradictory views regarding the short and long term consequences of food 
redistribution policies. I focus on formal safety nets. Formal social safety nets, an 
important component of social protection, refer to cash or in-kind transfer programs 
that seek to reduce poverty and vulnerability by redistributing wealth and protecting 
households against income shocks. Food safety nets are a subset of social safety 
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nets, and aim to ensure a minimum amount of food consumption and to protect 
households against shocks to food consumption (FAO, 2006). Food aid, in turn, is 
one of many food safety nets.  
Vulnerable populations 
 
Different studies have identified a number of subgroups that are particularly 
vulnerable to food insecurity due to impaired physical access (from disability, lack of 
transportation, and remoteness) or economic access (poverty or low socioeconomic 
access) to supplies of healthy food (Palermo, Walker, Hill, & McDonald, 2008). For 
instance, worldwide geographically marginalized populations tend to pay higher 
prices for food (FAO, 2013) which makes them more likely to experience hunger or 
starvation. Poor people tend to be the most vulnerable since they tend to be those at 
risk of experiencing lack of access to food due to entitlement failures. In addition, 
studies of food access have brought attention to uneven intra-household food 
distribution (Barrett, 2010). Even within vulnerable households there tend to be 
individuals (usually women) that are less likely to eat appropriate amounts of food or 
eat foods that have less nutritional value (ELCSA, 2012).  
In recent years, knowing who is vulnerable has not been enough, it has been 
recognized that it is essential to identify the individuals, households or the 
communities who are more at risk of suffering hunger in the future and that analyses 
of vulnerability should stop focusing on poverty (Turner et al., 2003). In other words, 
there has been increasing awareness that the analysis of food insecurity should be 
carried out in a dynamic context (Scaramozzino, 2006) that considers changes in 
social and institutional relations that are likely to affect food access and distribution. 
This dissertation contributes to the understanding of vulnerabilities by identifying if 
participation in specific non-market mechanisms in these four study communities is 
linked to food security. 
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CHAPTER 3 
RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODS 
In this section I explain the sampling strategy and the rapid assessment multi-sited 
ethnography research design used in the study. The methods included free lists, 
semi-structured interviews and participant observation. In addition I used and an 
EBFSS (experienced based food security surveys) and anthropometric measurements 
as data sources. Both qualitative and quantitative methodologies were used in a 
comprehensive approach to analyze the relationship between institutions and food 
security.  
Once in the field the research proceeded in two phases. The first phase 
consisted in recruitment, training, and selection of three field assistants/ translators, 
requesting permission in the villages, and data compilation. The first phase took 
place in San Cristobal de las Casas in December 2013 and January 2014 and laid the 
groundwork for the second phase (February to April 2014). During the second phase 
an ethnographic study on the intra- and inter-community institutional landscape of 
four villages was conducted using a multi-sited ethnography approach.  
Rapid Assessment Multi-sited Ethnography 
Ethnographic data collection took place simultaneously in four different communities 
of Los Altos, Chiapas. Both the research topic and the region where fieldwork took 
place are complex. A multi-sited ethnography is that in which data is collected in 
different locations at the same time to address complex objects of study (Marcus, 
1995).Its main advantage is the increased number of observations and the 
comparability of the results. On the other hand, the main concern is attenuating the 
power of fieldwork. This concern is based on the idea that ethnographers should be 
culturally proficient and knowledgeable in the community that they are working in. 
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There is a presumption that attaining such proficiency becomes difficult or impossible 
if researchers spend time in several communities instead of one during fieldwork. 
This difficulty was overcame by having a research team (See Appendix A on team 
recruitment, selection, training, and rigor and Appendix B to see the training 
manual) where individual team members focus on specific communities. Thus, the 
team was able to have sufficient understanding about each field site while being able 
to gather enough qualitative data (Marcus, 1995; Rogers-Dillon, 2005; Woods, 
Boyle, Jeffrey, & Troman, 2000). 
Sampling 
 Each one of the four communities was treated as a separate study area, thus all the 
sampling described here is at the community level.  
Free lists. An initial purposive convenience sample of 20 individuals was 
recruited for the free list protocol in each community. The sample size was large 
enough that it allowed us to produce valid and reliable data about a specific cultural 
domain (Bernard, 2011) allowing us to come up with a comprehensive list of all the 
meso-level institutional arrangements in each community and their micro-region. To 
ensure a diversity of age and gender in the sample, the target recruits were 5 
women >35 years old, 5 women <35 years old, 5 men >35 years old, and 5 men 
<35 years old. The 35 years of age cut off was chosen after asking participants in 
the pilot study about who they considered “old” or “experts” on specific institutions, 
and validating their selections with the research team members that have local 
knowledge of the area. In addition, men occupying top positions in local community 
institutions, such as churches or comites, are usually more than 35 years old. 
Additional criteria for participant eligibility were that subjects had to be older than 18 
years of age, and were community members.  
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A total of 135 free lists were conducted in the four communities (Mesbilja 
n=26, Pajaltón n=44, Cañada Grande n=27, and Balun Canal n=38). In each 
community the team first targeted the initial sample to see if any of the age by 
gender groups was more knowledgeable than the others. When it was determined 
that a group was more knowledgeable, more free lists were done with members of 
that gender and age group until saturation was reached. Saturation in this study is 
understood as the point in data collection when no new or relevant information 
emerges (Saumure & Given, 2008). The use of free listing allowed the team to 
acquire specific information quickly and effectively. 
Various strategies were used to recruit participants for the free lists. Most of 
the participants were interviewed at their home, and team members reached them 
while doing community walks. In the beginning, almost anyone who was contacted, 
who fell under the sampling categories, and was willing to participate could do so 
since there were slots available for each category; but as the study progressed the 
team started to target specific categories to fulfill our quota of 20. On some 
occasions when the team members reached houses and asked for specific categories 
(i.e. women over 35) the person asked would recommend someone else that fell 
under that category, converting it into a snowball sample. Once saturation was 
reached in all categories, saliency analysis was performed to identify the most 
prominent institutions in each community as well as key informants.  
Interviews. Once the inter-community institutions and key informants for 
each kind of institution were identified, the team started to collect data on specific 
institutions using semi-structured interviews. The informant with the most 
knowledge on an institution was used as a seed for snowball sampling. Another seed 
was started with the second most knowledgeable informant if no information or 
saturation had not been reached on an institution through the initial seed. Seeds 
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were started until informant saturation was achieved or data on all the salient 
institutions had been collected. The final number of interviews performed in each 
community varied depending on the number of seeds, how fast saturation was 
reached, and the number of institutions that were present in each community (n=51 
Balun Canal, n=55 Cañada Grande, n=72 in Pajaltón, and n=57 Mesbilja).  
Ethnography of Institutional Arrangements.  
Free lists. Participants were asked to respond to three free list questions: 1) 
Tell me all the ways in which anyone can acquire food in this community without 
buying it; 2) Tell me all the reasons why someone can give you food; and 3) Tell me 
if ever in your life you have exchanged food with someone from another community, 
and if so, list the communities.  
Participants were probed using redundant questioning and no specific cueing 
to elicit more information. Doing free lists in Tseltal with illiterate people proved 
difficult, as one of the most common probing techniques is alphabetical probing. The 
research team was instructed to do alphabetical probing with literate subjects as 
they were used successfully during the pilot study. However, alphabetical probing 
was dropped as a probing technique after the first day of data collection as it proved 
to be problematic due to differences in the Tseltal and Spanish alphabets and the low 
number of literate participants.  
Despite the probing, some participants only answered one or two of the free 
lists. Additionally, samples size varied from community to community depending on 
how fast saturation was reached. However this is not problematic since only a small 
sample of informants (10-15) are needed to produce valid and reliable data about a 
specific cultural domain (Bernard, 2011). Data analysis took sample differences into 
account by adjusting frequency and saliency calculations to represent the total 
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number of respondents in each free list rather than in the whole protocol. Frequency 
and saliency were calculated using the following formulas:  
Freq= F/N   S=(F/N)[(L-mP)/(L-1)] 
in which relative Frequency (Freq) results from dividing the frequency of 
mention of an item in a specific community (F) by the number of respondents in each 
list in a specific community (N). Saliency (S) is calculated by multiplying frequency 
with the result of the second factor (L-mP)/(L-1)]. The second factor results from the 
mean length of a list (L) minus the mean position (mP) in which the term is named 
in that list, divided by the mean length of the individual lists (L) minus 1 (Sutrop, 
2000). 
Participant observation. The bulk of the data obtained in the field came 
from participant observation and interview transcripts. Since this study used a rapid 
assessment approach, team members were instructed (and monitored) so that notes 
referred to transcriptions by informant code and that notes and transcriptions did not 
repeat information. Accuracy of notes and transcriptions was double checked by 
myself and one other team member by asking about X researcher’s week, 
contrasting it with their interview log, community interviewee list, and the notes. 
This step ensured that important or relevant findings and information were contained 
in one document.  
Participant observations were used to generate adequate rapport, develop 
experiential knowledge, and to contextualize data from the interviews (Spradley, 
1980). This method was used with field informants, as well as with the host families 
and at public events (i.e. asambleas, comite reunions). Participant observation 
mainly took place in the house of the interviewees or in public spaces like the school 
or church. Comments and social interaction that alluded to food reciprocity and 
redistribution were recorded in the field notes. Field notes are the foundation of 
  24 
ethnographic work, making observations usable and allowing researchers to make 
them public. Proper and accurate recording of field data are necessary for theory 
building (Schensul & LeCompte, 2013). 
Writing field notes is a complicated task. Since team members had some 
previous knowledge on how to write field notes, they were instructed on how to 
transcribe their notes to standardize them. Standardizing field notes reduced data 
preparation time; allowing data analysis to start faster. Researchers were provided 
with a laptop or an internet coffee allowance so that they could do their 
transcriptions in the field when possible. However, due to the high amounts of data 
collected, they also spent some days in San Cristobal transcribing.  
Interviews. After Cultural Consensus Analysis to check for saliency was 
performed, the team realized that not all the types of inter-community reciprocal 
institutions were present in each community. At one of our meetings we prepared a 
list of interview protocols that were necessary to capture the reciprocal and 
redistributive institutions. Then we elaborated protocols for each kind of interview. 
Since each community in the study is different from the other and has slight dialect 
differences, each protocol was a guideline that contained questions to ask and the 
information each question was going after. Interviews were performed at the 
researcher’s discretion. In addition, informal interviews were used by the researchers 
to enrich their field notes, build rapport in the communities, and explore related 
topics. Interviews were performed until saturation was reached. At least two 
interviews on institutions that did not appeared in the cultural consensus analysis 
were done in each community.  
The semi-structured interviews focused on the practical functioning of 
institutional arrangements. A major focus was placed on rules in use, rules in form, 
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sanctions, and monitoring. Interviewees were asked about the members of each 
institution and its functions. This strategy was used to collect information to inform 
the authority and social capital scales. 
Table 2.  
Data collection 
Instrument Balun Canal Cañada Grande Pajaltón Mesbilja 
No of participants 42 42 59 51 
Free lists 38 27 44 26 
Exchange interview 4 8 7 7 
Comite interview 10 5 7 9 
Basketball interview 6 4 6 2 
Religious exchange 
interview 
4 6 4 10 
End of class 
interview 
8 5 4 2 
 
Additionally, I conducted qualitative analysis on the transcripts of 99 semi-
structured interviews (Mesbilja n=28, Pajaltón n=24, Cañada Grande n=23, and 
Balun Canal n=24) to inform how reciprocal and redistributive exchanges function 
and take place within and across communities and the current state of the 
communities’ governance systems. Interviews were coded using grounded theory. 
That information was used to elaborate two scales on governance (civic authority 
scale and traditional authority scale) that represent the spectrum of governance 
systems found in the communities and four scales on exchange strategies (inter and 
intra-community reciprocity, inter- and intra-community redistribution) that 
encompass the diversity of exchange strategies reported. Each scale was tested for 
internal consistency and reliability for the sample using Cronbach’s Alpha test. Table 
2 contains a list of the interviews that were performed by type and community. Aside 
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from the free lists all the other types of interviews refer to a type of institution that 
was identified through the free lists. 
Exchange interviews were used to collect information on inter-household 
exchanges of food stuffs that occur among residents in different communities. Such 
exchanges can occur between family members or between opportunistic strangers. 
Comite interview refers to the interviews that we did with the local comite or local 
authorities regarding the specifics of the organization in the community. These 
interviews also included information on community membership and affiliation, 
institutions, sanctioning, monitoring, and history. In addition, the team conducted 
interviews regarding the basketball tournaments and the rise of basketball as a new 
form of cooperation.  
In some of the communities it became apparent early on that religious 
institutions played a large role on inter-community reciprocity. These interviews were 
framed to understand how far these inter-community links extend, the nature, and 
the products exchanged. One of the biggest celebrations where food is exchanged in 
the region is the clausura or end of classes. We interviewed teachers, organizing 
authorities and parents about how they work, who is invited and the specifics of 
feasting in this celebration.  
Food Security 
Data from the National Health and Nutrition Survey (ENSANUT) 2012 was used to 
calculate the degree of household and community food security. This study uses: 1) 
ELCSA (Latin American and Caribbean Food Security Scale); 2) reliance on food 
redistribution; 3) Z score (Weight/Height) of infants, children, and teenagers and 
BMI for adults; and 4) Z score (Height/Age) of infants, children, and teenagers. 
These are reliable measurements of food security that have been validated in other 
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countries. By combining food experience scales as well as anthropometric 
measurements, the study has a strong understanding of the food security status of 
each community.  
Data collection for ENSANUT in Tenejapa and Oxchuc was done during 
February and March of 2012. There were 1712 households sampled in each state. 
Sampling was done using AGEBs (Geographic and Statistical Basic Areas) as the 
primary units for sampling. Stratified sampling was done using two strata: urban 
level and marginalization. The sample has a 95% validity.  
Anthropometric measurements. The most common measurement of food 
utilization is growth in children and body mass in adults. Despite the widespread use 
of these measurements to denote food insecurity and malnutrition their accuracy is 
contested. Academics acknowledge that these measures can be problematic since 
the rates of nutrition absorption and growth of an individual can be affected by 
external variables. Additionally, there is a debate regarding the relationship of food 
security and malnutrition. One view argues that food security and nutrition are 
synonymous, while another view argues that nutrition is independent of food security 
(Maxwell and Smith, 1992). Household food security is necessary but not sufficient 
for adequate nutrition. In that same way nutrition is necessary, but not sufficient for 
adequate growth. 
Body Mass Index (BMI) (weight in kg/(height in meters)2) and Body Mass 
Index for age are other anthropometric measurements that help to indicate 
undernourishment or obesity in adults and teenagers respectively. The use of these 
measurements is limited by their high cost and the distrust that they might cause in 
the field. Recently the use of Z scores, the deviation of an individual’s value from the 
median value of a reference population, divided by the standard deviation of the 
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reference population, has also been used in adults as a reliable tool to assess under 
nutrition and obesity (de Onis, Blössner, & World Health Organization, 1997).  
Growth in children is measured using two common indicators 1) weight/height 
and 2) height/age. The score of this measurements is compared against the World 
Health Organization (WHO) child growth standards collected through the Multicentre 
Growth Reference Study to identify abnormal growth patterns due to malnutrition in 
infants and children. The Z scores (standard deviation scores) presented by the WHO 
take into account gender differences as well as feeding method (formula or breast 
milk) for infants. They are a reliable way to indicate if a child is under nourished or 
obese, but are unable to identify the sources of the problem. For population based 
assessment the Z-score is widely recognized as the best system for analysis and 
presentation of anthropometric data because of its advantages compared to the 
other methods (de Onis et al., 1997). For that reason, Z scores for weight/height 
and height/age in children and adults collected through the National Nutrition and 
Health Survey (ENSANUT) (Encuesta Nacional de Nutricion y Salud) will be used as a 
proxy for food security.  
Latin American and Caribbean Food Security Scale (ELCSA). ELCSA is 
an experience-based food security scale (EBFSS) that directly measures food security 
by allowing individuals to express their perception of the food security situation in 
their households (Pérez-Escamilla, Melgar-Quiñonez, Nord, Álvarez, & Segall-Correa, 
2007; Pérez-Escamilla & Segall-Corrêa, 2008; Pérez-Escamilla, 2012).  
ELCSA was built using the US Household Food Security Supplement Module 
(HFSSM), the Brazilian Food Insecurity Scale (EBIA), the Lorenzana Scale validated 
and applied in Colombia, and the USAID Household Food Insecurity Access Scale, 
(HFIAS) as point of references (ELCSA, 2012).  
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The questions that comprise the ELCSA refer to situations that people face 
during a time period in households, related to the quantity and quality of food 
available and the strategies respondents use in an attempt to alleviate food 
shortages. In addition, the instrument also collects data on the experience of hunger 
in people by age group (under 18 and over 18). ELCSA collects data on the 
perception of food security and objective measurements of food security. For 
instance, the first question records perception by asking about "the concern of food 
running out at home". While the remaining in the instrument collect data about self-
reported objective situations that household members experience, such as reducing 
the amount of food served, skipping some of the meals, the presence of hunger in 
any household member, and the delay of meals due to lack of money or other 
resources (ELCSA, 2012).  
When a household suffers from mild food insecurity there is anxiety and its 
members are worried about their food supply. Moderate food insecurity occurs in 
households that have made adjustments to their budget that affect the quality of the 
diet and adults limit the amount and quality of their food intake. Lastly, when food 
insecurity is severe the quantity and quality of the children´s food supply is affected. 
  The scale is composed of 15 questions that can be answered as yes or no 
(see Appendix D for a complete list of the questions). The scale makes differences 
between households where children are present and where they are not. This has its 
foundation in the idea that households members try to protect children from 
experiencing food insecurity (Segall-Correa et al. 2007). In households with children 
under eighteen six extra questions (Q9 to Q15) are asked. These questions relate to 
conditions affecting children under 18 at home. Therefore a household without 
children answers 8 questions (Q1 to Q8) while a household with children answers 15 
questions (Q1 to Q15). Each question collects data about a different situation. Thus, 
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each question is intended to capture specific information related to the theoretical 
construct that supports ELCSA. Questions can only be answered “YES”, “NO” or 
“DOES NOT KNOW/DID NOT ANSWER”(ELCSA, 2012). 
A household can be classified as being Food Secure, or having mild moderate 
or severe food insecurity based on the number of “YES” responses given. For 
example, a household without children would be considered food secure if all the 
questions were answered “NO”, mildly food insecure if 1-3 answers were given “YES” 
as a response, moderately food insecure if 4-6 answers were “YES” and severely 
food insecure if more than 7 answers were “YES”. Meanwhile, a household with 
children would be considered food secure if all the questions were answered “No”, 
mildly food insecure if 1-5 answers were given “YES” as a response, moderately food 
insecure if 6-10 answers were “YES” and severely food insecure if more than 11 
answers were “YES” (ELCSA, 2012). 
ELCSA is an instrument that has been validated in Mexico and in other 
countries of the region and that provides reliable information on objective and 
subjective measures of the food security status of households and whose data can be 
analyzed at different levels. For that reason I will use the results of the 2012 ELCSA 
as one of the proxies for the food security variable.  
Community attributes 
Specific population data for each community was retrieved from the INEGI (National 
Institute of Statistics and Geography) 2010 Census. These data were used to 
complement community descriptions and to inform our understanding of certain 
community attributes such as religion and migration.  
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Ethical Considerations 
Human subjects’ protection focuses on making sure that the people that are part or 
involved directly or indirectly in the study or are not harmed as a consequence of the 
study. All consent forms, questionnaires, interview guides, and recruitment materials 
used in this study were translated and back-translated between English, Spanish, 
and Tseltal and were approved by the Institutional Review Board of Arizona State 
University. All the questionnaires and instruments used in this study can be found in 
Appendix C.  
Informed consensus was granted orally in Tseltal or Spanish depending on the 
subject. A copy of the consent form in the mother language of the subject was given 
to each participant. The form was read to each person before consent was granted.  
Compensation for participation was given either at the community level or at 
the personal level depending on what the community authorities decided when they 
granted the team permission to do the study. Participants in most of the 
communities (3/4) were compensated individually, while one community opted to be 
compensated at the community level. In all of the communities, the community 
leaders and I negotiated how to compensate. In the three communities were 
compensation was given to each participant the team gave a kilogram of rice. 
Meanwhile in Pajaltón,the community that was compensated at the community level, 
I paid twice for 6 boxes of ½ a liter of Coca-cola for each man in the general 
assembly.  
Additionally, each household that hosted a team member was compensated 
each week with a substantial amount of groceries. At the end of the fieldwork I also 
made a gift to each one of the host houses that consisted of chicken for the entire 
family and a gift for the household (i.e. blanket, basketball). I decided to 
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compensate with food to the participants despite that this is a food security research 
because it did not alter the data that we were collecting as the team did not collect 
data on food security; community leaders specifically asked for food to compensate 
their community members; and since food access is limited in all the communities I 
wanted to ensure that the researchers will not go hungry.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1. Picture of a week’s grocery supply given to a host family. 
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CHAPTER 4 
RESEARCH SETTING  
This study took place in Los Altos, a geographic, sociocultural, historical, and 
administrative region located in the southernmost state of Mexico: Chiapas. The 
region is of particular interest due to the different degrees of food insecurity present 
among its communities (villages) and the recent changes in the conformation of its 
communities and their institutions. In Mexico, indigenous and rural populations 
experience food insecurity at higher rates than the rest of the population. The degree 
of food insecurity experienced by Los Altos residents varies from extremely food 
insecure to food insecure (CONEVAL, 2012). Los Altos residents have suffered from 
food insecurity and government neglect since the Spanish conquest, allowing local, 
collective responses to emerge. This history makes this an ideal location to study the 
effects that inter-community reciprocal and redistributive institutions have on food 
security.  
 In this chapter I describe the research setting, including historical 
background, and the most recent demographic information on the region and the 
four study communities. This chapter also includes specifics on the logistics of 
conducting this multi-sited ethnography.  
Research Site Description 
The Chiapanecan government recognizes the highlands as a socioeconomic region 
called “altos Tsotsil-Tseltal” that is formed by 17 municipalities: Aldama, 
Amatenango del Valle, Chalchihuitán, Chamula, Chanal, Chenalhó, Huixtán, 
Larrainzar, Mitontic, Oxchuc, Pantelhó, San Cristobal de las Casas, San Juan Cancuc, 
Santiago el Pinar, Tenejapa, Teopisca and Zinacantán (CEIEG, 2012). Culturally, the 
region is subdivided in Tsotsil and Tseltal. Spanish is the main language spoken in 
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San Cristobal, however in all of the rural municipalities the main language spoken is 
either Tsotsil or Tseltal. In fact, Tsotsil is the lingua franca in the region and is 
spoken amongst many indigenous peoples of other ethnicities (i.e Lacandones, 
Tseltales, Choles) and some ladinos. 
Brief history of Los Altos, Chiapas and its Tseltal inhabitants. The 
Chiapanecan highlands constitute a portion of the Central American Highlands that 
run from the Tehuantepec Isthmus in Mexico to the lowlands of Nicaragua 
(Encyclopedia Britannica, 2013). The highlands of Chiapas comprise a limestone 
mass with extrusive volcanic rocks at the highest peaks, extending for over 11 000 
km2, 160 km along a northwest–southeast axis, and 70 km at its widest (Mullerried, 
1957 cited by Ochoa-Gaona & González-Espinosa, 2000). The height of the relief 
varies from 300 meters to 2,898 m above the sea level (CEIEG, 2013) with a land 
area of 3,711.90 km2. The higher elevations are covered by extensive pine forests, 
while oak and liquidambar stands are found at lower elevations (Encyclopedia 
Britannica, 2013). 
The seasons comprise a hot dry season (March through May) and a rainy 
summer (May through September). The winter (October through February) has 
alternating dry and damp spells. The seasonal pattern of rain is ideal for the 
cultivation of maize and beans, which are the staple food for most indigenous 
peoples. However, at high elevations in tierra fria, production only reaches 
subsistence levels. On the flanks of the highlands between an altitude of 1,220 and 
1,670 m. coffee can be produced. Coffee constitutes a major crop and unlike beans 
and maize it is sold for cash (Menegoni, 1990). Other cash crops are also produced 
for local consumption and commerce within the region such as cabbage in Chamula 
or Mandarin oranges in Tenejapa, but their importance is negligible compared with 
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coffee. Cattle and sheep are other commercial enterprises undertaken in some of the 
municipalities (Brown, 1993; Menegoni, 1990). 
 
Figure 2. Map of Los Altos region highlighting the field site. 
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Economic activity in Los Altos is constrained by a high degree of 
marginalization. The region's total population is 601,190 distributed in 1,182 villages 
of which only two have more than 15,000 inhabitants (CEIEG, 2011). According to 
CONEVAL (2012) 74.7% of the population lives in poverty. The vast majority of 
people live in communities with less than 2,500 inhabitants. In fact, there are more 
than 900 communities with fewer than 500 inhabitants (CEIEG, 2011). The largest 
population center is San Cristobal de las Casas with 158,000 inhabitants. This city is 
the economic and political center of the region (Lewis, 2008). San Cristobal or 'Jovel' 
(in Tsotsil) was founded in 1528 as “Ciudad Real” by Spanish conquerors as the 
capital of the province and the headquarters of Hispanic control in the highlands. In 
colonial times the Chiapanecan region was a marginal territory due to its lack of 
precious metals and the long distance to the main commerce routes or the sea; 
making it an unattractive region for Spanish conquerors to settle in (Viqueira, 1995). 
In Los Altos the social order was composed of extreme castes; the majority of the 
inhabitants were impoverished Indians while the few Spanish concentrated the social 
and economic power (Viqueira, 1995). 
Ethnic segregation was and still is at the core of the economic system. Since 
colonial times and until recently, the Los Altos indigenous population has provided a 
steady flow of labor to other regions and to the non-indigenous living within the 
region. As described by Viqueira (1995), San Cristobal was a “parasitic city that used 
its political, administrative, and religious powers to strip the Indians of the fruits of 
their labors (p. 109).” The city was key in establishing an exploitation system in the 
region. At the center of the exploitation system are long term ethnic divisions where 
mestizos (persons of Hispanic culture from outside of Los Altos), ladinos (persons of 
Hispanic culture from within Los Altos, historically San Cristobal) and indigenas 
(persons of indigenous descent, most of them Tsotsiles or Tseltales) have a 
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place(Brown, 1993; Fabrega & Manning, 1973; Menegoni, 1990; Whitmeyer, 1997). 
Brown (1993) talks extensively about the inequalities that the system has created for 
indigenous peoples and how, despite the efforts of the Mexican government, those 
inequalities still persist.  
Starting in the 1940s the National Indigenist Institute (INI) (Instituto 
Nacional Indigenista) ran a program aimed at “integrating” the indigenous people 
into the modern world. The public policy was known as indigenismo. Acculturation 
took place through the training of promotores -indigenous instructors- that taught 
Spanish, hygiene, and cultural norms to indigenous communities. Another important 
component of the program was to introduce much needed infrastructure like roads, 
schools, health clinics, and commerce to the communities since, as pointed out by 
Lewis (2008), during the 1950s modern infrastructure was virtually nonexistent 
outside of San Cristobal. Despite many difficulties and the use of controversial 
approaches, the program created a rudimentary highway system in which some of 
the communities are connected by all-weather roads, while most have access 
through dirt roads that are unusable during the rainy season or no road at all 
(Brown, 1993; CEIEG, 2013). As a consequence, bringing products (food and non-
food) to the communities can be a difficult task. Producers (usually indigenous) also 
face hardships when trying to commercialize their produce, as described by Brown 
(1993): it is a usual practice for intermediaries known as coyotes (usually ladinos) to 
charge producers a high fee to transport their harvest from their community to the 
cabecera municipal (seat of the municipality) or San Cristobal to be sold. For this 
same reason, products sold directly in the communities tend to be more expensive 
than when sold in San Cristobal. This situation, along the collapse of INMECAF 
(Mexican Coffee Institute) and the politics of zapatismo, have resulted in some 
indigenous coffee producing communities self-organizing into coffee cooperatives; 
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offering an alternative way for independent indigenous producers to commercialize 
their product (Brown, 1993).  
 As described above, there is a low level of commercial infrastructure in the 
state, particularly in Los Altos (Lopez Arévalo, 2007). During the 18th century and 
the first half of the 19th century it was common practice to ensure a constant supply 
of Indian workers in the coffee plantations through the use of engancho, a 
recruitment system in which plantation agents would hook (enganchar) indigenous 
peasants to work by giving them a cash advance for three or four months of their 
work (Menegoni, 1990). The engancho then allowed plantation owners to set-up 
stores where the cash advance could be used. Thus, commerce was used as an 
instrument of oppression against Indians by inserting them in the cash economy. 
When the indigenismo policy was underway, one of its objectives was to increase the 
number of commercial outlets in the region; especially in the indigenous 
communities where the only commerce was owned by ladinos. The INI did so by 
establishing tiendas CONASUPO (National Company of Popular Subsistence). Tiendas 
CONASUPO gave community residents an alternative by offering a wide variety of 
products at prices that were set by the federal government (Yunez–Naude, 2003). 
While CONASUPO stores increased food availability in the communities, they also 
forced rural residents to use cash, and could have played a role in the abandonment 
of non-cash strategies. Today, the importance of tiendas CONASUPO (now DICONSA) 
has diminished due to a loss in government funding and an increasing amount of 
small commerce (Yunez–Naude, 2003). However, last year the federal government 
started a new anti-hunger campaign called National Crusade against Hunger 
(Cruzada Nacional contra el Hambre), in which DICONSA stores play a key role.  
Most of the new commerce in the rural communities in Los Altos is owned by 
indigenous people (Brown, 1993), but these stores carry a limited supply, offer 
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mainly non-perishable goods, and all of them carry Coca-Cola or Pepsi. Thus, the 
amount of food and non-food products found is still limited and most of the people 
that live in the communities acquire their supplies during market days at their 
cabecera municipal. On market days vendors from communities and neighboring 
municipalities set up stands in the center of the town and sell grains, produce, 
manufactured items, and prepared food. Los Altos’ late integration into the general 
cash economy has also been marked by a strong opposition against capitalism by the 
Zapatista Army of National Liberation (EZLN) (Ejercito Zapatista de Liberación 
Nacional) and the communities that support it (Guerrero, 2002). The EZLN’s declared 
war against corporate incursions in Chiapas in 1994 and the idea of civil resistance 
amongst indigenous people in the region and other supporters has altered how 
indigenous communities perceive themselves and how governance in the region 
takes place. Although such opposition to trade liberalizations is not prevalent in all 
the communities there is a sense of autonomy and indigenous pride in most of the 
region that is related to the prevalent marginalization of the region (Skeffington, 
Morales, & Ferguson, 2006). 
Rus (2010) hypothesizes that changes to the labor system in Los Altos -such 
as engancho – and an increase in population -partially due to immigrants from 
Central America- have posed problems to the communities by making it difficult for 
everyone to have a living. As a result, many communities have been “shaking out”: 
getting down to a more reasonable population density. Some of the changes in the 
social composition have been a widespread expulsion of inhabitants from the 
“traditional communities” to the new neighborhoods – colonias - of San Cristobal. 
One of the most common reasons for such expulsions has been conversion to 
Protestantism. Traditionally inhabitants of the communities were Catholic, but since 
the 1950s there has been a change to Protestantism. In many communities less than 
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half of the community’s population identifies as Catholic. In other communities like 
Chamula religious change has been rejected, and converts are expelled from the 
community. There have also been expulsions due to political reasons (Rus III, 2010). 
Such expulsions have altered traditional patterns of reciprocity and governance that 
in some cases included food.  
Historically, religious institutions such as the cofradias and mayordomias 
(Catholic institutions that help to organize religious festivities) have played an 
important role in the region among both indigenous and non-indigenous inhabitants. 
Palomo Infante (2002) points out how, since their beginnings, such institutions have 
had as their main characteristics fraternity, solidarity, and mutual help among their 
members. Additionally, both cofradias and mayordomias have the specific function to 
assist with the preparations of the festivities, which include feasting. The importance 
of cofradias has decreased and by the XX century mayordomias had taken over 
(Palomo Infante, 2002).As expressed by Urbalejo Guerra (2003), mayordomias are a 
fundamental part of the political and religious system of Tsotsil and Tseltal 
communities. Traditionally, all adult (male) members of the communities had to 
participate in the mayordomia system (sistema de cargos) at least for one year in 
which they would be in charge of organizing and paying for religious festivities. 
Mayordomias require a substantial expenditure of economic resources. They help to 
distribute resources among community members, making communities more 
homogeneous (Urbalejo Guerra, 2003). One of the main resources that is reallocated 
during festivities is food, which travels from the hands of the families that have 
access to resources at that moment to the hands of those who do not (Obregón 
Rodríguez, 2003). Since the mayordomia system is based on Catholic Saints, recent 
conversions to Protestantism have altered the system making it loose its importance 
(Urbalejo Guerra, 2003). 
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INI policies also marked the beginning of a long history of “help” that the 
government has given to the communities to better their living conditions. In terms 
of nutrition, the region still receives resources to attack hunger and malnutrition 
through programs that run at the federal, state, and municipal level. In fact, there 
are at least eight programs that the government funds and several more that 
international non-governmental organizations and non-profits sponsor (DIF 
CHIAPAS, 2014). However, the cultural accuracy and effectiveness of these 
programs is contested(Angelucci, Attanasio, & Shaw, 2004; Behrman, Parker, & 
Todd, 2004; Farfán, Genoni, Rubalcava, Teruel, & Thomas, 2011; Fernald, Gertler, & 
Neufeld, 2008; Leroy et al., 2008; Ulrichs & Roelen, 2012) . 
OPORTUNIDADES is the principal anti-poverty program of the Mexican 
government. Its main objective is to reduce poverty in rural and urban communities 
by investing in human capital. OPORTUNIDADES provides cash transfers and food 
supplements to households conditional to regular school attendance and health clinic 
visits. OPORTUNIDADES provides services in 100,000 communities nationwide 
(OPORTUNIDADES, 2009). However, there are some communities in which the high 
level of geographic and social marginalization prevents their inhabitants from 
accessing healthcare. In those communities OPORTUNIDADES cannot be in place, 
since health clinic visits are mandatory, and as a consequence those inhabitants are 
covered by the Alimentary Support Program (PAL) (Programa de Apoyo Alimentario). 
PAL's target population represents .87% of the national population, but Chiapas 
contains 24.5% of PAL's target population, much of it concentrated in the highlands 
(SEDESOL, 2012b).  
Despite the efforts outlined above, malnourishment is still prevalent in all the 
municipalities that compose the highlands and between 50 and 68 percent of kids in 
the region suffer from it in some degree (R. Rojas, 2013).While food insecurity is 
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prevalent in all the municipalities that are part of the highlands, the level of food 
insecurity that affects each community differs greatly.  
Tseltales in Los Altos. While Tsotsil people are more predominant in Los 
Altos, Tseltal or Bats'il k'op (true language) is the second most spoken language 
after Spanish in the state of Chiapas. In 2010, almost 600,000 people spoke Tseltal 
as their first language. Tseltal speakers traditionally reside in the municipalities of 
Ocosingo, Altamirano, Amatenango del Valle, Tenejapa, Yajalon, Sitala, 
Socoltenango, Villa las Rosas, Chilon, Oxchuc, San Juan Cancuc, and Comitan. Due 
to migration, Tseltal speakers now also reside in San Cristobal de las Casas, 
Palenque, and Tuxtla Gutierrez (INEGI, 2010).  
Siverts (1969) explains that while all the “tribes” in the highlands are similar, 
there are several identifying characteristics that distinguish the inhabitants from one 
municipality from the inhabitants of another municipality. These characteristics are: 
traditional rights over a common territory, their own political-religious formal 
organization, a specific saint or tribal God, tribe endogamy, a productive 
specialization, a traditional suit, and a moral code and common etiquette.  
Tseltales from each municipality can be distinguished by non-indigenous 
people by their clothing and language. During colonial times the Catholic Church 
promoted municipal variation as a way to fragment and control the indigenous 
population. This policy aided in segregating and dividing groups that had been part 
of a señorio (kingdom) before the Spanish conquest. This might have helped each 
municipality to develop their own institutions to self-govern and combat collective 
action problems (González Esponda, 2013). Despite this, Tseltales have a shared 
history, and despite regional variations, the same language and Cosmo vision 
(Gómez Muñoz, 2004).  
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Tenejapa and Oxchuc are two of the three Tseltal municipalities in Los Altos. 
The other Tseltal municipality in the region is San Juan Cancuc. The three 
municipalities are contiguous and located in the north-east corner of the region, 
where they occupy roughly one fourth of the territory of Los Altos (see figure 3).  
Los Altos Tseltales have links with other Tseltales that live in other regions. 
Residents of Oxchuc have a long history of maintaining relationships with Tseltales 
from Ocosingo rather than San Cristobal partially because until recently they were 
part of the municipality of Ocosingo. Likewise, Tenejapa has strong relationships with 
San Juan Cancuc and San Cristobal probably due to its geographic location between 
both of these municipalities. 
Land tenure in Los Altos. There are three types of land tenure in the 
region: private property, ejidos, and communal use indigenous property.  
Communal lands in the region of Los Altos are constituted by individual 
smallholder plots worked by independent family units that can be bought and sold 
between community members known as comuneros. They constitute the basis of a 
traditional social organization based on kinship and governed by a politico-religious 
structure that is based in land tenure and community membership. These 
communities are known as parajes in the region. This name distinguishes them from 
newer communities based in the ejido system. All of the four study communities are 
parajes.  
In Chiapas, part of the commons became ejidos. Since then the dichotomy 
between communities and ejidos in indigenous regions has had huge implications for 
the application of development models and projects (López Meza, 1996). The ejido 
represents one of the ways in which the rural space is organized. While communal 
land escapes the formal governmental institutions and constitutes a type of space 
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where the traditional, informal territorial organization typical of indigenous areas 
takes place. Moreover, since the ejidos are the product of the promotion of the state, 
they are permeable to any government intervention. The government also 
determines the organizational procedures of the ejido.  
In Oxchuc, six agrarian cores were constituted after the agrarian reform: a) 
Santo Tomas, b) Guadalupe Bakja ', c) The Niz and Las Cabañas, d) San Ramon, e) 
Reforma Santa Teresa and f) El Retiro. The first two are communal use indigenous 
property, while the latter are under the ejido scheme (Gómez Santiz, 2011). 
The last type of property in Los Altos is private property. This kind of property 
is structured under ethnic divisions, meaning that communal properties and ejidos 
are indigenous landholdings while private property is ladino or foreigner owned. 
Private property in the region tends to be land of better quality than that owned by 
comuneros (López Meza, 1996). It is important to distinguish private property as a 
type of land tenure from the small parcel land holdings that Indians sell, buy, and 
trade under the configurations of communal property and ejidos. There are many 
differences between these kinds of land tenure. For example, among indigenous 
landholders, changes in land tenure are not registered in the Public Property 
Registry, properties are not taxed, and any violation of the oral contracts is solved by 
the traditional community authorities (López Meza, 1996). Since 1994 federal 
protections on the communal aspect of ejidos were lifted by the federal government 
and ejido land could be sold in the market. However, most if not all ejido land in 
Tenejapa remains under the possession of indigenous people. Lopez Meza (1996) 
attributes the maintenance of indigenous ownership to the Zapatista fight for the 
land.  
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In addition, during the last 20 years there has been a strong process of re-
indianization, meaning that ladinos and mestizos have been pushed out of Los Altos 
either in a pacific or violent manner. This process has also significantly reduced the 
amount of private property in the region as communities re-appropriated the land 
after the non-indigenous left. Re-appropriation can be done by selling the land 
directly to indigenous people or after 1994 through the government. In Tenejapa 
there are co-properties, communal land holdings that were bought back from ladinos 
to be administered like communities, but have not yet reached the government 
protection of being traditional communities.  
The Communities  
While there are many units of social organization in Los Altos (ethnic group, 
lineage, family, etc.) communities are the unit at which religion and politics are self-
organized as well as the unit the state uses to organize their incursions into the 
region. In simple terms a community is a group of people living in the same place or 
having a particular characteristic in common. In Los Altos the word comunidad 
(community) is used to describe a group of people that reside in the same village, 
obey the same authorities and participate actively in the community decision 
process.  
All the communities that participated in the study have set geographical 
boundaries and only community members can reside within those boundaries 
(although land can be owned by other indigenous people that reside outside of the 
community). Community membership is a family affair since the social organization 
of the communities is based on the family structure. Community members and their 
family have rights and responsibilities in and to the community. Among the four 
communities studied, the two boundary rules used are compliance with local 
authorities and residence patterns. 
  46 
 This study was conducted in three communities of the municipality of 
Tenejapa and one community in the municipality of Oxchuc. I will proceed by 
introducing some of the geographic and demographic characteristics of each 
municipality followed by a general description of the communities that participated in 
the study. I will start by introducing the municipality of Tenejapa and the 
communities of Balun Canal, Cañada Grande and PAJALTON. Following these 
descriptions I will introduce the municipality of Oxchuc and the community of 
Mesbilja.  
Tenejapa. Tenejapa means “río calcáreo” (noisy river) in náhuatl. It is 
located in the limits of the Chiapanecan Central highlands and the Northern 
Mountains, which makes all its territory mountainous. Its geographic coordinates are 
16°49' N y 92°30' W. Tenejapa has an extension of 99.4 km2 (INAFED, 2014).  
 Before the arrival of the Spanish, Tseltal groups settled in the present 
territory of the municipality. During the second half of the sixteenth century, the 
Dominicans settled in the region and struggled to found a ceremonial center that 
would help them implement the structure of colonial organization. The Dominicans 
settled in the town and erected the church of San Alfonso. López Meza (1996) 
asserts that what is known as the “traditional organization” in Tenejapa is the result 
of the colonial imposition of a monotheist cosmovision against the polytheist Tseltal 
cosmovision, as well as the insertion of the “teología de la liberación” (Liberation 
Theology) during the 70’s, and the introduction of Protestantism. The latter 
processes have altered and degraded the so-called traditional organization. 
According to that tradition, each community has a Poxiletik (shaman), a Muk’ul 
kaviloetik (person that prays), Pas A’teletik (religious cargo system), and A’tel patan 
(political cargo system). In the following chapter I will explain in more detail how this 
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traditional organization is structured and what role it has in the reciprocal inter-
community relationships of each village.  
The territory in Tenejapa is controlled from the seat of municipality, where 
the traditional A’tel Patan and non-traditional authorities are located. The town of 
Tenejapa is the largest and most important village in the municipality. Since colonial 
times the town of Tenejapa functioned as a Catholic ceremonial center, whose 
importance has now been diminished due to religious conversion (Medina Hernández, 
1991).The material structure of the village reflects ladino and indigenous influences. 
Ladino households are permanent and follow a Spanish grid-like pattern, while 
indigenous houses are found in the periphery and are used as family property which 
family members could inhabit while they held the position of traditional authorities 
(López Meza, 1996; Medina Hernández, 1991). Today, few ladinos live in Tenejapa 
and the houses of the ladino families are now occupied by indigenous families. This is 
a consequence of re-indianization, the ongoing process of re-appropriation of the 
rural territories by indigenous people in Los Altos. 
The rest of the population centers in the municipality can be classified as 
parajes or ejidos. Paraje is the name given to the communities that follow the 
traditional organization system outlined before. While ejidos are communally owned 
land used for agricultural production created by the Federal government during the 
first half of the XX th century by expropriating ranches owned by ladinos and 
foreigners.  
While my focus for this study is on the relationships among communities, it is 
crucial to understand what communities are and how are they organized. I will 
explain each communities’ institutions in greater detail in Chapter five, but for now it 
is necessary to understand that a community is a group of people linked by internal 
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relationships that reside in a territory that they control. Community members are 
usually linked by the same social and cultural traditions and through institutions that 
help them satisfy their individual and collective necessities (Medina Hernández, 
1991). 
Balun Canal, Tenejapa. Out of the four communities where we conducted 
research, Balun Canal was where we had the most difficulties. Despite the fact that it 
is the most connected community through transport of all, and that a lot of people 
are bilingual, we had several misunderstandings with the authorities regarding our 
role in the community.  
 
Figure 3. Picture of Balun Canal.  
This community is located 22 km east of San Cristobal de Las Casas, at 16 46’ 
49’’ north and 92 32’ 17’’ west. It is 2245 m asl (INEGI, 2010). It has a temperate 
sub humid climate with temperatures around14-16 C with a rainy season during May 
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to September (Gómez, Castro, Junghans, Ruíz Montoya, & Villalobos, 2000) . The 
locals classify this set of geographical variables as cold weathered land or tierra fria. 
The village of Balun Canal has a total population of 420, of whom 87% speak 
an indigenous language. While Balun Canal has the largest prevalence of Tsetsal 
speakers in this study, it is also the community with the lowest rate of 
monolingualism (42.31%) (INEGI, 2010). Despite the high prevalence of bilinguism 
and the presence of a kindergarten, an elementary school, a middle school, and the 
frequent taxi trips connecting the village with Tenejapa where the high school is 
located, the average person has attended school for 3.79 years (the lowest average 
of the study communities) (INEGI, 2010). This means that, on average, an adult in 
this community has not finished fourth grade. This is important to keep in mind when 
I explain the relevance that the elementary 6th grade commencement celebration has 
for households and communities.  
While the team was conducting research in Balun Canal we rapidly noted the 
amount of Protestant and Evangelical temples in the community. Unsurprisingly, only 
16% of the community remains catholic, while 65% identified themselves as 
evangelical, protestants, or biblical during the 2010 census.  
As observed during fieldwork, fields are used for slash and burn agriculture, 
intensively for two years. Fields are prepared for sowing in late winter and early 
spring (February and March) and sowing is done before or at the beginning of the 
May rainy season. Maize and beans are the two most common crops, and corn is 
harvested during autumn. Other crops are planted throughout the year to 
supplement their food, like peas and different kinds of pumpkins. Most houses also 
have at least one free range chicken that is fed food scraps and scavenges on the 
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property. Cattle are not a common possession among indigenous people, but we saw 
at least three households that owned cows during our stay there.  
Men supplement household income by working outside the community as taxi 
drivers, construction workers, or seasonal workers at coffee plantations outside of 
Los Altos (Gómez et al., 2000).  
Cañada Grande, Tenejapa. Cañada Grande is known in the municipality for 
its proximity to Tenejapa. In the past it was also known for its high involvement in 
the traditional catholic festivities. It is located about 3 km north of Tenejapa, at 16 
49’ 05’’ north and 92 31’ 21’’ west (INEGI, 2010). The community is connected by an 
all-weather road from Tenejapa. There is no regular public transportation connecting 
these towns, but one can walk from Cañada to Tenejapa in about 25 minutes. 
Walking the other way usually takes a little bit longer since one has to gain 
elevation. The community sits at 2126 m asl, however households can be found on 
the top of the adjacent hills. The rainy season from May to September. This 
community is also considered tierra fria. 
According to the 2010 census there are 544 inhabitants in Cañada Grande, 
267 males and 277 women. All inhabitants identified themselves as living in an 
indigenous household or being indigenous, 82% of the population speak an 
indigenous language, and 53% of the population 5 years and older are monolingual 
in that language (INEGI, 2010).  
The average years spent in school is 5, one of the highest averages in the 
municipality (INEGI, 2010). Among the Tenejapan communities that participated in 
the study, this is the only one where we met males that had left their community to 
get a college degree instead of migrating as seasonal workers. Moreover, we met 
middle aged men that had accounting and education degrees.  
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Figure 4. Picture of Cañada Grande. The picture shows the new kindergarten 
(right) the old community buildings (left) and the roof of the new elementary school 
(top). 
In the past, Catholicism played an important part in the village identity. 
Today, roughly 50% of the population is Catholic and 20% of the population 
identified themselves as being Protestant or Evangelical (INEGI, 2010). In this 
community people also identified themselves as practicing the “old” religion, 
meaning that they practiced a combination of prehispanic beliefs and Catholicism.  
As a tierra fria community, Cañada Grande’s production is limited to corn, 
beans, stone fruits, certain types of squash, and peas. Cañada Grande has a history 
of migration to other states in Mexico, so rather than migrating to the coffee 
plantations 40-50 years ago, people from Cañada migrated to Mexico City or 
Guadalajara as construction workers, housekeepers, or merchants. 
  52 
Households in Cañada Grande have land within the limits of their community, 
and use slash and burn agriculture to produce corn and beans on steep hills with a 
two year rotation. People supplement their food by having chickens and pigs, and 
some households also have cows. We also talked to people that still hunt for small 
rodents and that gather herbs and other plants to eat.  
Pajaltón, Tenejapa. Out of the three communities in Tenejapa where data 
were collected for this study, Pajaltón is the most isolated. According to SEDESOL 
(2014), Pajaltón has a very high degree of marginalization. It is located on the top of 
a hill close to the border of the Tsotsil municipality of Chamula. Pajaltón and Cañada 
Grande are connected by a precarious, windy, dirt road that is practically impassable 
during the rainy season. Pajaltón is located at 16 50’ 04’’ north and 92 31’ 51’’ west 
at an altitude of 2299 m asl (INEGI, 2010). 
 
Figure 5. Picture of the main road that connects Pajaltón to Cañada Grande. 
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According to the 2010 census the total population of Pajaltón is 715 
inhabitants (344 males and 371 women (INEGI, 2010)). All community members 
identify themselves as indigenous, 85% of the population speaks an indigenous 
language, and 54% of the population 5 years and older are monolingual in that 
language (INEGI, 2010).  
Pajaltón has a kindergarten and an elementary school. All the teachers and 
instructors are from outside the community and, as in most rural villages in Mexico, 
they reside in the village only during the school week. Getting a hold of the 
professors that work in Pajaltón was extremely difficult as classes were rarely held 
during fieldwork despite the fact that classes were in session. The average adult in 
Pajaltón went to school for 4.23 years; in other words, the average is less than fifth 
grade (INEGI, 2010).  
Pajaltón´s Catholic population represents 43% of the community and 47% of 
inhabitants identify themselves as Protestant, Evangelicals or Biblical (INEGI, 2010). 
Among these religions the Iglesia de Dios (Church of God) is the most important in 
the community. It has a prime location, situated next to the road, and has more 
attendees than the other churches.  
 Pajaltón sits higher than any other community in this study. It is usually 
surrounded by a thick fog that allows the soil to be moist all year long. Walking 
around the community I observed apple, peach, and plum trees. However, the 
residents say that the fruit is too small to be sold and is usually eaten by them or 
their animals.  
 Pajaltón inhabitants also practice slash and burn agriculture. Their main 
staples are corn and two different varieties of beans (long and short stock). They 
harvest local kinds of squash like chilacayote in December, snow peas in April, and 
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other herbs throughout the year to supplement their diet and income. Most houses 
have chickens that roam freely in the household and very few have any other kind of 
domesticated animal used for food consumption. 
Oxchuc. Oxchuc means three knots in Tseltal. The municipality is located 
within the boundaries of the Central Highlands and the Northern Mountains with 
geographical coordinates of 16 ° 47 'N and 92 ° 21' W. Development in the 
municipality is favored by its location between the cities San Cristobal de Las Casas 
and Ocosingo, which are regional centers of economic dynamism; and its proximity 
to the Pan American highway. To the north of Oxchuc lie Ocosingo and San Juan 
Cancuc, to the east lie Ocosingo and Altamirano, while Chanal is located south of 
Oxchuc, and Huixtán and Tenejapa west of the municipality.  
The municipality has an area of 72.00 km² representing 1.9% of the surface 
of the Altos region and 0.1% of the state. Its altitude varies from 1000 to 2500 m 
asl, breaking the territory into warm and cold zones, which affects agricultural 
activities and socio-economic dynamics, presenting different challenges for regional 
development (INEGI, 2010). 
Oxchuc was an important ceremonial center. During the mid-sixteenth 
century Spanish missionaries responsible for the evangelization of the area gave the 
people the foundations of a colonial government. By the year of 1712 the town's 
inhabitants were actively involved in the Indian uprising; on June 19, 1778 the first 
internal territorial division in the province of Chiapas was made and in that division 
Oxchuc stayed under the governance of Ciudad Real (San Cristobal). The 1900 
Population Census listed Oxchuc as a municipality, however years later it descended 
to the status of municipal agency under the municipality of Ocosingo. In 1915 it was 
transferred to the municipality of Chilón and then in 1936 it regained the status of 
  55 
municipality and is classified as corresponding to the region of Los Altos. As a result, 
this region still shares strong links to the Palenque region where Chilón and Ocosingo 
are located (INAFED, 2003). Throughout all these changes ladinos and mestizos were 
at the top of the political hierarchy holding the political power.  
In the early fifties the mestizo dominion over the municipal institutions was 
terminated by the rise of indigenous political power. In the eighties and nineties, due 
to structural changes and reform of the municipal structures in the federal Mexican 
government, there was a great struggle for power in Oxchuc. Two distinct indigenous 
political forces (democratic and vanguardistas) fought for the power and ended up 
determining the political conditions that currently dominate the municipality 
(INAFED, 2003). 
Despite its location Oxchuc became connected with San Cristobal through an 
all-weather road in 1968. Today the trip between Oxchuc (seat of the municipality) 
and San Cristobal takes an hour and can be done by car, bus, or colectivo (shuttle 
vans). The seat of municipality is larger than Tenejapa and is constantly busy with 
people commuting from San Cristobal to Ocosingo  
Oxchuc has a population of 41,423 inhabitants, of which 20,755 inhabitants 
are men and 20,668 are women, with a population density of 575.31 inhabitants per 
km2. The population is distributed over 97 sites, of which only 11 sites have more 
than 1,000 inhabitants (CIBCEC, 2013). Oxchuc’s population is mainly indigenous, 
with 96.07% speaking Tseltal, and almost 50% being monolingual.  
Almost the entire surface of the municipality (99.2%) is used for agriculture 
(CIBCEC, 2013). The most common crops are milpas, coffee production, and 
horticulture in which vegetables are interspersed between coffee or corn.  
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Mesbilja, Oxchuc. Mesbilja means “water that sweeps”. The residents think 
that the name arose because during the rainy season the Mesbilja’ river that runs 
through the locality sweeps away everything within its reach. Weather in Mesbilja is 
diverse; in spring it is dry and semi-hot, in the summer months it is rainy with 
showers in the morning and at night, and in autumn and winter it's cold in the 
mornings and at night.  
Mesbilja is located on the bottom of a valley through which a small river 
flows. The town is connected to the San Cristobal-Palenque paved road by a dirt road 
that goes through the community of El Corralito. Mesbilja is located at 16 48´01’’ 
north and 92 14’ 47’’ west at an altitude of 1511 m asl (INEGI, 2010). 
According to the 2010 census the total population of Mesbilja is 1793 
inhabitants (893 males and 900 women) (INEGI, 2010). All community members 
identify themselves as indigenous, 86% of the population speaks an indigenous 
language, and 24% of the population 5 years and older are monolingual in that 
language (INEGI, 2010).  
Mesbilja has a kindergarten, an elementary school, an Agricultural junior high 
(Secundaria Agropecuaria) and a high school. The average adult in Mesbilja went to 
school for 5.9 years, which makes it the study community with the highest average 
of completed education (INEGI, 2010). The team also met several middle aged men 
that had college degrees mainly in education. 
Most of Mesbilja inhabitants practice evangelical Presbyterianism. In fact, 
83% of the population identified themselves as Protestant, Evangelical, or Biblical, 
while the Catholic population represents less than 10% (INEGI, 2010). Conversion to 
Protestantism started in 1961 when American missionaries arrived in the community 
(Corbeil, 2013).  
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Figure 6. Picture of the Mesbilja’ river. Picture shows the river (center), the 
dirt road (right) that connects the community with the paved road and a protestant 
church on top of the hill (left). 
 Mesbilja sits at a much lower altitude than any of the other study 
communities and is considered a “hot soil”, or tierra caliente, community. The 
temperate weather affects the production cycles and produce. Community members’ 
land is situated within the borders of the community and to a lesser degree outside 
of it. 
 Subsistence and cash crop farming are practiced in Mesbilja. Subsistence 
farming in the milpa consists of corn, beans, coffee, peach, avocado, banana, radish, 
lemon, lime, orange, tangerine, squash, pumpkin, sugar, tomatoes, peppers, and 
herbs. Corn planting begins in late February and sowing ends in May. Depending on 
the variety of corn and how early it was put in the ground, harvest could take place 
anywhere from July to November. Families consisting of parents, children, and 
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relatives (extended family) and neighbors help plant and harvest their crops. 
Families also raise chickens. When families raise cows they do so to sell them in 
Oxchuc or Ocosingo and they do not consume their milk. 
Cash crop farming is limited to coffee. Most households have a milpa and also 
have coffee trees. Coffee is used for household consumption and in good years 
surplus is sold. It is a common practice to sell the dry beans to coyotes that come to 
the community rather than commercializing them directly in Oxchuc or Tenejapa. To 
our knowledge there are no coffee producing cooperatives in the community.  
Community Selection 
Since the use of indigenous languages is predominant in this region, I needed to find 
research assistants that were fluent in Tsotsil or Tseltal. Contrary to my 
expectations, I was only able to find three assistants, all of whom spoke Tseltal. 
Thus, for practical reasons research only took place in Tseltal communities.  
I restricted community selection to those villages that participated in 
ENSANUT (National Health and Nutrition survey) 2012. So, the sample was limited to 
three communities in Oxchuc and three communities in Tenejapa. The research team 
decided that for practical reasons it was best for all the assistants to do fieldwork in 
communities that were close by to each other. Thus, assistants did work in the three 
communities in Tenejapa first.  
 After concluding fieldwork in Tenejapa the whole team started to conduct 
fieldwork in Mesbilja, where I had already been granted permission to work back in 
January. The other two communities in Oxchuc were not part of the study because 
we could not find one of them (I later learned that it is a small caserio with only 2 
houses and a dozen inhabitants) and we were not granted permission.  
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Gaining Access to the Communities 
When I visited Los Altos in winter 2011-2012 to do the pilot study for this project I 
was told by several researchers from ECOSUR (South Border College) that getting 
permission to work in the communities was a daunting task. I was advised to go 
accompanied to the communities, bring a translator, and be prepared to wait in-
between 6 to 8 weeks for an answer and to not offer anything in exchange.  
 Gaining access and permission to conduct research in Northern and Central 
Mexico is an “easy task” in which the researcher brings and an ID from their 
research institute and approaches the highest ranking authority in the community. 
The researcher presents the project and addresses any possible questions from the 
authority. Unlike most communities in central Mexico where entrance to the villages 
is without restrictions, entrance to autonomous and Zapatista (that adhere to the 
National Liberation Zapatista Army) communities in Los Altos is restricted. Non-
autonomous and non-Zapatista communities in the region are likely to impose and 
enact restrictions on who can be in their communities and a permit to be there has 
to be requested as soon as one enters the community.  
In December 2013, I selected four communities in four (two Tsotsil and two 
Tseltal) municipalities to participate in the study. I spent one week visiting one 
community every day to request permission to collect data there in February and 
March. Gaining access to the communities was easier than expected. All the 
communities agreed to participate in the study the same day we were there (I took 
my dad and toddler along). In all the communities I had to speak to the authorities. 
The first day I spoke to the General assembly of Pajaltón that consisted of all the 
men between 16-45 years old that reside in the community (~160). One of the men 
functioned as a translator. Permission was granted and in exchange they requested 
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five boxes of Coca-Cola. The men drank it there. As I later learned coke is used to 
seal the deal and I bought cokes for all the members of the community that were 
present when I requested permission in each one of the communities. At the end of 
the week I had been granted permission to collect data in all four communities: 
Pajaltón, Tenejapa; Mesbilja, Oxchuc; La Granadilla, Zinacantán; and Majomut, 
Chenalhó.  
However, after recruiting the team in February and deciding with them that 
we would work in Tenejapa, I had to request permission in Balun Canal and Cañada 
Grande (I had already been granted permission in Mesbilja and Balun Canal). During 
the week of training the three assistants and I visited Balun Canal and Cañada 
Grande to request permission. In each of these communities we requested 
permission directly with the comite de educación, which as we will learn in the next 
chapter is the facto authority of these communities. By the end of the training week 
we had been granted permission to work in these communities and were ready to 
start with data collection.  
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CHAPTER 5 
INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE IN GOVERNANCE AND NON-MARKET EXCHANGE  
In this chapter I explore the changes that two systems of institutions have had in the 
study communities: governance and non-market exchange. I explore the governance 
system since the traditional political-religious system used in these communities 
influence the way that communities are governed (referred here as the civic system) 
and their trade networks (Cámara Barbachano, 1966; López Meza, 1996). Non-
market exchange institutions have also adapted to changes in local governance. 
Non-market exchange institutions such as reciprocity and redistribution are seen in 
this dissertation as coping or adaptive mechanisms used to deal with fluctuations in 
the amount of food available. Thus, I consider the use of institutional arrangements 
to govern resource use and distribution as a response to spatial and temporal 
resource variability. Each one of the diverse patterns of social organization described 
in this chapter have emerged to deal with resource variability among other functions.  
Governance System 
While there are many units of social organization in Los Altos (ethnic group, 
lineage, family, etc.) communities are the unit at which religion and politics are self-
organized as well as the unit the state uses to organize their incursions into the 
region. Community authorities are the most immediate governance level for 
Tseltsales living in Los Altos. The governance system of each community is the result 
of a unique process in which community members participate actively to stablish 
rules and regulate life within their villages. These rules also affect the way in which 
interactions with members of other communities happen.  
 A community’s governance system can range from very traditional to civic. 
Traditional authorities in this study refer to the presence of traditional political-
religious authorities in a community. In Tenejapa this means presence of bankilal 
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and rerol and in Oxchuc it refers to Mayores. Civic authorities refer to the use of 
secular groups such as comites and asambleas generales to lead the community. The 
four study communities sit in different places of this continuum.  
Traditional Political-Religious Governance System. The traditional 
political-religious system used in the municipalities of Tenejapa and Oxchuc was 
imposed by the Spanish during the conquest to solve contentions between the 
indigenous populations and linked them to the colonial justice system (López Meza, 
1996). Segmentation politics imposed by Spaniards and continued by the Mexican 
government resulted in different traditional systems in each municipality. In 
Tenejapa the traditional organization system is composed of four institutions: 
poxiletik (healers), kaviloetik (prayers), pas a’teletik (religious system) and a’tel 
patan (political system) (see figure 7). In this system each institution has a position 
in each spatial scale (i.e. community, inter-community, municipal). In Oxchuc the 
traditional system is based on adscription to one of two calpules: Mucul calpul or big 
calpul and Chin calpul or small calpul (see table 4). Calpules were not binded by 
geographic or kinship delimitations; members of a calpul can be inhabitants of any 
community or be part of any clan (Villa Rojas, 1990). Calpules are the institution 
through which religious festivities and justice administration, monitoring and 
enforcing happened in Oxchuc. 
In Tenejapa the traditional political system or A’tel patan was represented in 
each community by two fiadores (tiviniketik) and two regidores (reroletik). 
Throughout the municipality there were 90 reroletik and 90 tiviniketik (see figure 8). 
They represented all the parajes of the municipality. Reroletik and tiviniketik were a 
link between their community and the higher level political system. Their main 
function was to monitor and enforce justice according to the local tradition (rules in 
use) and their good judgment. Through them justice administration was a 
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community affair that rarely exceeded the village limits. Additionally, they served as 
messengers between the Ladino political system, higher ranking traditional 
authorities and the communities. They occupied their position for one year, during 
which they were the highest ranking authorities in their communities.  
 
Figure 7 .Traditional organization system in Tenejapa, Chiapas. 
Source: Andres Lopez Meza (1996) p 26. 
In Oxchuc traditionally sindicos and cornales function as judges and 
policeman enforcing rules and apprehending people. They were also in charge of 
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distributing the news from the authorities throughout the municipality (see table 3). 
Unlike in Tenejapa, there were only two actors occupying each of these positions per 
calpul in the entire municipality. Since most communities did not have a direct 
representative of the traditional political system, justice administration and 
enforcement was usually done by people from outside the community. Justice 
enforcement and monitoring had a high transaction cost. After their cargo ended 
sindicos and cornales were well respected members of society that had prestige and 
were called cabildos or principales.  
Table 3.  
Religious authorities in each Calpul in Oxchuc. 
Quantity Tseltal name Position  Special feature 
1 Catinab Supreme chief of the 
calpul 
 
1 Okil-cabil Chief helper  
4 Chuyacacales Church workers  
2 Dzunubiles Great “pulzdor”  
1 “alcalde” mayor Baton 
2 Cornales governor Baton 
2 Sindicos sindico Baton 
4 x-tules or rej-rol Regidores or 
councilors 
 
 
Inter-community Civic Governance System. In 1937 Tenejapa and 
Oxchuc gained the status of municipality and their governance system suffered 
changes. Currently, both municipalities have an Ayuntamiento Municipal that is 
product of the constitution. The constitution states that the Ayuntamiento Municipal 
ought to have a presidente (mayor), a sindico propietario (main trustee), a sindico 
suplente (substitute trustee), six regidores proprietaries (main councilors) and three 
regidores suplentes (substitute councilors) that have to be elected by relative 
majority. However, Oxchuc and Tenejapa have adapted this institution in different 
ways (see figure 8).  
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Figure 8. Political organization of Tenejapa. 
Red boxes represent traditional institutions, blue boxes represent the 
Ayuntamiento Municipal and the purple box represents where they intersect. 
 
In Tenejapa the A’tel patan and the Ayuntamento are interlinked. The actor 
occupying the position of mayor also occupies the position of tatik kunerol (see 
figure 10). He (no women has ever occupied this position) has been elected in 
different ways through the last century. Medina Hernández (Medina Hernández, 
1991) states that according to oral history the tiviniketik used to elect the tatik 
kunerol before 1940, and later during the 1950-1980 period ladino professors and 
bilingual promoters gained influence in the election by promoting party affiliations. 
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While the election of the mayor closely resembles the election system stated in the 
federal constitution, the other positions are still chosen by the mayor instead of 
being elected as it is stated in the constitution. The changes in norms of how to elect 
the mayor caused secularization of the A’tel patan and further divided religious and 
civic institutions. According to tradition, the mayor, or Tatik Kunerol, is not the 
highest ranking person in the political hierarchy in Tenejapa. He has to obey and 
seek council in the Tatik Martir, a council formed by four elders that have occupied 
several religious and political positions and that are usually also healers or Poxiletik. 
(Medina Hernández, 1991). However, in the current arrangement the Mayor is the 
most powerful man in the political structure, probably because embodying the 
positions of Tatik Kunerol and Mayor gives him access to information and power 
available to members of both institutions, but at the same time is responsible for 
complying with two different sets of norms that sometimes can be contradictory. 
In Oxchuc the two political organizations co-exist without being inter-linked. 
In the beginning, the Ayuntamiento Municipal became another instrument used by 
the Oxchuc ladinos to maintain local power, but the importance of this institution was 
almost null in the communities. By 1940 there was an agreement stating that the 
mayor had to be an indigenous man. When this rule took effect the most important 
man was still a ladino that occupied the role of secretary. In 1942 the mayor was 
paid 10 pesos per month, while his secretary was paid 20 (Siverts, 1969). In the 
sixties, tribal leaders from each calpul still had a say in who was a good candidate to 
become a mayor (Siverts, 1969). In 2004, elections in Oxchuc worked in two stages, 
first a plebiscite and then a formal election that obeys the constitution (Rodriguez, 
2004). That year was also the first year in which a woman was elected mayor of the 
municipality; she became the first indigenous woman ever to occupy that position in 
the state of Chiapas. Her campaign was filled with death threats. Her election also 
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serves as proof that the new powerful groups in the county are family groups as her 
husband is the current mayor and she is trying to run for reelection. Calpul leaders 
no longer have a saying in the election of a candidate. 
In Tenejapa the A’tel patan has remained in use probably because it merged 
with the Ayuntamiento Municipal, however it is far from being as important as it once 
was. Decrease in its importance can be quantified by the current state of two of their 
positions tivinikeik and reroletik that have gone from 90 members in 1937 to 86 and 
50 respectively in 2014. Likely causes of this loss of importance are the incursion of 
Protestantism and changes in the land tenure regime. Since the A’tel patan is a 
religious system a decreasing pool of young men interested in occupying these 
positions can be related to their decreasing numbers as task specialization is related 
to the size of the population (Anderies, 2006). In addition, the creation of ejidos 
during the 1960s and 1970s that are governed through a political and judicial system 
known as comisaria ejidal that is completely secular and in which traditional 
authorities do not have a place set an example of communities that were doing well 
(mainly due to an injection of government resources) without investing resources in 
the traditional system, encouraging other communities to not participate.  
Currently the traditional political system in Oxchuc is in disuse while the 
traditional religious system is in use only among Catholics in some communities. At 
the municipal level adscription to a calpul has lost importance due to religious 
conversion and the emergence of new ways to access power. The incursion of 
Protestantism has impacted the amount of men interested in occupying Calpul 
positions. Also, it is increasingly more difficult to fill out Calpul positions because 
power can be accessed through participation in the Ayuntamiento municipal and local 
governance institutions.  Additionally judicial functions are now being met by 
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members of each community through the local comite. Thus, transaction costs for 
justice enforcement have diminished. 
In summary the traditional religious-political system in Tenejapa has adapted 
to the Ayuntamiento Municipal by linking to it. External factors have had an impact 
on the importance that the traditional religious-political system has. Some of its 
functions are being replaced by other institutions. In Oxchuc, the traditional political 
system has also been affected by external institutions that have substituted some of 
its functions. In both municipalities the traditional religious-political system is no 
longer the only way in which actors can access power.  
Local Governance. Presently the most important political organizations 
within the community are the Asamblea General, Comites, and patronatos. These 
men lead the organizations where decisions that forge the future of the community 
are made. In the micro-region where Mesbilja is located, the current civic 
organizational structure is represented by the civil authorities who are municipal 
police officers, comites of education, water, electricity, road, and traditional 
authorities called mayores; people that are more experienced and have been 
authorities in their community and are respected for the decisions of greater 
importance in all locations. In the municipality of Tenejapa the civic organization at 
the community level consists of a general assembly and several committees and can 
include members of the traditional-political system. 
The Asamblea general is a democratic decision making organ that is designed 
to represent all the households of the community. Every man in between the ages of 
16 and 45 years of age that are not studying are part of a list and have a vote. All 
voters have a voice and voting is decided by majority. Probably one of the most 
important functions of the general assembly is to ensure that all men enrolled in the 
list are active in their community. Enforcement of this function is by checking 
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attendance by reading all the names in the list and enforcing monetary sanctions to 
those that do not attend. Another function of the Asamblea general is to keep 
community members informed. The Asamblea meets whenever it is necessary; in 
other words there are no set dates, but the meetings are called by the comites when 
there are important decisions or announcements that need to be made public. Topics 
that are usually discussed in an Asamblea include, but are not limited to water 
distribution for the households, electricity bills, school related issues (i.e. teacher 
attendance, upgrades), and calls to participate in events or get enrolled in 
government programs. Asambleas are usually held in the basketball court of the 
community. Due to the location of the meetings men are likely to play basketball 
before and after the meetings which has reinforced the importance of basketball as a 
sport played by men.  
The comite of the community is the common formal expression of the political 
activity that takes place within the community. Sieverts (1994) indicates that this 
organizational system dates from 1930s, while Laurent Corbeil (2013) dates it in the 
1950s. Despite their differences both authors associate the incursions of comites to 
elementary schools. According to Corbeil, INI requested the support of some male 
parents and local boards of education for the resolution of school problems and to 
develop education programs. This group of parents was called comite de educación. 
The comite altered the prior political structure and the internal dynamics of the 
communities by adding another institution to the institutional landscape of the 
communities (Pineda Sánchez, 1993). Comites became important in the communities 
because they administered a great amount of resources that were given by the 
government to maintain and improve the schools. The Comite also represented an 
alternative to access power and prestige even if a person religious affiliation was 
non-Catholic. 
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Currently, local governance system of the communities is conformed by 
several comites (infrastructure, electricity, water, etc). The comite de educacion 
remains the most important of all the comites since one of its main functions is to 
organize and secure resources for the fiesta de clausura (end of school year 
celebration), monitoring that teachers work, and requesting and implementing 
infrastructural improvements to the school. Each comite is conformed by a president, 
secretary, treasurer and assistants. Each person occupying a position in the civic 
political system has a specific function depending on the comite or patronato (lower 
ranking comite) that they are part of, its composition, and their position. The 
organization of each communities comites is shown in Appendix E. 
The president of the comite de educacion is the one that organizes the 
meetings, he is the one that decides on the agenda for each meeting and the point of 
contact for anyone interested in approaching the comite or community. He is also the 
man that signs all the letters that are sent to request resources from external 
sources. Since the president is the “face” of the community during the year that he is 
in his position, it is not uncommon for him to travel to San Cristobal or the seat of 
the municipality to request funds for the fiesta de clausura or improvements in the 
school or community. The president also acts as a de facto president of the 
Asamblea general. The secretary is the person that is in charge of keeping a list of 
the members, reading their names before every meeting, tracking all the points 
discussed in a meeting, and writing letters to request funds. This position is usually 
occupied by a person that is literate and fluent in Spanish, and when that is not the 
case another actor such as the principal of the elementary school, or the vocals 
(asistants) can assists the secretary. The treasurer is the person that keeps track of 
the money that has entered or exited the comite and community funds. He keeps 
track of who donated for the fiesta and how much; that information could be used in 
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subsequent years to decide if that person is worth requesting money from and how 
much should be requested. The treasurer also keeps track of the money that is 
collected through monetary sanctions to lista and community members. He keeps 
track of everything in paper and at the end of the year he has to pass all the 
information and money to the next treasurer. The first and second vocal (asistant) 
are general assistants of the comite; they do activities depending on their personal 
qualifications ranging from carrying coke boxes to writing letters. The actors in the 
vocal position have access to more information than a regular community member, 
but not all the information that the president or secretary have access to.  
Historically community authorities were elected based on reputation and 
status. Thus, not every man in the community had a chance to occupy a position as 
an authority (Cohen, 2010). Reputation and status increased based on the good 
performance and appropriate behavior of the authority (Cancian, 1994). Currently 
community authorities’ election in three quarters of the communities are based on a 
democratic system in which names are picked out from a lista enabling all male 
community members to occupy a position at least once in their lifetime. This switch 
from status driven to democratic election has been linked with the incursion of 
schools in the communities (Corbeil, 2013). Surprisingly the community in which 
traditional authorities still have a saying in the election of local authorities is the one 
with the longest presence of schools: Mesbilja. Despite that the election of the 
president of the comite de educación (the highest ranking man in the community) is 
still based on reputation in Pajaltón, Cañada Grande and Balun Canal.  
I elaborated two scales to situate the study communities in the traditional-
civic governance continuum described earlier. The first scale called “Traditional 
Authority Scale” was designed to measure the presence or absence of 10 items 
identified as markers of traditional Tseltal Mayan authority defined by earlier 
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ethnographers (RW.ERROR - Unable to find reference:103; A. V. ROJAS, 1969; Villa 
Rojas, 1990). The second scale called “Civic Authority Scale” measures the strength 
(frequency of mention) of sanctions imposed by the comites and asambleas in the 
semi-structured interviews (Balun Canal n=32, Cañada Grande n=28, Pajaltón n=28 
and Mesbilja n=28).  
Table 4.  
Traditional Authority scale measuring presence or absence in study communities. 
 Mesbilja Pajaltón Cañada 
Grande 
Balun Canal 
Community has 
traditional authorities 
1 0 1 0 
Traditional authorities 
wear traditional attire 
0 0 1 0 
Traditional authorities 
are part of comite 
0 0 1 0 
Traditional authorities 
are part of Asamblea 
General 
0 0 1 0 
Traditional authorities 
have a saying in 
electing comite 
members 
1 0 0 0 
Comites are based on 
list 
0 1 1 1 
Comites are based on 
performance 
1 1 1 1 
Community has jail 1 0 1 0 
Community has 
policeman 
1 0 1 0 
Community has strict 
boundary  
1 1 1 1 
Total 6 3 9 3 
 
The Traditional Authority Scale includes items about blatant presence of 
traditional authorities in a community (items 1 and 2). The scale also includes items 
about actions that historically correspond with those of traditional authorities (items 
1-8) to illustrate if in communities were the position of traditional authorities has 
disappeared other institutions have adopted those actions. Items about actions can 
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be divided in two categories those that denote executive powers (items 3-7) and 
those that refer to judicial powers (items 8-10). Executive power items refer to those 
in which traditional authorities have a voice in community politics either by 
participating in meetings or helping choose the local (civic) authorities. Judicial items 
are those in which the actions are aimed at enforcing order in the community. This 
scale has a Cronbach’s Alpha value of .84 suggesting very good internal consistency 
reliability for the scale with this sample. 
In the Civic Authority Scale sanctions were coded depending on how they are 
paid: monetary or non-monetary. I differentiated between the kind of payment as 
the use of monetary sanctions is a proxy of market integration. Then they were 
classified depending on who is aggravated: the institution, a community member, or 
the environment. The seven item scale described on Table 5 has a Cronbach’s Alpha 
value of .76 suggesting very good internal consistency reliability for this sample. 
According to the two scales, communities that score the highest in the 
traditional scale tend to score lower in the civic scale indicating that a process of 
substitution might be occurring. Currently, we can find traces of both the elder’s 
influence and the increasing importance of the civic authorities in Mesbilja. Mayores 
are a selective group of men that have served in all the important service positions 
in the community (i.e. president of the comite de educación, president comite de 
obras) and are respected and recognized for their good performance. Mayores have 
a say on the election of new comite members. Also, Mesbilja is the only community 
in the study in which the selection is done depending on a person’s status and 
influence in the community. Thus, this is the only community where the research 
team encountered middle aged men (30-40) that had never served in a comite.  
According to the Civic scale Mesbilja is the community that enforces the least 
sanctions despite the fact that it has a jail and policeman. The transaction cost of 
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enforcing rules and norms is in theory lower than it used to be when the traditional-
political religious system was in use, however the size of the community (n=1793) 
might be a deterrent to enforce rules. I also hypothesize that the large number of 
men enrolled in the list has an impact on the way in which elections of authorities 
takes place (by prestige rather than use of the list). 
Table 5.  
Civic Authorities scale measuring frequency of mention in study communities. 
 Mesbilja Pajaltón Cañada 
Grande 
Balun 
Canal 
Total 
Non-Monetary 
Sanctions 
Comite to 
Community 
0 1 2 0 3 
Monetary 
Sanctions 
Comite To 
Community 
0 1 0 1 1 
Monetary 
Sanctions 
Comite to Lista 
0 1 0 1 1 
Monetary 
Sanction 
Attendance 
0 2 1 1 3 
Monetary 
sanctions for 
inappropriate 
behaviors 
1 1 1 0 3 
Non-monetary 
sanctions for 
inappropriate 
behavior 
3* 6* 1 0 9 
Monetary 
Sanction Trash 
0 2 0 0 2 
Total  4 14 5 3 22 
Total monetary 1 7 2 3 13 
Total non-
monetary 
3 7 3 0 13 
Total offended 
institution 
0 5 3 3 11 
Total offended 
community 
member 
4 7 2 0 13 
Note. *paid in boxes of Coca-cola. 
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Balun Canal is the community that enforces the least kind of sanctions (1/6). 
Balun Canal is the only community that only enforces monetary sanctions to its 
members and none of the community members spoke about community cooperation 
systems like cooperacion or tequio (cooperation of work to build a community asset) 
denoting an erosion of community ties that has been replaced by money and 
churches. Mesbilja also presents a similar situation in which the rate of monetary 
sanctions (when adjusted) is three times higher than that of non-monetary sanctions 
and similarly there were few mentions of reciprocity and redistribution in the 
community.  
Pajaltón is the community that scored the highest on the civic authorities 
scale and is also the community that enforces the most types of rules. It is also one 
of the two communities that scored the lowest on the Traditional Authority scale. On 
the other hand Balun Canal scored the lowest and is the one that enforces the least 
kind of sanctions. While clear delineation of rules and sanctioning is only one of the 
indicators of strong institutions (Triplett, Gainey & Sun 2003) it is the proxy used in 
this study. According to these we can conclude that Pajaltón is the community with 
the strongest civic institutions while Balun Canal is the one with the weakest 
traditional and civic institutions. 
Traditional authorities in Cañada Grande take part of comite meetings and 
Asambleas. In Mesbilja Mayores are not required to participate in meetings, but are 
welcome to express their voice and more importantly when the community faces a 
difficult challenge they might act as an “advisory board” for the current authorities.  
I described earlier how traditional authorities in Tenejapa and Oxchuc were in 
charge of solving disputes at the community level. Table 5 shows that in Cañada 
Grande and Mesbilja there are still local policeman that enforce community rules. In 
Pajaltón and Cañada Grande there is no designated jail nor position for someone that 
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acts as a policeman, but when there is a dispute that requires the intervention of the 
authorities they use a classroom as a jail and a comite member acts as a policeman.  
To summarize, none of the communities has a written set of regulations (with 
the exception of some written announcements), but there are rules in use that are 
known widely by all community members. Through qualitative analysis I identified 
three kinds of rules: those that regulate how institutions work, those that regulate 
communities’ members behavior and those that regulate the use of resources (i.e. 
water, electricity, trash). Rules in use are not in practice for the three kinds of rules 
in all communities. Although rules are known for the first and last category, most 
sanctions for inappropriate behavior are not pre-stablished and they seem to be 
stablished on a case to case to basis. There is a trend of paying sanctions with 
money instead of time or community service which is the customary way described 
by the elders and the ethnographic record. This trend is more marked in Pajaltón and 
Balun Canal. Also, Balun Canal and Pajaltón (n=3) have the lowest presence of 
traditional authorities while Cañada Grande (n=9) is the one with the highest 
presence.  
Non-Market Exchange 
Redistribution, the systemic movement of goods from a local level to a hierarchical 
center and back to the local level, and reciprocity, the exchange of goods based on 
symmetrical relationships between social entities, are two non-economic mechanisms 
that are used to provide food resources to those who are unable to fully participate 
in market economies (Morton, Bitto, Oakland, & Sand, 2008). In urban populations 
these mechanisms thrive on and are seen as necessary to make up for the 
shortcomings of the market inefficiencies (Lomnitz, 2002). In Mesoamerican societies 
they are seen as adaptive mechanisms used by households to strengthen social ties 
and to increase access to various resources, including food (Monaghan, 1990a). 
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Reciprocity and redistribution can also be the result of collective actions, made within 
communities to negotiate, adapt, and cope with political and socio-economic changes 
(Cohen, 2000).  
 In the next section I will describe the state of the mechanisms and 
institutions associated with four different kinds of exchanges: inter-community 
reciprocity, intra-community redistribution, inter-community reciprocity and intra-
community redistribution. This section includes a succinct explanation on the 
changes that have occurred in these institutions. 
Food Reciprocity. In the past in Tenejapa food reciprocity and redistribution 
at a the inter-community and intra-community level occurred through the traditional 
religious-political system. Exchange of foodstuffs was prescribed throughout the year 
by the cargo system between communities from different ethno-environments (tierra 
fria and tierra caliente) (López Meza, 1996). This prescription ensured that non-
kinship relationships could be kept between members of different communities and it 
facilitated exchange of different products. Today these traditional institutions have 
changed, below I describe the current mechanisms through which exchange takes 
place. 
Intra-community reciprocity. Community members that exchange food 
within the community limits are often linked by kinship or vicinity and have 
developed trust relationships over time either by becoming acquaintances, friends, 
compadres (ritual kinship) or through reputation (good person, be polite, speak 
Spanish, performed a favor, respected in the community, etc). Currently reciprocal 
exchange within communities happens for three main reasons: visit, celebration or 
necessity. These reasons are not exclusionary.  
 A visit or visita is the act of stopping over at a friend or relative’s house for a 
period of time that ranges between a couple of hours to days (when they occur at 
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the inter-community level).Visitors can visit people from their same community (i.e. 
neighbors, family, friends) or people from other communities (i.e. extended family). 
The person visiting is provided with nourishment and shelter during the duration of 
the stay. This is a deferred exchange, meaning that the person visiting will repay the 
exchange of goods in a future visit in which he or she will host (Siverts, 1969). 
Usually visitors are greeted with a seat under the shade or next to the fire depending 
on the weather. After a couple of minutes the visitor is presented or offered water, 
coca-cola, pozol (a traditional drink made with ground nixtamalized corn and water, 
in some communities it is considered a meal), or any other drink available. In some 
rare cases the visitor is also offered a tortilla or a piece of fruit. What is offered 
depends on the season, the social proximity of guest and host, and the physical 
distance of the visitor’s house. For example, it is not uncommon for a visitor in 
Pajaltón to get some pozol before leaving if their house is more than an hour by foot 
as the visitor might need some extra energy. In some cases when there is 
abundance of a crop visitors are sent with some product. On other occasions the visit 
is purposefully made because the visitor is enduring hardship and will express his 
necessity to the person he is visiting; in those cases the visitor will almost surely be 
sent with some foodstuffs if the visited household is not enduring hardship as well.  
Siverts (1969) reported the use of visits in Oxchuc in the early1940s. The 
team observed little changes on the way that visitas take place from what Siverts 
observed however I hypothesize that there has been a change in who can be visited. 
As explained during field work the team reported that new institutions particularly 
churches had impacted social networks within the communities. For example in 
Mesbilja, were Siverts reported that kinship was very important now members of the 
same kinship group that belong to different religions reported not taking. Thus, while 
the mechanism of visitas persist, it has adapted. 
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Birthday parties are a new way of reinforcing reciprocal and redistributive 
ties. Older community members rarely keep track of their age. They often do not 
know their birthday because recording births was not a common practice. Birth 
recording has become increasingly common with the incursion of outside institutions 
in the communities that require people to have a birth certificate, like schools and 
government programs such as OPORTUNIDADES. Birthday parties in the 
communities happen under specific religious prescriptions. Celebrations can range 
from a mass where only members from the same religious group are invited and a 
drink of pozol is offered to the attendees, to big celebrations in which all community 
members are invited. The latter could be explained by a decrease in the importance 
and frequency of traditional religious festivities in which people from all the 
communities could socialize, eat together, and where the party sponsor can gain 
prestige and status. These all-community birthday parties are fairly uncommon as 
they require a lot of resources, but were described in Cañada Grande among the 
wealthy and prestigious community members. Simple food is offered at these 
celebrations, such as a soup or beans and rice and tortillas.  
On occasions when a household is in a difficult situation, the household can 
engage in reciprocal exchanges with other households under the understanding that 
they will repay at a later time. Another less common option is to borrow either 
money or foodstuffs from the local store. Borrowing is associated with having to pay 
interest and with the interest being increasingly higher as time goes by. At least one 
participant in each community reported having to engage in borrowing in difficult 
times during the semi-structured interviews. And other informants reported knowing 
how borrowing works and what the interest rate is in their community (10%-20%). 
Borrowing was not reported by earlier ethnographic accounts probably because 
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private stores are recent in communities and borrowing was not a practice of 
government run stores such as CONASUPO. 
In Mesbilja participants reported that the decline in intra-community 
reciprocal exchanges is due to the presence of tienda CONASUPO (DICONSA) where 
they can borrow corn at no interest and pay it back next year. CONASUPO is present 
in all the communities, but no one from the other communities reported interest free 
lending in the stores. Participants in Pajaltón reported that they are now ashamed of 
asking for food from their neighbors since they can borrow from the CONASUPO 
store. This practice was not reported in other communities and is probably an 
isolated case of the administrator giving personal credit to community members not 
a government policy. The incursion of stores owned by community members has had 
little impact on reciprocal exchanges because they rarely carry food; they usually 
carry a small supply of Coca-Cola, candies, and junk food, so borrowing there is not 
a strategy to alleviate food insecurity.  
To summarize, there are three non-exclusionary avenues through which intra-
community reciprocity occurs among community members. Visits are the most 
frequent of them in all communities, followed by celebrations and necessity. While 
the use of visits heve been recorded previously even when the traditional reciprocal 
system was fully functioning celebrations have emerged as adaptations to declining 
traditional institutions. Balun Canal is the community that engaged in more scenarios 
to reciprocate while Pajaltón engaged in the least. However frequency of 
participation in each scenario in Balun Canal was lower (avg freq=.10) than in 
Pajaltón (avg freq=.42). Participants in Pajaltón reported an average of 5.52 items 
per list while participants in Balun Canal reported an average of 2.65 items per list. 
The process of religious conversion has altered the nature of reciprocity, but 
these forms of reciprocity persist to some extent. Visitas are still in use and meet 
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their function, but the participants are now shaped by other institutions. Necessity is 
one of the reasons why people reciprocate, different communities participate in inter-
household reciprocity at different rates probably caused by varied degrees of 
integration of external institutions. While these changes are subtle they might have 
implications on the food security status of vulnerable populations. 
Inter-community reciprocity. As explained in Chapter four the current 
state of inter-community relationships among communities in Oxchuc and Tenejapa 
are very different. Traditional political and religious systems that traditionally dictate 
inter-community relationships are still in use in some communities in Tenejapa while 
they have almost vanished in Oxchuc. These differences in organization affect the 
way that food reciprocity takes place. During our fieldwork the team identified 
several ways in which food was distributed in a reciprocal manner among members 
of different communities. 
The most frequent and salient kinds of inter-household reciprocity occurred 
across and within communities through visitas (visits) (see Table 6) among members 
of an extended family. In addition to shelter and food, the host usually sends out of 
town visitors with a small present composed of fruits or corn. Other appropriate gifts 
are chosen depending on the community that the visitor is from; for example if the 
visitor is from tierra fria, products from tierra caliente such as a coffee, cane, and 
certain fruits will be much appreciated. For people from the same ecosystem, the 
exchange of goods can be limited to specialty items from the domestic group. For 
example, if a person from another tierra caliente community visits a family from 
Mesbilja, an appropriate gift consists of something that the household produces that 
the recipient household does not (i.e. bananas, bol ha). This kind of reciprocity helps 
to add variety to the diets of households (Morton et al., 2008). 
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On rare occasions households will engage in reciprocal exchanges with people 
outside of their social network (non-kin, non-neighbors, non-church members). Since 
reciprocal exchanges are based on trust and reputation, and a household 
reciprocating with strangers lacks that information, exchanges tend to happen in a 
shorter time frame. Reported food exchanges with strangers happened in Cañada 
Grande and Balun Canal. On both occasions they followed the same pattern: taxi 
drivers from the community were bringing people from San Cristobal (tierra caliente) 
to Tenejapa (seat of the municipality, and tierra fria); one of the passengers started 
small talk with the driver about where are they were from and what gets produced in 
their community; later they agreed to exchange products between their tierra 
caliente and tierra fria communities. They agreed on a time, location, product, and 
appropriate rate for the exchange. The exchange occurs at the set time and location 
and is immediate, meaning that one person gave a product and then received 
another product in return immediately, instead of waiting for weeks or months for 
the exchange to be repaid.  
 Informants conducting these exchanges reported that they participate 
because it allows them to get products “cheaper” than at the market, it added 
variety to their diet, and they gained some status among their family members who 
often received a “sample” of the foodstuff exchanged. If the informant lacks the 
product that will be exchanged they are often able to find it within their family 
group; in such cases they give half of the product received to the family member or 
friend that supplied the product. The person conducting the exchange (taxi driver) 
keeps the other half as a compensation for their time and energy. The certainty and 
amount of detail provided by the three informants that reported this kind of 
exchange leads me to think that this is not an isolated case. However, their positions 
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as taxi drivers puts them at an advantage because they become brokers with 
outsiders.  
 Another household in Pajaltón reported participating in a similar kind of 
exchange, but in this family they lacked a “broker” so they depended on having 
contact with other people through other channels like inter-community church 
reunions or having one of our team members visiting them. After talking to one of 
the team members and learning that she is from Chilon, a tierra caliente municipality 
where coffee is produced, the family grew interested in knowing if they could arrange 
an exchange of coffee for corn. The family reported doing similar exchanges in the 
past, especially during advantageous years, when corn in tierra caliente is scarce or 
when coffee prices are low. Current exchange rates are 10 kilos of corn per kilo of 
coffee, but they reported doing a 1-1 exchange in the past.  
Table 6.  
Frequency of mention of reciprocity at the inter-community and intra-community 
level according to semi-structured interviews. 
 Mesbilja Pajaltón Cañada 
Grande 
Balun 
Canal 
Intra-community Reciprocity 
HH TO HH neighbors 
0 2 1 1 
Intra-community Reciprocity 
HH TO HH family 
1 2 1 0 
Inter-community Reciprocity 
HH to HH family 
0 1 1 0 
Inter-community Reciprocity 
HH to HH No Social Network 
0 0 2 1 
 
In summary, while visitas are the most frequent kind of reciprocal exchange 
in all communities at the intra-community and inter-community level they occur at 
different frequencies among the studied communities (see Tables 5 and 6). Intra-
community reciprocity occurs more frequently in Pajaltón, while inter-community 
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reciprocity was more frequent in Cañada Grande. Mesbilja is the community in which 
interviewees reported engaging in reciprocal exchanges the least.  
Food Redistribution. Redistribution is still largely influenced by political and 
religious institutions. Redistribution has been the dominant, formal response of 
governments with market economies to address food insecurity issues in the regions 
where there are market failures (Morton et al., 2008). Religious institutions have 
long been seen as key mechanisms for the circulation of goods in Mesoamerican 
communities (Monaghan, 1990a).  
Table 7.  
Frequency of mention of intra-community food redistribution in each community in 
semi-structured interviews. 
 Mesbilja Pajaltón Cañada 
Grande 
Balun 
Canal 
Intra-community 
Redistribution Church to HH 
3 0 1 1 
Intra-community 
Redistribution HH to Church 
2 0 2 0 
Intra-community 
Redistribution May 3rd (water 
fiesta) 
0 0  2  2 
Intra-community 
Redistribution Religious 
festivities 
1 0 0 0 
Intra-community 
Redistribution Other 
Celebrations 
 
0 1 2 0 
. 
Data from the free lists showed two subsets of redistribution mechanisms, 
those organized by the state and those organized by other institutions (local political 
systems such as comites or churches). Interview data also demonstrates the 
existence of such categories (See Table 7). Further, it shows a pattern in which 
intra-community redistribution is heavily marked by religious institutions and 
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celebrations while inter-community redistribution is marked by a combination of 
religious and political institutions.  
Intra-community redistribution. Catholic and protestant religious groups 
are still at the core of the redistribution within the community. The most common 
kind of redistribution mentioned in the free lists (Frequency SUM=2.42) and the 
interviews (n=19) was the one in which a church acted as the hierarchical center of 
the distribution. Intra-community redistribution through the church happens either 
through help offered to church members in need or through religious celebrations.  
Ayuda mutua, or mutual help, refers to when a church helps the needy. It is a 
common practice in all the studied communities (Mesbilja n=.45, Pajaltón n=61, 
Cañada Grande n=1.38 and Balun Canal n=.80). The way this mechanism functions 
varies slightly from church to church, but tends to follow this pattern: When a church 
member needs help either another church member or themselves will report their 
situation to the head of the church in the community. Then someone from the church 
will pay that person a visit to assess their situation. That person will get an idea of 
what the most pressing necessities are for the person enduring the hardship (i.e. 
medicine, food, money). He or she will talk to the head of the church (if he is not the 
person occupying this position), and they will decide what they can ask for from the 
rest of the church members. At the next meeting they request a cooperación 
(cooperation) or ayuda (help) and collect it in the next meeting. After the resources 
have been collected, an entourage will pay a visit and deliver them. Ayuda mutua 
constitutes a clear example of redistribution because households give resources to 
the church and then the church delivers them, avoiding the creation of reciprocal 
ties, but enforcing a sense of community by diffusing the burden of the affected 
household (Mtika, 2000).  
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Semi-structured interviews reported that Ayuda mutua is more prevalent in 
Mesbilja (n=5) then in Cañada Grande (n=3), Balun Canal (n=1) and Pajaltón (n=0). 
Frequency of ayuda mutua does not correlate with the number of churches in the 
community (Mesbilja n=7, Pajaltón n=3, Cañada Grande n=3 and Balun Canal n=5) 
(Field data) nor the percent of religious conversion (Mesbilja n=82.59, Pajaltón 
n=47.41, Cañada Grande n=20.77 and Balun Canal n=64.52) (INEGI, 2010). One 
explanation could be the strong influence and presence that Catholicism has in 
Cañada Grande since frequency of ayuda mutua would correlate with the number of 
churches and percent of religious conversion if Cañada Grande was excluded from 
the sample. Ethnographic accounts of redistribution in the region do not mention any 
mechanism that is similar to ayuda mutual, which leads me to think that is a new 
mechanism that has emerged as a result of religious conversion since it is based in 
the existence of differentiated churches within the community.  
The other mechanism through which religious institutions redistribute food in 
the community are religious festivities (Cancian, 1994). In this context, redistribution 
means a movement of goods from those who sponsor a fiesta to other members of 
the community, through the serving of sumptuous meals to fiesta guests (Monaghan, 
1990a). But as explained previously, religious conversion has altered the way 
religious festivities work. Instead of finding a wide participation in the traditional 
Catholic based religious systems like the Pas a’teletik in Tenejapa or the Calpul in 
Oxchuc, the team found either religious festivities in which only members of a 
specific church participate (i.e Holy week, Christmas, Easter) or some “traditional 
festivities that still remain as a community event” (i.e. water celebrations and corn 
production rituals). The later kind seem to persist because their function is to ensure 
harmony in the region (i.e. maintaining peace, supplying water, having a good 
harvest) and they have a clear pre-Hispanic origin. 
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Every third day of May Mayan communities throughout the region have a 
celebration in which religious authorities request water from the cave or spring 
where the community gets their supply. This ritual ensures the fertility of the land 
and, consequently, the good harvest (Méndez-Pérez, 2014). In Cañada Grande, the 
celebration proceeds like this:  
On May 3rd the principales [generic term to describe traditional 
authority] have to fast, meaning that they leave their house early without 
eating nor drinking anything and they go for a walk on the hill, because on 
the other side of the hill there is a spring. On that day the principales walk all 
day until they find 23 angels each one of whom they burn a candle to. Angels 
are the crosses in each waterhole and they cannot come back until they find 
each one of them. They have to walk all day and their point of arrival is at the 
school. Their food is prepared for them. They are fed tamales or pozol. 
(Interview participant 30, March 19, 2014) [My translation from Spanish]. 
In Cañada Grande and Pajaltón the comite de aguas is in charge of organizing 
the feast for the May 3rd celebration. The comite gathers the necessary resources for 
the candles and food. Food is provided by the whole community, but only served to 
the principales as a way of paying them. Other people are welcome to eat in the 
school at the same time, but most bring their own food. This is similar to what 
happens in Balun Canal, with the exception that Las Manzanas (a nearby community) 
and Balun Canal share the same spring and they coordinate their festivities. In 
Mesbilja the emic explanation for not celebrating this festivity is that they no longer 
have a spring, thus there is no place to celebrate. However, Mora (2008) argues that 
the loss of these indigenous traditions can be attributed to the colonizing politics of 
the Mexican state that have broken local traditional institutions throughout the 
region.  
 The other type of redistribution that occurs through religious institutions are 
those celebrations in which only specific members of a church participate. In 
Mesbilja, the community with the highest religious conversion rate in the sample 
(81% of the population are non-catholics), several churches celebrate Easter, but in 
different ways. For instance, Catholics organize a procession through the streets of 
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the community in which they carry an image of Jesus Christ called viacrucis. They 
have different stations where they read the bible and pray. Each station is decorated 
with palm tree leaves. Presbiterians have meetings during the evenings of the three 
holy days. In these meetings they preach, pray, and sing praises. On Easter Sunday 
priest officiates a mass in which brothers from other communities, especially choirs 
are invited (people from Mesbilja are also welcomed in other Presbyterian churches). 
After the mass they eat a meal. The meal is put together by the members of the 
church who contribute 100 mxn (9usd) to pay for the meal.  
In summary, data shows that there are three kinds of redistribution at the 
community level: ayuda mutua, religious festivities and traditional festivities. All of 
these mechanisms are associated with a religious institution, but there is a tendency 
to secularize the traditional festivities that do not happen inside a specific church 
(i.e. May 3rd). This tendency is part of a larger process of secularization that has 
taken place in Oxchuc and is taking place in Tenejapa in which traditional political 
religious institutions are displaced by secular institutions.   
Inter-community redistribution. While intra-community redistribution is 
heavily marked by religious institutions, inter-community redistribution is mainly 
dictated by secular institutions. Free list data shows that there are two differentiated 
kinds of inter-community redistribution that happen at the community level: 
government based and non-government based. Here I use the term government to 
refer to state and federal level outside institutions that comply with the Mexican 
Constitution and the Chiapas state Constitution. Non-government refers to 
institutions that dictate the life of the communities and e: merge from them, they 
include churches and civil institutions locally referred as comites. Semi-structured 
interviews were used to collect information on the frequency and specifics on non-
government inter-community redistribution. Data from ENSANUT (National Health 
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and Nutrition Survey) was used to inform the section on government inter-
community redistribution.  
Non-government inter-community redistribution. Some inter-communal 
redistributive exchanges happen through religious institutions. Churches acquire the 
resources they redistribute at the inter-community level either by collecting them at 
the community or by securing them through the organization that they are part of. 
Churches in the communities (i.e. Presbyterian, Evangelical, Pentecostal) that are 
part of regional, state, national and in some cases international organizations (López 
Meza, 1996) are sometimes able to secure resources for their members through 
donations of missionaries or the organization themselves. Regional level churches 
like the “Iglesia de Dios” depends more heavily on collecting resources at the 
community level.  
During fieldwork the Iglesia de Dios from Pajaltón hosted their regional 
meeting. Church members had to prepare in advance as they hosted 400 out-of-
town guests and had to provide six meals for each of them during a two day period. 
The menu was set in advance and consisted of beans, rice, tortillas, chicken and 
beef. Coca-cola, coffee and kool-aid were served as drinks. Every married male that 
is part of the community and the church had to cooperate with 300 mxn (~25 
usd).Some males donated more money to ensure that there was enough food which 
gained them status among other church members. Money collected was used to buy 
tortillas, chicken, beef, sugar, coffee, dish detergent, etc. Additionally, the Saturday 
previous to the event each married women donated two cups of dried beans.  
In the Iglesia de Dios, regional reunions occur every year and they rotate 
location. Church members of the host community are expected to provide food and 
do so because they know that they will be able to eat for free at the next reunions. 
In that sense, this constitutes an inter-community reciprocal arrangement. However, 
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since links are not made from social unit to social unit and resources have to be 
administered and reallocated through a central institution this also constitutes inter-
community redistribution.  
 
Figure 9. Attendees at the “Regional Reunion Los Altos of Chiapas” in Pajaltón. The 
reunion was celebrated on March 11-12, 2014. Assistants are standing up outside of 
the temple eating. 
Another example of inter-community redistribution that is funded by local 
communities is that of ayuda mutua that transcends community limits. In other 
words, in some occasions members of a church have a food drive and give that food 
to needy members of their church that reside in other communities. This kind of 
inter-community reciprocity was only reported in Mesbilja (see Table 8).  
Traditional fiestas and cargo systems are still important in Cañada Grande 
where half (51%) of the community members are still Catholic (INEGI, 2010). 
Cañada Grande inhabitants participate as attendees and sponsors of regional fiestas 
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occupying cargos like Kaptanetik and Martometik. Feasting is a key element of these 
fiestas in which resources from a wealthy family or individual are reallocated to other 
community members (Cancian, 1994; Monaghan, 1990a). 
Table 8.  
Frequency of mention of inter-community food redistribution in each community in 
semi-structured interviews. 
 Mesbilja Pajaltón  Cañada 
Grande 
Balun 
Canal 
Inter-community 
Redistribution Church To HH 
1 1 1 0 
Inter-community 
Redistribution Church to 
Church 
1 0 0 0 
Inter-community 
Redistribution HH to Church 
2 2 0 0 
Inter-community 
Redistribution Basketball 
0 6* 3* 5 
Inter-community 
Redistribution Clausura (end 
of school year) 
0 0 1 4 
Inter-community 
Redistribution Religious 
Festivities 
0 0 1 0 
Note. *Money is offered instead of food. 
Non-religious inter-community redistribution occurs through activities 
organized by the comites. In Tenejapa two activities that are organized by the 
comites in which food is reciprocated are fiestas de clausura (end of school term) 
and basketball tournaments. People from communities across the region are invited 
to attend these festivities, however written invitations are also delivered to some 
communities’ comites. Formal invitations are extended to high ranking authorities 
like the Mayor and those communities with which there is a strong relationship or 
reciprocal tie (meaning that they mutually invite the other in a formal way). In some 
occasions the invitation to participate in a basketball tournament is also made 
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through radio comunitaria (community radio station) that broadcasts throughout the 
region in Tsotsil and Tseltal.  
Fiestas de Clausura are the most important event in the studied communities. 
It takes place in June or July, each community has a set day to celebrate the 
clausura that does not overlap with other community’s day allowing people from all 
the municipality to attend despite the fact that official last day of school is the same 
throughout the country. Having a set day also ensures that high ranking authorities 
from the Ayuntamiento Municipal will be able to attend without any conflict. This is 
important as it legitimizes the good standing of the community and its authorities 
among the civic political system. It also enables the comite de educación to ask the 
mayor to be the padrino de generación (person sponsoring the graduating class) 
enabling them to secure much needed resources for the celebration. 
All three Tenejapan communities in the study use the clausura celebration to 
change their local authorities (change of authorities in Mesbilja takes place on 
December, 31st). Thus, if the Mayor is present the legitimization of local authorities 
takes place in front of both a traditional and civic authority (the mayor also occupies 
the role of Kunerol). Communities that have traditional authorities like Cañada 
Grande also appoint their new rerol and bankilal that same day.  
Another purpose of the celebration is to authenticate that sixth graders have 
completed elementary school and in the communities where there is a secundaria to 
legitimize that ninth graders finished junior high. The program for a clausura has 
some variants, but follows a similar schedule among communities. First, there is a 
basketball tournament that starts in the morning and continues in to the afternoon 
when the padrino de generación arrives. Then the national anthem is sung, there is 
cambio de escolta (flag ceremony), dance performances, students graduating are 
named and they are given their diplomas, graduates dance the waltz, then the 
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change of authorities and finally the prize for the basketball tournament is given. 
After the two-to-three-hour-long ceremony is finished food is served and music 
starts to play so that attendees can dance.  
Food redistribution in each community happens differently. Balun Canal is the 
only community in which everyone is invited to the ceremony and at which every 
attendee is fed. The first people to be served are the Mayor and the incoming comite 
members, then the comite members that just finished their cargo, then graduates 
and their padrinos. After that all the community members and then all non-
community members are served. Everyone is served the same food. The community 
is known in the municipality for giving away beef as they buy, kill and cook an entire 
bull for all attendees. Money used to buy the bull comes from monetary sanctions 
and requests made to high ranking people from the municipality (usually politicians) 
and other municipalities.  
In Cañada Grande the tradition is to provide a meal to the authorities, the 
graduates, their padrinos and parents. All other attendants are fed bread and a 
Coca-cola. Resources to buy food are collected through donations from important 
community members and requests to local authorities. Cañada Grande inhabitants 
have a lot of pride in the length and quality of the music they play for this 
celebration and people from other communities attend the clausura just to be able to 
dance.  
In Pajaltón no food is served. The parents of the graduates cook a meal at 
their homes and invite the padrino to eat at their home. Since it is a special occasion 
most households try to buy beef or chicken. The Mayor is not invited to eat in any 
house and usually leaves right after the graduates are awarded their diploma. 
Throughout the year Pajaltón inhabitants collect some money through monetary 
fines and sanctions and that money is used to give a 5000 mxn (450usd) prize to the 
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winners of the basketball tournament and to pay for music. Pajaltón is known in the 
region for this substantial price.  
Basketball tournaments happen as part of the clausura, but also to celebrate 
the opening of a new structural feature in the communities (i.e. new classroom, 
road, health clinic). Playing basketball and celebrating clausuras are a direct result of 
the incursion of schools in the communities. Basketball was introduced by school 
teachers when they first came to the communities as each school was built with a 
basketball court. Informants in Pajaltón that were part of the first set of students at 
the community’s school recounted how the teacher brought a basketball and taught 
them the rules during recess.  
The importance of basketball in these communities resides in the fact that it 
is a male-only sport in which ties among young males can be forged despite their 
religious affiliation. Team membership gives good players status, community and in 
some cases regional recognition. Basketball works much like compadrazgo (ritual 
kinship) and other kinds of ties that are no longer in practice among community 
members due to religious conversion by establishing cross-linkages between 
community members (Cohen, 2010).  
In tournaments teams represent their communities. Thus, basketball 
functions to celebrate local identity (Cohen, 2010). They provide cohesion based not 
on sameness, but based on interaction between differentiated communities 
(Springwood, 2006). Similarly, if a team wins they strengthen their community’s 
reputation. Tournaments are an important part of playing basketball as they help 
validate a team or community’s standing. They also allow participants from various 
communities to know one another and exchange information. Tournaments favor a 
function that used to be covered by participating in traditional and religious systems. 
Feinberg (2003) notes that basketball tournaments are a contemporary form of an 
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institutionalized system of inter-regional travel that has gone in disuse as fiestas are 
no longer important.  
There are no set teams, young males play at their community’s court during 
the evenings or prior to an Asamblea general. Matches are 10-15 minutes long so 
that every team can have a chance to play. When a community has been invited to a 
tournament players start to coordinate amongst each other who will attend so that 
they can have a headcount. The day of the tournament team members find a way to 
get to the community where the tournament is being hosted and play. Most of the 
players own jerseys with their last names and they wear them to the tournaments.  
The winner of a tournament is awarded a cash prize. Team members decide 
how to divide it and what to do with it. It is not uncommon to use the money to 
provide a meal to friends and family back in their community or to use it for their 
personal expenses. In the past food was offered to basketball players by the 
community hosting the tournament and a feast was served to celebrate the winning 
team who received a trophy. Currently most communities only provide winners with 
a cash prize.  
In summary, non-government inter-community food redistribution happens 
through civic or religious institutions. Redistribution among communities has adapted 
to the incursion of external institutions. The decline of Catholic Church in the region 
has put traditional inter-community redistribution systems based on religious 
festivities in disuse. Meanwhile the incursion of Protestantism has shaped new inter- 
community links among Tseltsales in Los Altos, depending on the church these links 
have expanded or contracted the number of communities and area where 
redistribution can take place. An aspect of inter-community redistribution that has 
persisted is that it is mediated by religious or political institutions. In many ways 
these new exchanges serve the same functions that the Catholic based exchanges 
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served. Frequency data show a higher presence of religious institutions in Mesbilja 
and lower presence in Balun Canal. While secular institutions were stronger in Balun 
Canal and lower in Mesbilja.  
Government inter-community redistribution. The federal and state 
government have a variety of programs aimed to reduce food insecurity. The two 
most important federal programs are PAL and OPORTUNIDADES. Federal programs 
have a set “enrollment period” in which SEDESOL workers visit communities, contact 
people, fill out forms and enroll new beneficiaries. The state of Chiapas has eight 
programs that are enacted by DIF (Family Integral Developmet). DIF programs are 
coordinated at the municipal level and beneficiaries enroll within each community, 
this means that programs are not in place automatically in each community, but that 
each Ayuntamiento Municipal has to request to participate in the program and that 
each community’s comite has to be aware of the program to be able to affiliate 
beneficiaries from their community. In practice this bureaucratic process is 
translated in variability in the programs that communities participate in.  
Table 9.  
Frequency of redistributive government programs according to ENSANUT 2012. 
  Mesbilja Pajaltón Cañada 
Grande 
Balun 
Canal 
OPORTUNIDADES 0.75 0.9 0.62 0.85 
Grocery bag DIF 0.16 0.5 0.12 0.14 
70 y mas 0.08  0.25  
School Breakfast  0.7 0.12 1 
Folic Acid  0.1  0.14 
Iron  0.2  0.28 
PAL  0.1   
DIF soup kitchen  0.3 0.12  
Vitamin A  0.2   
Boarding school for 
indigenous children 
 0.1   
Day care  0.1   
LICONSA milk   0.12  
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Data from ENSANUT 2012 shows that there are 12 different government 
programs in the region, but not all of them are present in all communities. Program 
presence in communities ranges from three programs in Mesbilja to 10 programs in 
Pajaltón. OPORTUNIDADES and Grocery bag from DIF are present in every 
community while other programs like LICONSA, day care, PAL and Vitamin A 
supplements are only present in one community.  
 It is not surprising that OPORTUNIDADES is the most frequent program 
mentioned in all communities since it is the principal antipoverty program of the 
Mexican government. It focuses on helping poor families throughout the country to 
invest in human capital through several components. The food component part of the 
program includes the delivery of a monthly direct monetary support to beneficiary 
families, to contribute to improve the quantity, quality and diversity of their diet, 
aiming to increase their nutritional status (SEDESOL, 2012a). Similarly, food 
supplements are delivered monthly or bimonthly delivery food to enhance infant, 
pregnant and lactating women’s nutrition. Additionally, Oportunidades provides 
monthly monetary support, called Better Living Food Support (Apoyo Alimentario 
Vivir Mejor) that aims to compensate the families from the effect of the rise in 
international food prices. Child Support Live Better (Apoyo Infantil Vivir Mejor) is a 
monthly monetary support received by families for each child between 0 and 9 years 
to help strengthen its development and nutrition (OPORTUNIDADES, 2009). It is 
important to note that not all the families enrolled in the program receive all the 
components of the program and that one of the biggest criticisms of the program is 
that there is no monitoring to ensure that cash transfers are used to buy food 
(Ulrichs & Roelen, 2012).  
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 The other program that is present in all communities is Despensas DIF 
(Grocery bag DIF). This program consists of a grocery bag that is delivered bi-
monthly by the state government to expecting and nursing mothers. Once infants 
reach six months of age the grocery bag includes formula. In some communities the 
team members observed pigs eating the formula as breastfeeding beyond two years 
of age is the norm in these communities. Supplying formula also goes against 
current WHO (World Health Organization) recommendation to breastfeed for at least 
two years.  
School Breakfast (Desayunos Escolares) is a DIF program that provides 
bimonthly food supplies to children attending public schools preschool and primary 
education in the state of Chiapas, to help improve their diet. Ideally the program is 
designed to ensure that school age children eat a nutritious hot breakfast at school. 
This meal should be prepared by parents at the school kitchen using the supplies 
given by the government and some fresh vegetables supplied by the parents. DIF 
gives the school a menu with every bimonthly grocery delivery. All communities in 
the sample are enrolled in this program, but they implement it differently.  
In Pajaltón, the comite de educación has to pick up the groceries in Tenejapa 
(seat of the municipality) using resources provided through cooperacóon by the list 
members. The asamblea general has decided that since they “pay” for the groceries 
that they should benefit and each list member receives a grocery bag. If there are no 
active members of the list in a certain household they do not receive any food even if 
there are school aged children, putting children from older parents (>65) and single 
mothers at a disadvantage. In Balun Canal beneficiaries receive a grocery bag, in 
Mesbilja the comite de educación prepares a meal when they get the groceries and 
feed all children. 
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 PAL (Programa de Apoyo Alimentario) is an umbrella program that covers 
those that are not able to be served by OPORTUNIDADES due to their level of 
marginalization. PAL includes: 1) monetary support aimed to improved nutrition of 
children, adolescents and pregnant women, 2) support for families with children of 0-
9 years of age to strengthen its development, 3) nutritional supplements for children 
over six months and under two years of age and for pregnant or nursing women, and 
4) fortified milk for children between two and five years. Between OPORTUNIDDAES 
and PAL virtually all the communities in the region are covered. Among the study 
communities PAL is only present in Pajaltón.  
 Government programs in the communities also supply specific supplements 
such as iron, folic acid and vitamin A that are aimed at specific populations. For 
instance, folic acid is given to pregnant women, while iron is given to children. 
Supplements given by the government have a monetary exchange value in the black 
market and it is not uncommon to see these supplement being sold at the local 
market in San Cristobal. Other food items like milk and tuna that are not culturally 
appropriate often become animal feed. Finally, some supplements are used in the 
household by members which the program did not intend to serve (i.e formula being 
drank with coffee by adults). 
 In addition to lack of enforcement and lack of monitoring government 
programs also lack cultural accuracy. These programs overlook the importance of 
existing reciprocal and redistributive institutions between households and among 
communities. Angelucci & De Giorgi (2009) found that cash transfers to eligible 
households had a positive indirect effect on the food security status of an ineligible 
households. Food preference should be taken into account too, for instance tuna, soy 
and milk are commonly used through these programs and while they are universally 
consumed foodstuffs in urban Mexico, they are rarely used in most rural villages 
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especially among indigenous groups. When these foodstuffs are redistributed in Los 
Altos they usually end up being consumed by animals or traded in the black market. 
In summary, there exists differentiated access to food security programs 
provided by the government depending on the local authority’s ability to enroll in the 
programs. Once a community is enrolled in a program lack of enforcement and 
monitoring and a variety of sociocultural factors such as food preference affect the 
correct implementation of the programs. For instance, community members can 
decide not to operationalize programs as they are intended or households may 
decide not to use the resources that they are given to cope with food insecurity. 
Thus, program enrollment does not necessarily translate to increased nutrition for 
the beneficiaries. 
On the other hand, the amount of programs in which a community 
participates can be a good indicator of medium term ability of their local authorities 
to secure access to specific resources and to deal with outside institutions. According 
to this assumption Pajaltón is the most efficient community securing access to 
government programs while Mesbilja is the least efficient.  
Reciprocity and Redistribution Patterns 
The purpose of this chapter is to explain if the patterns of reciprocity and 
redistribution differ between the study communities. Throughout the chapter I have 
shown that participation in reciprocity and redistribution is not exclusionary and that 
communities engage in these exchanges at varied rates and for different reasons. 
 Intra-community reciprocity occurs more frequently in Pajaltón, while inter-
community reciprocity was more frequent in Cañada Grande. Mesbilja is the 
community in which interviewees reported engaging in reciprocal exchanges the 
least citing the incursion of outside institutions as what caused these mechanisms to 
go in disuse.  
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Reallocation of resources through redistribution happens via non-government 
and government institutions. Religious institutions play an important role in intra-
community redistribution among all communities and inter-community redistribution 
in Mesbilja. Data collected through semi-structured interviews explain the existence 
of differentiated religious communities within the studied communities through which 
redistribution take place. I found a negative correlation between the frequency of 
mention between presence of religious institutions and secular institutions. Leading 
us to think that when redistributive functions are covered by secular institutions, 
religious institutions do not play a strong role in redistribution, and vice versa. In the 
next chapter I will study if the presence of traditional or secular institutions have 
effects on food security.  
Before I conducted research I hypothesized that participation in government 
redistribution programs could be considered an indicator of how efficient a 
community is dealing with external institutions. However, data shows that Mesbilja, 
the community with the longest history of government influence, is the one enrolled 
in the least amount of programs. A possible explanation might be that communities 
active agent in how external factors affect them.  
Ethnographic data also confirms a pattern of institutional change among 
communities in which religious conversion has boosted the presence of secularized 
institutions that act to serve the functions of traditional religious institutions that are 
now in disuse. While the process of religious conversion has altered the nature of 
reciprocity and redistribution to some extent, their functions still persist through 
adapted or new mechanisms. However, while some functions off reciprocity and 
redistribution like prestige, status, expanding social networks might be covered by 
these new or adapted mechanisms hey might have implications for the food security 
status of the communities or households. In the next chapter I will expand on the 
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implications on food security that participation in governance and non-market 
exchange has. 
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CHAPTER 6 
FOOD SECURITY AND INSTITUTIONS 
The purpose of this chapter is to explore the relationship between food security and 
the current institutional arrangements in each community. In the last chapter I 
presented an overview of the distinct non-market exchange and governance systems 
that are in use in each community. I will start this chapter by presenting the Food 
Security panorama of each community according to ENSANUT 2012 results. I will 
follow by testing the hypothesis presented in the introduction and discussing the 
results.  
Food Security Status of the Communities 
Food security is a difficult phenomenon to assess. The concept of food security has 
been used extensively as a measure at the household level. A household is 
considered food secure if it has the ability to acquire the food needed by its members 
to have adequate nutrition. However this does not mean that all members in the 
same household experience food security the same way nor that food security can be 
translated into improved nutritional status. Due to the difficulty of assessing food 
security and the variable units of analysis (household and individual) of the data that 
I am using this section aims to give a “big picture” of the food security status of 
most households in the study communities. This approach is limited because some of 
the analysis is at the household level, and to acknowledge the variability of food 
security status within each community I avoid labeling communities as a whole as 
food secure, mildly food secure, moderately food secure, or severely food secure.  
 According to ELCSA scores it is clear that most of the households in these 
communities are unable to have a constant food supply. However, the number and 
degree of food insecurity suffered in these communities differs. First, none of the 
households in the sample scored as food secure. Most of the households fall under 
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the mildly food insecure category. Followed by moderately food insecure households. 
Severely food insecure households are the most uncommon. In Mesbilja and Balun 
Canal there is the same amount of moderately and severely food insecure 
households representing three thirds of their population. In Pajaltón the proportion 
of severely food insecure households is almost three times lower than that 
moderately food insecure. There are no severely food insecure households in Cañada 
Grande (see Table 10 and Figure 10).  
 
Figure 10. Boxplot of ELCSA results per community. 
Figure 10 shows that while there are severely food insecure households in 
three of the communities (Balun Canal, Mesbilja, and Pajaltón) the severely food 
insecure household in Pajaltón is an outlier. Balun Canal and Pajaltón share a median 
value of five (moderately food insecure), while Mesbilja and Cañada Grande have 
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median values of four and three (mildly food insecure). Cañada Grande has both the 
lowest median value and the highest prevalence of moderate food insecurity. Which 
would make it the most food secure of the study communities according to ELCSA.  
 
 
 
Figure 11. Boxplot of number of programs in which a household is enrolled in by 
community. 
The second survey used to analyze food security by ENSANUT 2012 is an 
indicator of the amount of food aid and cash transfer programs aimed at alleviating 
food insecurity in which a household is enrolled in. As shown on Figure 11, there is 
some variability in the amount of programs a household is enrolled in ranging from 
zero to eight. Pajaltón is the community with the greater variability (0-8) and the 
one of the highest medians (Md=2). Balun Canal also has a median of two, but its 
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range is shorter (0-3), with the exception of an outlier that is enrolled in five 
programs. Cañada Grande and Mesbilja share a median of one program per 
household. A closer examination of the programs in which households are enrolled is 
part of Chapter 5.  
Table 10.  
Distribution of food insecurity levels among households in each study community in 
2012. 
Level of food 
insecurity 
Mesbilja Pajaltón  Cañada 
Grande 
Balun Canal 
Secure 0% 0% 0% 0% 
Mild 50% 63% 82% 56% 
Moderate 25% 27% 18% 22% 
Severe 25% 10% 0% 22% 
Smple size 13 11 11 9 
 
ElCSA is an experience based survey, meaning that participants self-report 
their food security status as experienced by them in the last three months. This 
measurement is reliable and valid, but might leave behind other aspects of food 
security such as the nutritional status of an individual. ENSANUT 2012 addresses 
that shortcoming by including an anthropometric component. When combined with 
ELCSA scores this component can shed light into the relationship between nutritional 
status and food security. For instance, anthropometric measurements in the study 
communities show a tendency that goes from underweight toddlers to normal kids 
and teenagers to overweight and obese adults (see Appendix F). Thus, while adults 
are overweight according to anthropometric measurements, they are food insecure 
according to ELCSA scores. Similar findings have been found among poor Americans 
and are referred to as the “hunger-obese paradox”.  
Anthropometric measurements also show that preschoolers are short for their 
age. The average HAZ (Height for Age Z score) score in Mesbilja and Balun Canal is 
<-2SD. Low stature also affects scores on BMI (Body Mass Index) by Age since short 
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kids with a weight in the 10 percentile for their age can score “normal” (see Table 
11). 
Table 11.  
Anthropometric measurements of participants in ENSANUT 2012 in study 
communities. 
Community Adults Teenagers School 
aged 
Preschoolers 
 BMI BAZ BAZ WHZ HAZ WAZ BAZ 
Mesbilja 27.76 0.67 -0.06 0.63 -2.04 -0.70 0.71 
Pajaltón 27.08 0.2 0.59 0.04 -1.76 -1.03 0.25 
Cañada 
Grande 
26.11 -0.00 -0.38 0.46 -1.83 -0.72 0.69 
Balun Canal 26.38 0.62 0 0.18 -2.75 -1.41 0.55 
Total 26.83 0.37 0.04 0.33 -2.1 -.97 -.55 
BMI stands for Body Mass Index; BAZ stands for Body Mass Index by Age valid Z 
score; WHZ stands for Weight by Height valid Z score; HAZ stands for Height by Age 
Valid Z score. The table is color coded to reflect the nutritional status of the 
participants. Scores that denote underweight are shown in red, normal scores appear 
on gold, and overweight scores are shown on green.  
 
Food Security, Reciprocity and Redistribution  
In this section I discuss the hypothesis (H1) that communities with a greater 
presence of inter-community reciprocal institutions are more likely to cope 
successfully against food insecurity.  
Table 12.  
Non-market exchange scores by scale in each community. 
 Intra-
community 
Redistribution 
Inter-
community 
Redistribution 
Intra-
community 
Reciprocity 
Inter-
community 
Reciprocity 
Mesbilja 6 High 4 Low 1 Low 0  
Pajaltón 1 Low 9 High 4 High 1 Low 
Cañada 
Grande 
7 High 6 Medium 2 Medium 3 High 
Balun 
Canal 
3 Medium 9 High 1 Low 1 Low 
 
The intra-community redistribution scale identifies three avenues through 
which foodstuffs are exchanged among members of the same community: church, 
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church, religious festivities and other celebrations (i.e. birthdays).The inter-
community redistribution scale is composed of four mechanisms through which inter-
community redistribution happens: church, basketball, clausura, and religious 
celebrations. The inter-community reciprocity scale codes two items, exchange of 
foodstuffs from households to households of a family member living in another 
community or to a stranger. Similarly the intra-community reciprocity scale identifies 
exchanges that occur within two households from the same community that are 
related by vicinity or kinship.  
As explained in chapter three this study presents results from four study 
communities. The sample size of communties is small and since it does not 
constitute a large random sample these results should not be generalized. However, 
the statistical analysis presented here is used to detect patterns which are 
subsequently explained and contextualized by the rich qualitative data collected by 
the research team. The statistical analysis used here cannot be used to generalize or 
to determine general conclusions of relationships. 
 I used non-parametric tests to test if the median ELCSA scores of the 
communities differed based on their grouping (see Table 12) according to their score 
on the two redistribution and two reciprocity scales. There was no pre-set point for 
the groupings since the range in each scale varied considerably. I tried to be 
consistent and group the results in at least three groups since the non-parametric 
tests used compare the medians of the groups based on their nominal “score”. A 
similar procedure was used to test H2 in the next section. 
As reported in the free lists, participation in redistribution happens via non-
government and government institutions. Religious institutions play an important 
role in intra-community redistribution among all communities and inter-community 
redistribution in Mesbilja. Data collected through semi-structured interviews explain 
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the existence of differentiated religious communities within the studied communities 
through which redistribution take place. I found a negative correlation between the 
frequency of mention between presence of religious institutions and secular 
institutions. Leading us to think that when redistributive functions are covered by 
secular institutions, religious institutions do not play a strong role in redistribution, 
and vice versa.  
As shown on Chapter five, intra-community redistribution is more prevalent in 
Mesbilja and Cañada Grande due to the role of protestant and Catholic churches 
respectively, while Pajaltón and Balun Canal scored lower in the scale. An 
Independent Samples Kruskal-Wallis Test revealed a significant difference in the 
ELCSA scores across three different groups (see Table 12) on the intra-community 
redistribution scale (Gp1, n=11 Low, GP2 n=9 Medium, Gp3 n=23 High, p=001). 
Mesbilja and Cañada Grande, the communities that reported the most intra-
community redistributive exchanges have a combined median ELCSA score of 4 
(Mesbilja Md=4.5 and Cañada Grande Md=3) statistically significantly lower than 
Balun Canal and Pajaltón (Md=5). According to this test there is a positive 
relationship between the median ELCSA scores of households and the amount of 
intra-community redistribution exchanges that community members reported to 
engage in. Communities that reported more intra-community redistribution are more 
food secure according to ELCSA measurements.  
Participation on intra-community redistribution is positively correlated with 
food security. This can be explained by a sharing risk effect in which ill, and needy 
people are able to access resources from their religious group. Mesbilja and Cañada 
Grande the two communities that engaged the most in intra- community 
redistribution did so through religious institutions. Mesbilja is the community in the 
sample that has the highest Non-catholic rate while Cañada Grande is the most 
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catholic of all the study communities. This suggests that there is no relationship 
between the religious affiliation and reciprocity rather than well stablished religious 
groups. Conversion in Mesbilja started in the 1930s and is not an ongoing process, 
but has well stablished religious groups that act as small communities at the interior 
of the larger community of Mesbilja. On the other hand Cañada Grande still remains 
one of the most active communities in the traditional political-religious system and 
the cargo systems and festivities associated with it. Similarly to what occurs in 
Mesbilja affiliation to a religious group, Catholicism in this case, allows individuals 
and families to participate in a group in which resources are redistributed and risks 
are shared.  
Inter-community redistribution was mentioned more frequently in Pajaltón 
and Balun Canal due to a high participation in civic events such as basketball 
tournaments and clausuras, while Mesbilja and Cañada Grande rank in the middle of 
the score. Mesbilja and Cañada Grande showed higher participation on inter-
community redistribution mediated by a religious institution. Another Independent 
Samples Kruskal-Wallis Test showed a statistically significant difference in the ELCSA 
scores across three different groups (see Table 11) on the inter-community 
redistribution scale (Gp1, n=12 Low, GP2 n=20 Medium, Gp3 n=11 High, p=001). 
Pajaltón and Balun Canal (Md=5), the communities that reported the most inter-
community redistibutive exchanges have higher median ELCSA scores than Mesbilja 
(Md=4.5) and Cañada Grande (Md=3). Meaning that Pajaltón and Balun Canal 
inhabitants are more food insecure than their Cañada Grande and Mesbilja 
counterparts. Communities that reported more inter-community redistribution are 
more food insecure according to ELCSA measurements.  
Statistical analysis also shows a negative correlation between frequency in 
reported participation in inter-community redistribution and ELCSA scores. This 
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might be explained by the amount of resources that Pajaltón and Cañada Grande use 
to engage in inter-community redistribution such as clasusuras and basketball 
tournaments and the low return in terms of foodstuffs for its inhabitants. Their 
returns appear to be in prestige and status of the community, this is in agreement 
with the food security and livelihood approach that recognizes that food security is 
not the only goal that a household has, but is one of many (Frankenberger & 
McCaston, 1998b).  
Additionally, it is also worth exploring the impact that different kinds of inter-
community redistribution have on food security. For instance not only frequency of 
mention, but the kind of institution (religious or secular) through which the exchange 
takes place might affect the way that it impacts food security. However, our data is 
not suited to determine the effects of this cofounding variables. 
Intra-community reciprocity was reported more frequently in Pajaltón, 
Further, Independent Samples Kruskal-Wallis Test and Independent Sample Mann-
Whitnney U test showed a statistically significant difference in the ELCSA scores 
across three different groups on the intra-community reciprocity scale (Gp1, n=21 
Low, GP2 n=11 Medium, Gp3 n=11 High, p=001).Mesbilja and Balun Canal the 
communities that reported engaging the least in intra-community reciprocal 
exchanges have higher median ELCSA scores (combined Md=5), than Cañada 
Grande (Md=3) and equal to Pajaltón. Results also indicate that the communities 
that scored the lowest on the inter-community reciprocit scale are those in which 
preschool kids are underweight according to ENSANUT 2012 anthropometric 
measurements (see tables 11 and 12). This finding is supported by other authors 
that have reported a direct relationship between participation in iner’household 
reciprocity and an increased food security status (Martin et al., 2004) 
  112 
 Inter-community reciprocity was more frequent in Cañada Grande. Mesbilja is 
the community in which interviewees reported engaging in reciprocal exchanges the 
least (n=0). Independent Samples Kruskal-Wallis Test and Independent Sample 
Mann-Whitnney U test showed a statistically significant difference in the ELCSA 
scores across two different groups on the inter-community reciprocity scale (Gp1, 
n=20 Low, GP2 n=12 High, p=001). Balun Canal and Pajaltón (ELCSA Md=5) the 
communities that reported the least inter-community reciprocal exchanges have 
higher median ELCSA scores than Cañada Grande (Md=3). Meaning that Pajaltón and 
Balun Canal inhabitants are more food insecure than their Cañada Grande and 
counterparts. Thus, participation in inter-community reciprocity might be linked to 
higher food security. 
As reported by interviewees participation in inter-community reciprocity 
seems to be associated with adding variety to a household diet rather than 
increasing the amount of food available at a certain moment. According to the semi-
structured interviews, some of inter-community reciprocal exchanges are done with a 
stranger and the exchange of food is simultaneous and immediate. The ethnographic 
record shows that in Tenejapa exchanges across households from different ethno 
climates used to be mediated by religious institutions (Cámara Barbachano, 1952; 
Cámara Barbachano, 1966; López Meza, 1996; Medina Hernández, 1991). There is 
little ethnographic evidence showing that was the case in Oxchuc (Siverts, 1969). 
The emergence of a new pattern in which a “broker” is needed to engage in inter-
community reciprocity shows that the function and necessity for this kind of 
exchange persists. However, the institution through which it has customarily taken 
place might no longer be sufficient to take care of the demand or might be in disuse. 
Emic explanations on the reasons of a decrease in inter-household reciprocity at any 
level is the presence of external institutions such as tienda CONASUPO (DICONSA). 
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Etic explanations based on participant observation also include sectorization 
(breaking in groups) of the community due to religious conversion. A claim that is 
supported by recent findings from Keuschnigg and Schikora (2014). 
Numerous studies have proven that inter-household reciprocity is an effective 
risk sharing strategy that protects its participants against food insecurity. This study 
results are consistent with these observations as I found that communities that 
engaged the least in inter and intra-community reciprocity had a higher median 
ELCSA score. Mesbilja and Balun Canal the two communities that reported engaging 
the least in intra-community reciprocity (the most studied kind of reciprocity and the 
one that is directly associated with higher food security levels) are also the two 
communities where preschool aged children score the lowest in their anthropometric 
measurements reinforcing previous findings from other studies. 
I have shown that participation in reciprocity and redistribution is not 
exclusionary. In fact, our results confirm Monogahan’s (1990b) claim that reciprocity 
and redistribution are interlinked. This is clear in religious festivities where for 
instance, community wide redistributive religious festivities could not be possible 
without “pulling” resources from the sponsor’s social capital in form of reciprocity. 
Redistribution through civic institutions (i.e. clausura, basketball tornaments) follow 
this pattern at a different level, resources for an event are solicited from a high 
ranking authority whom in repayment might ask for a favor (i.e. political support 
from the community). Thus, religious redistributive arrangements use inter-
household reciprocity, while civic redistributive arrangements use institution to actor 
reciprocity.  
In summary, communities engage in reciprocal and redistributive exchanges 
at varied frequencies and for different reasons. Engagement in reciprocal and intra-
community redistribution is positively associated with higher levels of food security 
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while inter-community redistribution is negatively associated with food security. 
Reciprocal and redistributive arrangements happen through religious and non-
religious institutions. In communities where religious institutions have a decreased 
importance civic institutions have taken over their non-market functions. However, 
new mechanisms do not act in the same way that traditional mechanisms do. For 
instance, foodstuffs obtained through participation in government redistribution do 
not adapt to fluctuations in the need of households and are not based on reciprocal 
ties. Participation in redistribution that occurs through traditional religious-political 
system serves as a mean for upward mobility by providing access to scarce 
resources (i.e. products from another ethno-climate) and affirms ethnic identity and 
community solidarity (Barlett, 1980).  
Another important aspect to think about is that participation in civic or secular 
institutions might be fostering individual ethics rather than a community sense. 
Though our research did not directly collected data on this, civic or secular 
institutions seem to be associated with fostering competition (i.e basketball) and 
individual status (i.e. comite de educación) instead of collaboration (i.e. ayuda 
mutual). From all the kinds of institutions and mechanisms studied here only 
government redistribution has the explicit function of increasing food security, all the 
other mechanisms have a variety of functions and increasing food supply or variety 
is only one of them. Social entities might engage in one kind of non-market 
exchange rather than other based on these other functions.  
Cañada Grande the community that has the lowest ELCSA median score is the 
one whose inhabitants reported participating the most in intra- community 
redistribution and inter-community reciprocity. Similarly, Pajaltón and Balun Canal 
the communities that engaged the least in these two kinds of exchange were ranked 
as more food insecure according to ELCSA scores. Another finding is that 
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communities (Pajaltón and Balun Canal) that reported participating in more inter-
community redistribution are more food insecure than their counterparts. A probable 
cause could be that they are focusing a great amount of resources into engaging in 
food exchanges with other communities and they are not receiving back food, but 
recognition and status.  
Governance and Food Security 
In this section I discuss the hypothesis (H2) that communities with stronger local 
institutions are more likely to secure outside resources from governmental programs, 
therefore their inhabitants are more food secure.  
Through the use of grounded theory and confirmed by the ethnographic 
record (Cámara Barbachano, 1952; Cámara Barbachano, 1966; Gómez Santiz, 2011; 
Medina Hernández, 1991; Siverts, 1969; Villa Rojas & Echánove Trujillo, 1946; Villa 
Rojas, 1990) I identify two distinct governance systems in the study communities. 
Using the Traditional Authority and Civic Authority scales I placed the study 
communities in a governance continuum that goes from traditional to civic. The 
scales showed that there is a trend among communities where a strong presence of 
traditional authorities leads to a low presence of civic authorities and vice versa (see 
Table 13). This trend is clearer in Pajaltón and Cañada Grande, while Balun Canal 
and Mesbilja rank in the middle on both scales. These two non-exclusionary systems 
are present in all communities, but the importance that either one of them has 
differs. Findings suggest that importance of one system decreases as importance of 
the other system increases.  
James Dow (2009; 2001) suggests that the religious authority against which 
Protestantism in indigenous communities is protesting is not the Catholic Church, but 
the authority of “traditional civil-religious hierarchies” (traditional authorities). Thus 
one can suspect that religious conversion can be linked to a decrease in the 
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importance of traditional governance systems evidence does not support that claim. 
In our four community sample, Pajaltón (47.4 % protestant) scored the highest in 
the civic authority scale and lower in the traditional scale, Mesbilja (82.5% 
protestant) scored in the middle of both scales,  Balun Canal (64.5% protestant) 
scored low on both scales and Cañada Grande (20.8% protestant) scored high on the 
traditional scale and low on the civic scale. If religious conversion was associate with 
decreased importance of traditional authorities, Mesbilja would scored highest on the 
civic scale followed by Balun Canal, Pajaltón and Cañada Grande.  
Table 13.  
 Authority scales scores band ELCSA median by community. 
 Civic Authority Traditional 
Authority 
Median 
ELCSA 
score 
Median 
No of 
programs 
Mesbilja 4 Medium 6 Medium 4.5 1 
Pajaltón 14 High 3 Low 5 2 
Cañada 
Grande 
3 Low 9 High 3 1 
Balun Canal 3 Low 3 Low 5 2 
 
A Kruskal-Wallis Test and an independent samples median test revealed a 
significant difference in the distribution of the number of food aid programs in which 
households are enrolled across three different groups (see Table 19) on the Civic 
Authority scale (Gp1, n=20 Low, GP2 n=12 Medium, Gp3 n=11 High, p=001). 
Pajaltón, the highest ranking community in the Civic Authority scale, recorded a 
higher median score (Md=2) than the other three communities (Cañada Grande and 
Balun Canal combined Md=1.5, Mesbilja Md=1). According to this test there is a 
statistically significant difference in the median number of food aid programs in 
which a household is enrolled in and the community’s score on the civic authority 
scale and those who scored lower. The relationship between high score on the civic 
authority scale and level of food insecurity is positive.  
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Another Kruskal-Wallis Test and Independent Samples Median Test revealed a 
statistically significant difference in the number of food aid programs in which 
households are enrolled across three different groups on the Traditional Authority 
scale (Gp1, n=9 Low, GP2 n=21 Medium, Gp3 n=12 High, p=001). Pajaltón, the two 
lowest ranking community in the scale, recorded a higher median enrollment (Md=2) 
than Mesbilja and Balun Canal the medium ranking community (Md=1.5) and 
Cañada Grande the highest ranking community (Md= 1) in the Traditional authority 
scale. Suggesting a negative relationship. 
Results from these tests suggest that communities with a higher civic score 
are more likely to be enrolled in more programs, while communities with a higher 
traditional authority score will be enrolled in fewer programs. However, these tests 
do not establish if there is a relationship between being enrolled in more programs 
and being more food secure. The experience based food insecurity survey (as 
measured by ELCSA) and the number of governmental programs in which a 
household is enrolled (as described by the Survey on Nutrition and Distribution of 
Foodstuffs) were investigated using Spearman’s rank order correlation. Preliminary 
analyses were performed to ensure no violation of the assumptions of linearity and 
homoscedasticity. There was a small positive correlation between the two variables 
(rho=.102, n=43, p<.01), indicating that there is a weak relationship between 
participation in food aid programs and the perceived food security status of the 
households. The coefficient of determination of .01 also shows that there is not much 
overlap between the two variables.  
I used another Kruskal-Wallis Test to test if there is a relationship between 
the kind of prevalent governance system used in the community and the median 
ELCSA score. The results revealed a significant difference in the distribution of food 
security levels over households based on ELCSA scores across three different groups 
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on the Civic Authority scale (Gp1, n=20 Low, GP2 n=12 Medium, Gp3 n=11 High, 
p=001). Pajaltón, the highest ranking community in the scale, recorded a higher 
median score (Md=5) than the other three communities (combined Md=4.5). 
According to this test there is a statistically significant difference in the median food 
security status of those communities that ranked low on the civic authority scale and 
the community that scored the highest. The relationship between high score on the 
civic authority scale and level of food insecurity is positive.  
Another Kruskal-Wallis Test revealed a statistically significant difference in the 
distribution of food security levels based on ELCSA scores across three different 
groups on the Traditional Authority scale (Gp1, n=9 Low, GP2 n=21 Medium, Gp3 
n=12 High, p=001). Balun Canal and Pajaltón, the two lowest ranking communities 
in the scale, recorded a higher median ELCSA score (combined Md=5) than Mesbilja 
the medium ranking community (Md=4.5), and Cañada Grande the highest ranking 
community (Md= 3) in the traditional authority scale. There was a statistically 
significant difference on the median ELCSA score of the communities based on their 
traditional authority score. The relationship is negative, thus communities that score 
higher on the traditional authority scale tend to have higher median ELCSA values 
than their lower scoring counterparts.  
Statistical analysis shows that communities with a higher score on the civic 
authority scale tend to participate in more programs than their lower scoring 
counterparts. Since there is a negative relation between the importance of civic and 
traditional governance systems, this finding also suggests that communities that 
rank higher in the traditional authority scale tend to participate in less government 
programs. A short coming of this finding that the traditional scale uses sanctioning 
and enforcement as a proxy and due to monetization comites that sanction more 
have access to more monetary resources needed to enroll its members in programs. 
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However participation in food security programs does not translate in increased food 
security. 
During fieldwork we found that unlike in most Mexican communities 
enrollment in government programs only happens in the study communities if the 
community authorities (comites) decide to enroll in a program. For state programs 
this means that comites should know about the existence of a program, gather the 
recruitment forms and enroll their community members in the seat of the 
municipality. This process is costly (time and resources) for the authorities since they 
have to invest time and money in recruitment, filling out formats and traveling. 
Enrollment to federal programs occurs after being selected by the program 
administrators in San Cristobal or Tuxtla Gutierrez (state capital), then community 
leaders are contacted and they decide in a junta de comite or asamblea general if 
they will allow program recruiters to enter the community. Thus, enrollment in 
programs is mediated through the local authorities.  
The amount of programs in which a community participates can be a good 
indicator of medium term ability of their local authorities to secure access to specific 
resources and to deal with outside institutions. Reallocation of resources through 
government redistribution programs can be considered an indicator of how efficient a 
community is dealing with external institutions. However as described in the previous 
chapter, this relationship can be attenuated by ineffective use of resources once they 
get to the communities. 
In summary, communities that score higher on the civic authority scale are 
more likely to secure outside resources (cash transfers and food aid) through 
government programs. This can be explained by their ability to deal with external 
institutions (i.e. state agencies) and the amount of resources needed to get enrolled 
in these programs.  
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There exists differentiated access to food security programs provided by the 
government depending on the local authority’s ability and willingness to enroll in the 
programs. Statistical analysis suggests that there is little relationship between the 
amount of programs that a household is participating in and an increased food 
security status. Ethnographic evidence shows that a lack of enforcements, 
monitoring and a variety of sociocultural factors affect the correct implementation of 
the programs. For instance, community members can decide not to operationalize 
programs as they are intended or households may decide not to use the resources 
that they are given to cope with food insecurity. Thus, program enrollment does not 
necessarily translate to increased nutrition.  
This statistical result is in line with our initial finding that communities that rank as 
having a higher presence of traditional authorities (which are the ones that 
participate in less government programs) are more food secure according to ELCSA 
scores than the ones that score the highest on the Civic authority scale. Since 
statistical analysis for the first finding (ELCSA score and anthropometric scores as 
related to participation in programs) where done using the household as unit of 
analysis, confirming our previous finding done using the community as the unit of 
analysis further validates the results presented in the previous sections. 
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CHAPTER 7 
CONCLUSIONS 
This study was designed to answer how local reciprocal and redistributive 
institutions have changed and what are their implications for food security? Through 
this study I have presented data about four Tseltal communities in Los Altos de 
Chiapas that have a deep shared history and culture, but whose recent history has 
taken them through different institutional adaptation paths. These communities are 
active agents on the way that their institutions change.  
Summary 
Mesbilja, Pajaltón, Cañada Grande and Balun Canal the Tseltal communities studied 
in this dissertation differ from each other. Mesbilja, Oxchuc is the only hot weathered 
or tierra caliente community in this study. Mesbilja’s history of institutional changes 
started in the 1930s via government intervention through schools and religious 
conversion through American missionaries. Despite that, with Cañada Grande they 
are the two communities in the study that still have traditional authorities. 
Traditional authorities in Mesbilja are called mayores and participate actively in the 
election of the civic authorities in the communities. In Mesbilja, traditional and civic 
authorities are secular. Religious secularism is important as close to 90% of the 
population is not Catholic. There are seven different religions in Mesbilja and 
religious affiliation commands inter-household interactions including reciprocity. 
Semi-structured interviews show that inter-community reciprocity, intra-community 
redistribution an inter-community redistribution happen mainly among members of 
the same religious group. Mesbilja has not much food so distributing among their 
own households is the only thing they can do. Mesbilja is also the only community in 
the study that produces a cash crop. When the price of coffee is good selling coffee is 
another strategy that households use to secure resources including food. Variability 
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in the price of coffee affects all producers in the community at the same time, thus if 
one household is in need others might be in need too preventing households from 
practicing inter-community reciprocity.  
Pajaltón, Tenejapa is the most geographically marginalized community in this 
sample. It is located on the top of a mountain and its rocky terrain makes it costly 
for its inhabitants to commute from one household to another or to go to other 
communities. Foodstuffs are scarce in Pajaltón. Stores have a limited supply of non-
perishable products mainly junk food and Coca-cola. The dirt road that connects 
Pajaltón to the commercial center of Tenejapa is practically unusable during the rainy 
season. Thus, acquiring, selling or exchanging foodstuffs from May to October is 
complicated. Reciprocity occurs between households in the community as “lending” 
or “selling” on credit at no or very low interest. Inter-community reciprocity and 
redistribution are limited, perhaps due to the difficulty in accessing other 
communities. Residents of Pajaltón have an active comite de educación and their 
Asamblea General meets frequently. There are no traditional authorities in Pajaltón. I 
suspect they had traditional authorities until recently since some people were 
unaware of the fact that they no longer elected bankilal and reroll in the community. 
The authorities in Pajaltón take justice enforcement seriously and fine people for a 
variety of reasons (i.e attendance, wasting water, not behaving properly). Most of 
the sanctions are paid in money or cases of Coca-cola. Money collected through 
sanctions is used to pay for the fiesta de clausura. Residents of Pajaltón have great 
pride in the cash prize that they offer for the basketball tournaments.  
Cañada Grande is the community that has the lowest percent of religious 
conversion and the highest score on the Traditional Authority Scale from the study 
communities. In Cañada Grande institutions from the traditional and civic 
governance systems function together. This kind of syncretism is also seen at the 
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municipal level in Tenejapa. The bankilal and reroll are active members of the comite 
de educación, and are part of the Asamblea General. Women and children are 
regular assistants to the Asamblea General in which they have voice, but cannot 
vote. Justice is administer by the bankilal and reroll. Most sanctions are paid in 
community service. Inter-community redistribution takes place in Cañada Grande 
through religious festivities, including the cargo system and May 3rd whose function 
is to maintain the universe in equilibrium. Occupying and acting well in positions in 
the traditional political religious system still gives actors good reputation that can be 
used to access higher positions within the civic or traditional governance systems.  
Balun Canal is the community with the lowest degree of education and one of 
the two communities that is most food insecure according to ELCSA 2012 scores. 
Balun Canal scored lowest on both governance scales. There are no traditional 
authorities. Civic authorities are in charge of organizing the fiesta de clausura in 
which they kill a bull and feed any assistants to the fiesta. Balun Canal is known in 
the region for this meal. Resources used to pay for the bull come from monetary 
sanctions paid to the comite and through donations from high ranking politicians. 
Balun Canal was the most difficult community to work in because comite members 
were inconsistent about what they had agreed with us. In addition, many community 
members were reluctant to participate in the study. Participant observation of 
several meetings of the comite lead me to think that the prestige that killing a bull 
gives to the community is a priority. For instance, there was a heated debate about 
what should I provide the community in exchange to permission to collect data, 
some members of the comite including the president thought that I should pay them 
as a community for the rights to be in the community, other members thought that a 
compensation in foodstuff (1k of rice) to participants was fair. The discussion in 
Tseltal in which my assistants interfered to convinced them about the economic 
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limitations that I had finished on an agreement to compensate participants and 
provide the comite with four boxes of Coca-cola (one for them to drink in that 
moment and three more for the fiesta).  
Main findings 
Through this study I have presented evidence that in Tenejapa and Oxchuc 
traditional religious-political institutions are being replaced. In Oxchuc, the traditional 
governance system (Calpul) is being replaced by external institutions (Ayuntamiento 
Municipal) that have been imposed by the federal and state government since the 
1930s. In Tenejapa, external and traditional governance institutions have merged. 
Non-market exchange institutions are also changing, inter-community redistribution 
occurs now through government and Protestant institutions displacing Catholic 
fiestas. The disuse of region wide festivities has altered the way in which contact 
between people from different communities take place and has modified the manner 
in which inter-community reciprocity happen. The incursion of external institutions 
and disturbances has prompted a shift in social organization and resource use 
patterns. Though, these changes seem to be occurring in the terms of each 
community. Communities incorporate their existing needs and functions in the new 
institutions, and privilege different functions such as prestige, food security, 
maintaining inter-communities ties and histories.  
Variation in the process of religious conversion and the increase of secular 
(civic) organization has altered the nature of reciprocity and redistribution. Religious 
organization remains a primary mechanism of redistribution and reciprocity, but in 
most communities religious membership dictates who can exchange with whom. 
Practices of social exclusion restrict flux of foodstuffs among members of a 
community which can be translated in more intra-community variability in food 
access and security. Also different churches might have different norms (i.e. 
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communal, individualistic) that can impact food redistribution practices. An increase 
in secularism has prompted the use of external institutions to comply with the 
functions of institutions that are in disuse or have lost importance (i.e. cargo system, 
traditional authorities). Since food procurement is one of many of the functions that 
traditional and new institutions have, the use of these new institutions might fulfill 
other functions, but have different effects on the food security status of the 
communities. For example, the substitution of basketball for religious ceremonies 
may fulfill the functions of prestige and recognition within and between communities 
but the implications for access to and distribution of food at the household and 
community level might be different than that of fiestas because they are based in 
money rather than the exchange of foodstuffs. Despite these changes, these non-
market exchange mechanisms persist to some extent and are positively associated 
with food security.  
Table 14.  
Governance, non-market exchange and food security scores of the study 
communities. 
 Religiou
s 
Convers
ion 
Percent 
Civic 
Author
ity 
Score 
Traditio
nal 
Authorit
y Score 
Intra-
communit
y 
Redistribu
tion 
Inter-
communit
y 
Redistribu
tion 
Intra-
commu
nity 
Reciproc
ity 
Inter-
commu
nity 
Reciproc
ity 
ELCS
A 
medi
an 
Scor
e 
Mesbi
lja 
91.8 4 6 6 4 1 0 4.5 
Pajalt
on 
56.8 14 3 1 9 4 1 5 
Caña
da 
Grand
e 
49 3 9 7 6 2 3 3 
Balun 
Canal 
73.6 3 3 3 9 1 1 5 
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I explored the relationship between types of governance systems and forms of 
reciprocity and redistribution, and between these institutions and food security. I 
found that participation in each of these mechanisms fulfills a different function. For 
instance, participation in reciprocity affects the amount and diversity of a 
household´s food supply. While participation in intra-community redistribution 
(ayuda mutua) is an emergency strategy. As described in chapters five and six many 
forms of reciprocity and redistribution are episodic and irregular and the food 
distributed is not substantive. Participation in these exchanges might not have a long 
term effect on the nutritional status of individuals, but might serve to establish good 
will and social capital, that is then implemented in inter-household reciprocity such 
as visitas.  
Findings from this study suggest that in marginalized communities that many 
scientists would describe as experiencing market failure, participation in inter-
community reciprocal, intra-community reciprocal, and intra-community 
redistribution are better predictors of food security than enrolment in food security 
programs. Moreover, I found that communities that participated the most in these 
non-market mechanisms have stronger traditional institutions, which previous 
decade long government policies like indigenismo have tried to diminish. A 
shortcoming of the study is that it is not clear if the effectiveness of government 
programs would be increased by acknowledging the existence of these non-market 
mechanisms or by other strategies such as monitoring and enforcing. However, it is 
clear that an increased awareness of sociocultural norms such as food preference or 
knowledge of the governance system could improve program implementation. 
Another implication emerging from my research is that communities have 
differentiated access to food redistribution programs. In theory, state food security 
programs in Chiapas are intended to benefit those who need them the most 
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regardless of their location, but current operationalization of the programs requires 
monetary resources, time, and understanding of outside institutions to be 
implemented. For some communities these requirements might seriously limit their 
ability to enroll in programs. Careful planning from state authorities is needed to 
level the chances of all communities to participate in these programs, even if 
enrollment in programs is not directly associated with better food security.  
Another interesting finding is that mention of participation in non-market 
mechanisms in free lists did not necessarily match the qualitative data collected 
through semi-structured interviews. Answering questions about participation in 
reciprocal and redistributive arrangements provided more information on which 
communities engage in these exchanges than the free lists. For instance, according 
to the free lists Mesbilja residents do not participate in intra-community reciprocity. 
Nonetheless, participation in intra-community redistribution in Mesbilja was recorded 
through semi-structured interviews. This accentuates the importance of combining 
quantitative instruments with more in-depth qualitative narratives.  
Limitations 
This dissertation addresses how governance systems, reciprocity and 
redistribution affect food security in four Tseltal communities. One of the limitations 
of this research is that there are only four communities in the study. A larger sample 
size would help us to understand if the findings from these four communities are part 
of a broader regional pattern. 
Other limitations include the mismatch between ENSANUT 2012 data and the 
ethnographic data collected by the research team. First, there is a two year 
mismatch between the data sets. Since we were collecting data on institutions that 
act within longer time frames I did not foresee this mismatch having a big impact on 
  128 
our results, yet this does not exclude the possibility that this mismatch can affect the 
results.  
 Additionally, there is a discrepancy on the unit of analysis. ENSANUT 2012 
measurements are collected at the household level while we were trying to collect 
data at the community level. Data were collected from actors in a variety of positions 
that represent the community and were contrasted and complemented with data 
obtained from lay community members that are part of households. However, since 
we lack specific information on which households participated in ENSANUT we did not 
attempt to pair them. Nonetheless, since statistical analysis done with ENSANUT 
variables confirmed statistical analysis done with our data set I assume that this 
discrepancy has a limited effect on the study results.  
Policy implications  
There is a mismatch between the current theoretical holistic view on food and 
nutritional security that some scientists have gained and the FAO’s food security 
definition that is extensively used by governments and governmental institutions. 
This mismatch has tended to focus official approaches combatting food insecurity on 
improving food access through food and/or cash redistribution at the household 
level. This study shows that redistribution programs in Mexico overlook the 
importance of existing informal relations and exchanges between households and 
among communities; putting these interventions at serious risk of failing due to 
incorrect implementation.  
This study provides evidence that in these communities government 
redistribution programs are not a successful strategy to increase food security. 
Qualitative data shows that lack of monitoring and enforcement affect the 
implementation of these programs at the community and household level. For 
instance culturally inappropriate foodstuffs were used to feed animals or sold in the 
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black market. Operational rules of Oportunidades and other programs prohibit selling 
these foodstuffs, and while program promotors are aware that the foodstuffs are sold 
in the black market they do not sanction nor investigate the issue. Any effort on 
enforcing or monitoring appropriate use and distribution of the food aid would be 
unsuccessful if it does not take into account cultural norms. Personnel that 
implements these programs should be trained in cultural competency and regional 
variation of the programs should allow for differences in the implementation in each 
region. 
Also, attention to existing forms of reciprocity and redistribution could be 
significant in increasing food security. Foodstuffs can be redistributed through 
existing institutions such as fiestas de clausura, but enforcement would be needed to 
ensure that resources are used to distribute food. Investing in strengthening local 
governance systems (being careful to not form cacicazgos) might support existing 
relationships between communities, and promote inter-household reciprocity that 
enhances food security. In general, forms of government intervention that support 
social capital formation rather than attempt to substitute it might be more 
successful.  
Recommendations 
An area for future research includes examining the effect that religious heterogeneity 
has on cooperation and governance systems. There are few studies on the effects 
that heterogeneity of participants have in cooperation games (Santos, Santos, & 
Pacheco, 2008), but there is little ethnographic data about the effects of religious 
heterogeneity in governance systems..  
Another area that needs further examination is the presence of the obesity-
hunger paradox among Tseltal adults. ENSANUT 2012 captures quantitative 
information about this phenomenon, but this issue has not been explored in Mexico. 
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Qualitative data could also shed light into how food insecurity and overweight 
intersect among indigenous populations. Similarly, studies about the food 
environments of these communities are important to understand the paradox. The 
other, important line of research, which is tied to the paradox, are ethnographies of 
the body that capture indigenous expectations and preferences about male and 
female bodies.  
Finally, the questions this research addressed, and some of the findings also 
need to be studied in other populations. There are groups that continue to be cited 
as traditional and engaging in reciprocal and redistributive arrangements, and those 
cultural assertions need to be reassessed in light of changes in the structures of 
communities. The effectiveness of food aid programs also needs to be reconsidered.  
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Team member selection. The team was formed by me and three local college 
graduates in the social sciences (two sociologists and one historian) that were hired 
as assistants (Bernard, 2011; 198). The assistants were researchers and translators 
performing data collection and transcription. The team was trained exhaustively 
during one week to familiarize them with the research protocol.  
I spent the first 10 days of my stay in San Cristobal recruiting and 
interviewing possible team members. Prior to my arrival I contacted the Social 
Sciences Department at the Universidad Autonoma de Chiapas. The academic 
secretary and a professor where crucial in aiding me in the recruitment process and 
provided me with materials and a place to conduct the interviews and the training. I 
interviewed 15 individuals most of who spoke Tseltal, however despite the fact that 7 
prospects agreed to participate in the study only 4 went trained. At the end 3 of 
those completed the training satisfactorily.  
The training period helped me to determine the interpersonal dynamics of the 
group that was composed by me, twin sisters and a college friend of them. The team 
members are al social scientists that are proficient in different techniques, but had to 
learn ethnographic methods. I had planned to recruit team members under the 
assumption that knowledge and proficiency in research methods can be acquired, but 
developing appropriate team dynamics would be difficult (Canon-Bower & Salas, 
1998).  
Team training. The goal of the training was to enable all the team members 
to interact interdependently and adaptively toward a common goal (research 
objectives). In addition, each member's roles and functions were explicitly defined. 
The training was designed keeping in mind that team training works when the 
training is theoretically driven, focused on required competencies, and designed to 
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provide trainees with realistic opportunities to practice and receive feedback (Salas & 
Cannon-Bowers, 2001). 
Using the Interviewer's Manual from the Survey Research Center at the 
University of Michigan (1976) as a guide I created a manual in Spanish that detailed 
the approach of the study, the objective, each reseracher´s responsibilities. The 
manual also included explanations of all the research techniques that were used in 
the field, step by step procedures and excercises that were used during the training. 
In addition the manual had information on data management and naming procedures 
for files. The training manual was designed using a constructivist approach to teach 
the team members data collection techniques.  
A crucial part of the training was to stablish a horizontal hierarchy and to 
include me in the team. Rogers-Dillon (2005) has pointed out the importance of a 
team's hierarchy on their success. He points out at least two critical issues that have 
to be taken into account when planning qualitative field research: first, many ethical 
issues an judgment calls cannot be anticipated in advance and must be addressed 
while in the field (see ethical dilemmas section); second there is the need to create 
consistency in the research protocol and internal validity among observations by 
different team members. To address the second concern, team members were made 
aware of how subjective their own observations are. Then we tested internal validity 
until they agreed on the observations.  
Team members were instructed to practice self- correction techniques as that 
is the naturally occurring tendency for effective teams. Members had the opportunity 
to debrief themselves by reviewing their past performance, identifying and 
diagnosing errors, discussing remedial strategies, and planning for the future 
(Canon-Bower & Salas, 1998).As part of the training and acknowledging the 
  142 
expertise of the team, members were allowed to correct the protocol before we 
started. They aided in diagnosing and solving practical problems in the protocol. 
Including them in the decision making process increased the level of commitment 
with the research and reduced the hierarchical structure of the team. 
Research rigor. As pointed out before, special considerations have to be 
taken at each stage of the research process due to the multi-site and team based 
nature of the study. McLellan, MacQueen and Neidig (2003) state that robust data 
collection techniques as well as research procedures are necessary when conducting 
team based research at each stage. Additionally, Crawford, Leybourne & Arnott 
(2000) suggest that developing a framework prior to commencing data collection and 
analysis helps to ensure rigor. Rigor is shown in the clear documentation of the 
research process since it allows replicability.  
In addition, Guba and Lincoln (1985) point out four criteria conventionally 
used for assessing the quality of research: internal validity, external validity, 
reliability and objectivity. Internal validity is the extent to which variations in an 
outcome or dependent variable can be attributed to controlled variation in an 
independent variable (Crawford, Leybourne & Arnott, 2000). In other words, internal 
validity means that the changes in the dependent variables are probably caused by 
the treatment (Bernard, 2011). However, the use of internal validity is more 
prevalent in quantitative research rather than qualitative. Specifically, there is a 
strong tradition of assessing internal -and external- validity in experiments started 
by Donald Campbell and his team (Bernard, 2011; Onwuegbuzie & McLean, 2003). 
Although we will not be conducting experiments some of the threats to internal 
validity described by Campbell are still applicable. Due to the nature of our study 
special attention will be paid to the history, maturation, testing and instrumentation 
confounds as defined by Bernard (2011). 
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External validity is the inference that the presumed causal relationship can be 
generalized across alternate measures of cause and effect and across different types 
of persons, settings and times (Crawford, Leybourne & Arnott, 2000). External 
validity is achieved through continual replication (Bernard, 2011). Bernard (2011), 
argued that ultimately, the validity of a concept depends on the utility of the device 
that measures it and the collective judgment of the scientific community that a 
construct and its measure are valid. Valid measurement makes valid data, but 
validity itself depends on the collective opinion of researchers”. This study will 
achieve external validity by having a high level of replicability due to clear 
documentation of the research process and by investigating a wide spread 
phenomena ensuring that different settings, populations and treatment variables 
exist to replicate the study. 
 Reliability is a precondition for validity and refers to a study's consistency, 
predictability, dependability, stability and accuracy (Crawford, Leybourne & Arnott, 
2000). This study is concerned with achieving instrument and inter-rater reliability. 
Instrument reliability refers to whether or not someone gets the same answer by 
using an instrument to measure something more than once (Bernard, 2011). 
Instrument reliability will be achieved by using instruments that have been used by 
other researchers like the NEMS-S survey (CITE) and by testing and modifying the 
instruments that the team will develop. Further, exit quality data measures such as 
suspiciousness of lie, interference by another subject or any other circumstance that 
could have altered the data collection process will be collected with each instrument. 
These measurements will be used to test instrument reliability.  
 Inter-rater reliability is used to determine whether two observers are being 
consistent in their observations. During the training team members performed 
different inter-rater reliability exercises to enable them to “see with the same eyes”. 
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Since data collection was performed in different communities at the same time there 
was no way to check inter-rater reliability once data collection started.  
Objectivity is a demonstration that the inquiry is free of bias, values and 
prejudice (Crawford, Leybourne & Arnott, 2000). Objectivity is the skill to become 
aware of one's experiences, opinions and values and acquire accurate knowledge by 
transcending our biases (Bernard, 2011). Bernard points out that objectivity is not 
equivalent to value neutrality since every researcher is affected by the work he or 
she does. Objectivity is the hardest of all the quality criteria to acquire since it 
requires observer's detachment from subjective experience and in this case there are 
four researchers. Objectivity will be achieved by switching back and forth between 
insider's view and that of analyst by having a colleague with whom the research 
team can talk things over regularly as suggested by Jorgensen (1989 cited by 
Bernard, 2011).  
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1. Trabajo en equipo 
 
“Un equipo es un numero pequeno de personas con 
habilidades complementarias que estan 
comprometidas con un proposito en comun, metas 
de desempen y enfoque el cual son mutuamente 
responsables” (Katzenbasch and Smith 1993:45).  
 
Introduccion 
Este proyecto se daesarrollara con la ayuda de un equipo de trabajo donde cada 
miembro tendra a su cargo la arecoleccion de datos en una comunidad. La validez y 
calidad de los datos recolectados depende directamente de la manera en la que cada 
uno de los miembros del equipo lleva acabo la recollection y transcripcion de datos. 
En este manula encontraremos una guia para estandarizar y hacer eficiente cada 
parte de la investigacion y ejemplos de las transcripciones. Asi como una descripcion 
del proyecto y un calendario de actividades y metas. 
Reglas basicas 
El exito de este proyecto depende de todos los miembros del equipo, de nuestra 
capacidad para diagnosticar problemas, crear soluciones y trabajar juntos con un fin 
comun. Trabajar en equipo a pesar de que estaremos trabajando de manera 
individual puede ser dificil por eso es necesario siempre tener en cuenta que las 
primeras semanas seran parte de un period en el que nos estaremos familiarizando 
tanto con las herramientas, last areas y los miembros del equipo. La comunicacion 
es clave en esta etapa. Todos los comentarios y sugerencias son siempre 
bienvenidos en este equipo.  
Tambien es importante tener bien en claro cuales son las tareas que acda uno de los 
miembros del equip ova a realizer, como, cuando y donde se deben realizar. Todos 
tenemos un rol especifico. Pregunta,pregunta, pregunta si tienes alguna duda. 
Todos podemos ayudarte. Opina si tienes una idea. Este se un equipo donde las 
jerarquias son minimas y yo (Sindy) asumire la ultima palabra cuando haya algun 
conflicto. 
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2. El Proyecto 
Este estudio utiliza el caso de Los Altos de Chiapas para examinar el papel que las 
instituciones de reciprocidad entre las comunidades juegan para hacer frente a la 
inseguridad alimentaria a nivel meso. Usando el marco de Análisis Institucional y 
Desarrollo ( IAD ) de Elinor Ostrom esta tesis explora la relación que las variables 
exógenas, como el tamaño y composición de las comunidades, el régimen de uso del 
suelo y la presencia de programas de ayuda alimentaria tienen sobre el uso de las 
instituciones de reciprocidad entre las comunidades para hacer frente contra la 
inseguridad alimentaria. Una amplia investigación sobre la reciprocidad en los 
hogares muestra que los hogares que reciprocan son menos vulnerables a la escasez 
de recursos. De la misma manera, se espera que las comunidades que se dedican a 
la reciprocidad inter comunal serán menos vulnerables a la inseguridad alimentaria 
transitoria y otros tipos de escasez. 
Las comunidades de Los Altos , como muchas otras comunidades de todo el mundo ( 
por ejemplo, el valle central de California, zonas cafeteras de Colombia ) se 
enfrentan a la paradoja de que se dedican a la producción de cultivos comerciales, 
mientras que sus habitantes sufren de inseguridad alimentaria. Estos cambios en la 
producción de subsistencia a producción para exportación senalan modificaciones 
profundas en la estructura de poder y las normas sociales de estas comunidades. En 
Los Altos , los investigadores han encontrado que las conversiones religiosas y los 
conflictos políticos han causado expulsiones generalizadas reconfigurando la región. 
Las teorías actuales de la Nueva Institucionalidad prevén que nuevas instituciones 
surgirán o / y que las instituciones actuales se adaptarán . Es imperativo examinar 
las instituciones reciprocas intercomunitarias ya que muchas de las fuentes 
comunitarias de riesgo para la seguridad alimentaria de las familias residen en el 
desmoronamiento de las instituciones de reciprocidad.  
Preguntas de investigación e hipótesis 
Esta tesis utiliza el Marco de Análisis Institucional y Desarrollo (Ostrom, 2005 ) para 
preguntar: ¿Cuál es el papel de los arreglos institucionales entre las 
comunidades para hacer frente a las amenazas a la seguridad alimentaria? 
Con el fin de adquirir conocimientos sobre estos acuerdos , primero tenemos que 
determinar : 
 
1) ¿Qué instituciones recíprocas hay en distintos niveles ? 
2) ¿Qué papel desempeñan estas instituciones recíprocas para hacer frente a la 
inseguridad alimentaria? 
3) ¿De qué manera los atributos específicos de cada comunidad, las normas y las 
condiciones biofísicos afectan la presencia de instituciones intercomunitarias 
recíprocas? 
 
Con base en la literatura sobre la nueva institucionalidad, el capital social y la 
reciprocidad se esperan encontrar una mayor presencia (cantidad y frecuencia de 
uso) de las instituciones intercomunitarias recíprocas en las comunidades donde: 
 
H1. Hay menor nuero de cambios en el tamaño y composición de las comunidades 
debido a la menor migración y conversión religiosa. 
H2. Hay mayor estabilidad en los regímenes de producción expresan en cambios de 
uso del suelo con menor frecuencia de la subsistencia a la producción de cultivos 
comerciales. 
H3. Hay baja presencia y dependencia de ayuda alimentaria externa y los programas 
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gubernamentales como se expresa en las respuestas de la Encuesta Nacional de 
Salud Y Nutrición (ENSANUT). 
 
Además, se espera que las comunidades con mayor presencia de instituciones 
intercomunitarias recíprocas serán menos vulnerables a la inseguridad alimentaria 
transitoria causada por una disminución temporal de la seguridad de los derechos de 
sus habitantes, haciéndolos más propensos a hacer frente a la inseguridad 
alimentaria. 
 
Como resultado de esta investigación, vamos a adquirir conocimientos sobre la 
forma en que las comunidades se auto-organizan y responden a la escasez de 
alimentos a largo plazo, el panorama institucional que las comunidades y sus 
miembros tienen a su disposición para hacer frente y adaptarse a la inseguridad 
alimentaria y la interrelación entre los cambios en variables exógenas, cambios en 
los arreglos institucionales y el estado de la seguridad alimentaria en estas 
comunidades. 
Metodología 
 
Este estudio recoge información empírica detallada acerca de las instituciones 
recíprocas intercomunitarias de 8 comunidades a través de un equipo de 
investigación que realiza etnografía multi-local. Los métodos utilizados son listados 
libres, entrevistas semi-estructuradas, análisis de consenso cultural y la creación de 
una escala de reciprocidad intercomunitaria. Datos de archivo se utilizaran para 
explorar la relación entre la presencia / ausencia de instituciones recíprocas entre 
comunidades con los cambios en los atributos de las comunidades en los últimos 25 
años, la estabilidad en el uso de la tierra en los últimos 25 años y la presencia y la 
dependencia de los programas alimentarios mediante análisis estadístico. Por último, 
la relación entre el estado de la seguridad alimentaria de las comunidades y la 
presencia / ausencia de instituciones recíprocas inter-comunitarias se examinará con 
el uso de estadísticas y se enriquecerá con el fino entendimiento que sólo el trabajo 
etnográfico puede dar. 
Recopilación de datos y análisis. 
El equipo de trabajo realizara una etnografía multi-local simultáneamente en 8 
comunidades. 
 
1) ¿Qué instituciones recíprocas existen en distintos niveles? 
Se utilizará Análisis de consenso cultural para llegar a una lista de todos los acuerdos 
institucionales a nivel meso. Se les pedirá a los informantes clave que libremente 
listen (free list) todas las instituciones de la región en la que los participantes se 
involucran en la reciprocidad de los alimentos ( por ejemplo, mayordomía , cofradía , 
tequio ). Cuestionamiento redundante, el sondeo no específica y el uso de un mapa 
será utilizado como ayuda para recopilar el mayor numero de informacion. 
Informantes de dominio específicos serán elegidos en base a sus conocimientos 
sobre las relaciones intercomunitarias . La muestra constará de 10 o 15 informantes 
ya que se necesitan sólo una pequeña muestra de informantes para producir 
información válida y confiable acerca de un dominio cultural específico (Bernard , 
2011 ) . Las listas libres resultados se limpiarán y se analizó la relevancia utilizando 
Anthropac . Además , los informantes serán entrevistados por el método de 
obtención marco para recopilar datos sobre la direccionalidad del intercambio 
recíproco . Una lista de las comunidades 20 por 20 se utilizará para pedir " hace ___ 
intercambios de alimentos con ___ " . Los resultados serán analizados en Anthropac 
mediante escalamiento multidimensional. 
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2) ¿Qué papel desempeñan estas instituciones recíprocas y se han desempeñado en 
el pasado para hacer frente a la inseguridad alimentaria ? 
Una vez que las instituciones intercomunitarias se han identificado mediante el 
análisis de consenso cultural, el informante que haya demostrado el mayor 
conocimiento sobre los arreglos institucionales a nivel meso en el análisis de 
consenso cultural se identificará y se utilizara como una semilla para un muestreo de 
bola de nieve. Otra semilla se iniciará con el segundo informante que más sabe si no 
hay información sobre todos los arreglos institucionales más destacados a través de 
la semilla inicial. Las semillas se iniciarán hasta que se alcanza la saturación. Los 
datos sobre las reglas de forma y las reglas en uso de las instituciones serán 
recolectados a través de entrevistas semi-estructuradas. Además, los datos sobre el 
estado anterior y el papel de las instituciones en el año 1994 se recogieran usando 
una técnica de fecha de recuerdo histórico. Este año ha sido elegido por su 
importancia regional ya que el levantamiento del Ejercito Zapatista de Liberación 
Nacional se llevó a cabo. El uso de eventos historicos son ayudas de recuperación de 
la memoria eficaces (van der Vaart y Glasner, 2010 ). Se recopilará información para 
desarrollar una escala de la presencia e importancia de las instituciones recíprocas 
intercomunitarias (VD). La escala se desarrollará mediante el análisis factorial. Si se 
otorga el permiso de los informantes, las entrevistas serán grabadas y transcritas en 
un programa de procesamiento de textos. Siempre que sea posible las grabaciones 
de sonido se complementan con notas de campo. Con base en el estudio piloto, se 
espera que un alto número de participantes no otorgará permiso para grabar. 
Métodos de entrenamiento de la memoria y de recuerdo serán utilizados para 
mejorar la calidad de las transcripciones (Werner, 1999). Los resultados se 
analizaran usando análisis de texto.  
 
Análisis de texto. Los entrevistadores harán notas estandarizadas de cada entrevista. 
Usando transcripciones estandarizadas disminuye el costo y tiempo de las 
transcripciones. La estandarización asegura que las transcripciones se generen de 
forma sistemática y consistente. Se utilizaran los siete principios de Mergenthaler y 
Stinson (1992) para el desarrollo de normas de transcripción como base para 
nuestro protocolo de transcripción. Se espera que un enfoque desnaturalizado es 
mejor para las transcripciones de este proyecto ya que se utilizaran traducciones 
(McLellan - Lemal , 2008 ; Mero - Jaffe, 2011). Los datos de las entrevistas se 
codificarán. Repeticiones, similitudes y diferencias, y de corte y se utilizarán para 
identificar los temas (Ryan & Bernard , 2003). Además , estas técnicas pueden ser 
realizadas por hablantes no nativos o no fluido de la lengua. Se creará un libro de 
códigos con no más de 30 códigos estructurales y de contenido. En esta etapa la 
confiabilidad entre codificadores es crucial. El uso de una guía de entrevista permitirá 
a los miembros del equipo para aumentar la validez y fiabilidad de los datos y 
facilitar la transcripción y la codificación. Además, las entrevistas no estructuradas o 
informales se llevarán a cabo a discreción de cada investigador. Las entrevistas 
informales ayudarán a los investigadores para enriquecer sus notas de campo, 
creación de relaciones en las comunidades y explorar temas relacionados. Los 
resultado del análisis de texto se utiliza para enriquecer resultados cuantitativos. 
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3. Las comunidades  
Este proyecto pretende obtener una perspectiva regional a cerca de la inseguridad 
alimentaria, para ello desarrollaremos trabajo de campo simultaneamente en varias 
comunidades. En la region existen ~1770 comunidades por lo que la selección de las 
comunidades donde s e realizara el trabajo etnografico es una parte crucial de la 
investigacion. El investigador principal y su comité de tesis han decidido utilizar los 
datos sobre seguridad alimentaria recopilados atravez de la Encuesta Nacionla de 
Salud y Nutricion (ENSANUT, 2012) lo cual limita las comunidades a 21. De esas 21 
comunidades se ha utilizado el muestreo intencional para seleccionar una comunidad 
de cada uno de los siete municipios que participaron en la ENSANUT.  
 Acontinuacion se presenta un listado de las 21 comunidades que participaron 
en el ENSANUT 2012 por municipio.  
Municipio Nombre  Lengua 
Chamula Chuchulumtic Tsotsil 
Chamula Joltzemen Tsotsil 
Chamula Romerillo Tsotsil 
Chamula La Ventana Tsotsil 
Chamula Naxic Tsotsil 
Chamula Yolonchen Tsotsil 
Chenalho Majomut Tsotsil 
Chenalho Bajoveltic Tsotsil 
Chenalho Tzajalhucum Tsotsil 
Mitontic Chalam Tsotsil 
Mitontic Pulumsibac Tsotsil 
Mitontic Suyalho Tsotsil 
Oxchuc Mesbilja Tsetsal 
Oxchuc Tuxaquilj Tsetsal 
Oxchuc Vistahermosa Tsetsal 
San Cristobal de las Casas Mitziton Tsotsil 
Tenejapa Balun Canan Tsetsal 
Tenejapa Pajalton Tsetsal 
Tenejapa Canada Grande Tsetsal 
Zinacantan Apas Tsotsil 
Zinacantan La Granadilla Tsotsil 
Zinacantan Joygel Grande Tsotsil 
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4. Trabajo etnografico 
Ademas de las tecnicas de investigacion que se explicaran en otras secciones es 
importante que los investigadores pongan a tencion a la vida de la comunidad. 
Estamos realmente interesados en entender la manera el que las instituciones 
reciprocas a todos los niveles funcion para combatir la inseguridad alimentaria. Sin 
embargo, hemos decidido enfcar nuestros recursos en las instituciones 
intercomunitarias ya que desconocemos de estudios que se enfoquen en estos y 
pretendemos utilizar los datos acerca de las instituciones reciprocas a nivel de hogar 
que fueron recolectadas por ENSANUT. La observacion participante, directa, la 
realizacion de entrevistas informales (platcas) con los miebros de la comunidad 
acerca de TODAS las instituiones reciprocas es crucial par aentendr los datos 
proporcionados por ENSANUT.  
 Los datos que se recaben mediante la observacion y las entrevistas 
informales se entregaran al investigador principal en forma de notas de campo. 
Escribir notas de campo es un trabajo tardado y que requiere practica. Estas nota s 
de campo al igual que todos los productos que se le entreguen al investigador se 
haran de un a manera estandarizada, es decir, todos haremos las notas de campo de 
la misma manera para eficietizar el analysis. Aquí los pasos que s eguiremos para 
crear nuestras notas de campo: 
1) Participar, observar y platicar. No hay manera de poder tener material par a 
ecribir en las nota s de campo si no estamos en la comunidad y no 
participamos de las actividades diarias. Lo primero que debemos hacer es 
insertarnos en la comunidad y adquirir la mentalidad de ser parte de esa 
comunidad”.  
2) Poner atencion y crear notas mentales. Obviamente no basta con estar en la 
comunidad para poder escribir lo que observamo s o escuchamos, hay que 
crear nota s mentales sobre los hechos o datos que creemos que son 
relevantes. Tambien es necesario identificar aquellos momentos 
“emblematicos” ques e pueden utilizar para una introduccion de un capitulo o 
reporte. Yo confio en que cad a uo de ustedes sabra cuales son estos 
elementos y me podra proporcionar varios para la tesis. Tomar notas 
mentales nos ayuda a conservar esaes primera s impresiones sobre lo que 
ocurre en la comunidad, impresiones que tienden a cambiar mientras 
pasamos mas tiempo alli. 
3) Crear notas escritas o grabadas (grabadora de voz). Es comun ver que todos 
los antropologos siempre traen una libretita donde escriben estas 
“impresiones” y “notas” para hacerlas mas duraderas. Ustedes tendran esas 
libretas pero tambien contaran con grabadoras de voz donde pueden hacer 
narraciones mas completas. Cada uno de ustedes tiene que decidir si quiere 
escribir las noas frente a las personas de la comunidad o de manera privada. 
Su deccion depende de las caracteristicas de la comunidad, la confianza que 
tienen con la persona con la que estan hablando y su capacidad para retener 
la atencion de los entrevistados. La manera en la que se toman las notas no 
debe de afectar la calidad de las notas de campo sin embargo puede 
comprometer la cantidad de notas y la manera en la que las interaccionse se 
llevan acabo.  
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 Tomar notas de manera privada implica que el tiempo entre la platica 
u obsevacion y escribir la nota es mas largo, por lo que el investigador tiene 
que hacer uso de su buena memoria. Escribir las notas frente a el sujeto 
puede hacer que la persona se sienta incomoda y que el investigador a ltere 
el ritmo y calidad de la conversacion. Las notas se pueden escribir en frente 
de la persona con la que estan convesando siempre y cuando hallan dado 
atorizacion para que escriban ahí. Recuerden que hay personas que estan 
dispuestas a hablar mpero la grabadora o el cuaderno pueden inhibirlos. Si la 
persona no se siente comoda o ustedes deciden que se mejor platicar sin 
escribir notas par a no afectar l a fluidez de la convesacion las nota s se 
pueden escribir nmediatamente despues de que la conversacion acabe. Es 
bueno siempre s er discretos y abiertos sobre lo que se graba o escribe. Si 
alguien les pregunta que es lo que estan haciendo expliquenle con calma y 
claridad. Recuerden que la informacion que estamos recolectando es de ellos. 
Los datos que se deben de incluir en estas notas son fecha, hora y lugar. 
Datos numericos o de nombres siempre deben de registrarse en las notas ya 
que tienden a olvidarse rapido. No confien mucho en su memoria y apunten 
todo o que puedan. Las notas deben de contener informacion que les ayude a 
recordar y reconstruir sus nota s de campo mas adelante, por ejemplo 
nombres, acciones importantes que les ayden a recordar toda la historia, etc. 
En algunos (raros) casos las notas pueden ser muy detalladas, por ejemplo si 
vas a la casa de alguien a pagar una visita puedes ir narrando tus notas a la 
grabadora cuando camines de regreso a otra casa.  
 
Ejemplo de notas 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
4) Grabar y o escribir notas de campo. Lo ideal es tener un tiempo cada tarde 
para escribir notas de campo detalladas. Tradicionalente estas notas de 
campo se escriben en un cuaderno, peo recientemente con fines de agilizar y 
aminorar el trabajo se escriben directamente en un procesador de palabras 
(word). Como no todos ustedes cuentan con computadora portatil las notas 
se podran grabar en la grabadora y luego las transcribiran. Cada investigador 
entregara las notas de campo en procesador de palabras como las 
grabaciones que las acompanen si es que existen.  
Grabar o escribir notas no es un proceso facil. Cada palabra que queda 
asentada en el procesador es resultado de horas de observacion y de 
refleccion por parte del investigador. Tomen en cuenta que ustedes son mis 
hojos en cad a comunidad y que seats notas de campo son los anteojos a 
travez de los cuales yo puedo observar las dinamicas de cada un a de la s 
localidades. Si ustedes omiten algun a contecimiento de sus notas tambien lo 
estan excluyendo de mi entendimiento de las dinamicas de su comunidad. Es 
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por esto que la selección de lo que se escribe es un proceso crucial para el 
resultado final de mi tesis.  
Es crucial que cada uno de ustedes encuentre un buen ritmo entre sus 
obligaciones de campo (hacer entrevistas) y el tiempo que dedican a escribir 
sus notas. Esta es la unica parte en la que no hay linamientos especificos. De 
cualquier manera se debe tomar en cuenta que cada observacion implica 
horas de trabajo en un escritorio, escribieno y describiendo lo que paso. Linda 
Shaw (2011) aconseja no hablar con nadie acerca de lo que uno va a escribir 
en sus nota s de campo ni dormir antes de escribir las notas ya que seto 
puede afectar la cantidad de informacion que se retiene o nuestra 
interpretacion sobre los hechos.  
5) Recordar para escribir. Una vez que cada uno de ustedes se dispong a 
aescribir o grabar sus notas de campo debe de tratar de recordar que es lo 
que sucedió par a poder tener material para escribir. Este proceso coniste en 
reimaginar y revivir lo que sucedio en el dia para poder escribir. En este 
estudio utilizaremos un enfoque de remembranza cronologico, es decir, cad a 
uno de ustedes pensara en los eventos del dia en orden cronologico . Es aquí 
donde uno puede hacer uso de las nots o grabaciones que contienen los datos 
especificos del dia (2 y 3). Las descripciones que se generen deben de ser 
logicas y tener sentido. 
6) Escribir. Hay muchsiimas manearas en la s que s e pueden escribir las notas 
pero nosotros nos limitaremos a organizar nuestras ideas en parrafos y a 
describir escenas. Los parrafos son la manera ams practica e intuitiva de 
organizar la informacion y a que contienen la descripcion completa de un 
hecho pequeño o dato importante. Tambien son faciles de empezar, continuar 
y terminar si hay interrupciones .Aunque en este estudio se utiliza un enfoque 
cronologico par a recordar lo acontecido durante el dia los parrafos no 
siempre tienen un orden cronologico cuando se escriben en un principio. De 
cualquier manera el resultado final (las nota sde campo que se me entreguen) 
deben de tener cierto orden y coherencia.  
Las escenas son narraciones mas largas y complejas en naturaleza. 
En una escena las descripcion es lo suficientemente densa para que cada uno 
de los lectores sienta que estan ahí y que son parte de lo que ahi ocurre. No 
todos los dias es necesario escribir una narracion. Una narracion unifica los 
detalles descriptivos de un lugar, individuo o incidente que tiene una 
sequencia inata y tiene carcater. Incluso se pueden hacer narraciones de 
episodios que son similares a las escenas pero tienen movimiento y no son 
estaticas.  
7) Comentarios y gloasas. Siempre es bueno leer y revisar lo que se contiene en 
las notas. Cuando se hace se la lectura a veces es necesario incorporar 
algunos comentarios o expandir y a clarar las notas. Esto se puede hacer a 
manera de glosas. Hay que tomar en cuenta que el mero proceso de escribir 
la s notas altera nuestra vision sobe lo que ocurrio en el campo, es por eso 
que se tas notas se consideran de carácter analitico, interpreattivo o 
secundario.  
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5. Transcripciones estandarizadas 
Las notas de campo y las entrevistas seran transcritas de acuerdo a las siguientes 
reglas: 
a. Escritas en mayusculas. 
b. Escritas en espanol. 
c. Las notas que se transcriban directamente desde grabaciones deben 
de contener textualmente lo que las grabaciones contienen. No debe 
de haber perdida de informacion.  
d. Las transcripciones de entrevistas no deben de ser traducciones 
directas a menos que incluyan informacion muy importante.  
e. Las transcripciones se haran de manera desnaturalizad, es decir, se 
cuidara que los significados y percepciones de los entrevistados se 
capturen en las transcripciones incluso cuando no se escriba palabra 
por palabra lo que hayan dicho.  
f. Se seguiran las siguientes notaciones.  
 
Simbolo Nombre Uso Ejemplo  
(texto) Parentesis Discurso no audible o que esta en 
duda 
 
((texto)) Doble 
parentesis 
Anotacion de una actividad no 
verbal 
(se toco la cara, indico 
con la mano el lugar) 
E entrevistador Se usara para marcar quien esta 
hablando 
E: Digame mas acerca 
de la fiesta. 
R Entrevistado Se usara para marcar qioen esta 
hablando 
R: Antes aquí habia 
muchas gallinas 
 
 
   
 
 
   
 
Ejemplo de una transcripcion. 
E:Y ¿Por que dejo de tomar esas pastillas, esas gotas? ((apuntando a las pastillas)) 
R: Por que yo tuve otra enfermedad… lo que pasa es que me puse mal y me llevaron 
con el medico. Y me sacaron exámenes de sangre antes de comer y después de 
comer y salió que estaba … que estaba normal que no estaba alto. El medico me dijo 
“ no tiene diabetes señora esta normal”. Y otra cosa que he hecho es que tengo 
cuidado para comer, como mas fruta y camino todos los días una hora al día, 
entonces yo me he sentido mejor.  
 
Ejemplo de notas de campo 
Phoenix, AZ   18 de enero, 2014  80 F nublado 
LLEGUE DOS HORAS ANTES DEL SERVICIO RELIGIOSO A LA IGLESIA DE CRISTO 
DEL VALLE PARA OBSERVAR LAS ACTIVIDADES PREVIAS A LA MISA.  
EL CAMPUS DE LA IGLESIA ABARCA UNA MANZANA Y TIENE UN EDIFICIO PRINCIPAL 
AL CENTRO Y DOS EDIFICIOS MAS PEQUENOS EN LA PARTE NORESTE. LOS 
EDIFICIOS SE UTILIZAN PARA LA ESCUELA DOMINICAL MIENTRAS QUE EL EDIFICIO 
PRNCIPAL SE UTILIZA COMO TEMPLO. EL EDIFICIO PRINCIPAL TIENE 4 ENTRADAS 
INDEPENDIENTES: UNA EN EL DLADO NORTE, DOS EN EL LADO OESTE Y UNA EN EL 
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LADO SUR. EL ALTAR SE SITUA EN EL LADO ESTE. EL EDIFICIO TAMBIE CUENTA 
CON UNA CAFETERIA Y UN AUDTORIO. HAY JARDINES ALREDEDOR DE LOS 
EDIFICIOS Y UN ESTACIONAMIENTO COMO PARA 150 CARROS QUE SETA 
PAVIMENTADO Y SE LOCALIZA EN LA PARTE SUDESTE DEL LOTE. 
LA LLEGADA AL SERVICIO SE DIO DE MANERA LENTA AUNQUE MIENTRAS MAS SE 
ACERCAB AL A HORA MAS GENET LLEGABA. LOS ASISTENTES SE CONCENTRABAN 
ALREDEDOR DEL EDIFICIO PRINCIPAL ALGUNS EN LOS JARDINES OTROS EN LA 
CAFETERIA.  
LA CAFETERIA TENIA UN MENU QUE CONSISTE EN 3 TIPOS DE SANDWICHES UNA 
ENSALADA, REFRIGERIOS Y BEBIDAS… 
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6. Listados libres  
Los listados libres son un metodo para explorar el contenido de los dominios 
culturales. Algunos investigadores los usan para identificar elementos en un dominio 
cultural y para calcular la relacion de cada element con la prominencia cultural. 
Tambien se pueden usar para medir la s caracteristicas cognitivas de los informants.  
 En este proyecto los listados libres se aplicaran con dos finalidades: 
1) Generar una lista de las instituciones reciprocas que existen en cada 
comunidad. 
2) Identificar las instituciones reciprocas intercomunitarias en las que se 
intercambia comida. 
3) Identificar informantes clave. 
A pesar de que creemos que los hombres lideres que han servido en puestos 
comunitarios tendran un mayor nivel de conocimiento acerca de las instituciones 
reciprocas inter-comunitarias tambien incluiremos en nuestra muesta a mujeres y 
hombres jovenes y adultos.  
 En esta tecniac a cada entrevistador se encarga de apuntar cada una de las 
palabras o frases que dice el entrevistado en el orden en el que se dicen. Se 
utilizaran tres tipos de ayuda para promover que los entrevistadores hagan memoria. 
Cada ayuda se utilizara en el orden pre escrito y una vez que el entrevistado ya no 
se acuerde de ningun otro nombre. Es importantsimo usar las ayudas. Si por alguna 
circunstancia las ayudas no se utilizaron, se debe de hacer una anotacion en la hoja 
donde se recolectaron los datos.  
En todos los sitios se realizara una aplicacion piloto del instrumento con 5 sujetos, 
para asegurarnos de que los informantes entiendan las preguntas y para poder 
corregir las preguntas antes de su aplicación.  
Se utilizará Análisis de consenso cultural para llegar a una lista de todos los acuerdos 
institucionales a nivel meso. Se les pedirá a los informantes clave que libremente 
listen (free list) todas las instituciones de la región en la que los participantes se 
involucran en la reciprocidad de los alimentos ( por ejemplo, mayordomía , cofradía , 
tequio ). Cuestionamiento redundante, el sondeo no específica y el uso de un mapa 
será utilizado como ayuda para recopilar el mayor numero de informacion. 
Informantes de dominio específicos serán elegidos en base a sus conocimientos 
sobre las relaciones intercomunitarias . La muestra constará de 10 o 15 informantes 
ya que se necesitan sólo una pequeña muestra de informantes para producir 
información válida y confiable acerca de un dominio cultural específico (Bernard , 
2011 ) . Las listas libres resultados se limpiarán y se analizó la relevancia utilizando 
Anthropac . Además , los informantes serán entrevistados por el método de 
obtención marco para recopilar datos sobre la direccionalidad del intercambio 
recíproco . Una lista de las comunidades 20 por 20 se utilizará para pedir " hace ___ 
intercambios de alimentos con ___ " . Los resultados serán analizados en Anthropac 
mediante escalamiento multidimensional. 
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Ayudas para la memoria 
Cuestionamiento redundante. Esta es la mas facil de todas las ayudas y simplemente 
consiste en repetir la pregunta. Sin embargo, su simplicidad puede hacer que se 
utilize de manera inprevista, sin pensar.  
Sonde no especifico 
Ayuda semantica 
Uso de mapa 
Procedimiento de la entrevista. Este procedimiento se repite con cad auna de las 
preguntas del listado libre.  
 Antes de empezar el entrevistador se asegura de tener el consentimiento 
informado de los participantes y de resolver todas las dudas que tenga el 
entrevistado sobre el estudio. 
 Primero, se llena el formulario de los datos del entrevistado y el 
entrevistador.  
 Segundo, se leen las instrucciones y se leexplica a el participante que no hay 
respuestas correctas ni incorrectas; que toda la informacion que de es 
valiosa. 
 Tercero, se lee la pregunta. Por ejemplo “Dime todas las formas mediante las 
cuales se puede conseguir comida en la comunidad sin que uno la compre.” 
Espere a que el entrevistado mencione todas las respuestas de las que se 
acuerde en primer instancia. Deje pasar un pequeño lapso para asegurarse de 
que ya no tiene mas respuestas.  
 Cuarto, repita la pregunta: “Dime todas las formas mediante las cuales se 
puede conseguir comida en la comunidad sin que uno la compre.” Espere a 
que la persona responda. Espere una vez más, cuando haya terminado de 
responder prosiga ala siguiente ayuda. 
  Quinto, preguntele al entrevistado “De que otras maneras se pueden 
conseguir alimentos en esta comunidad si usted no lo compra”, deje que la 
Preguntas de los listados libres.  
Instituciones reciprocas. 
1. Dime todas las formas mediante las cuales se puede conseguir comida en la 
comunidad sin que uno la compre.  
2. Dime todas las razones por las que alguien puede darte o regalarte comida.  
3. Dime si alguna vez en tu vida haz intercambiado comida con alguna persona de 
____________ comunidad.  
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persona responda. Una vez que finalize pregunte “De que otra manera se le 
llama cuando alguien te regala comida”. De igual manera se debe dejar que el 
participante conteste hasta que el participante no pueda pensar en mas 
respuestas y luego se prosigue a la siguente ayuda.  
 
 
 
7. Entrevistas 
El uso de una guía de entrevista permitirá a los miembros del equipo para aumentar 
la validez y fiabilidad de los datos y facilitar la transcripción y la codificación. 
 
 Además, las entrevistas no estructuradas o informales se llevarán a cabo a 
discreción de cada investigador. Las entrevistas informales ayudarán a los 
investigadores para enriquecer sus notas de campo, creación de relaciones en las 
comunidades y explorar temas relacionados. Los resultado del análisis de texto se 
utiliza para enriquecer resultados cuantitativos. 
 
Ayudas para  recolectar mas información durante las entrevistas 
 
El sondeo estimulante durante las entrevistas se utiliza para producir más 
información, de manera  contralada limitando la manera en la que  cada  
entrevistador se inserta en la entrevista aumentando la calidad de los datos.  
 
 El eco-  El eco consiste en simplemente repetir lo último que alguien ha dicho. 
Es útil cuando un informante está describiendo un proceso o un evento. "No 
veo ..... (repita los pasos ) ... Entonces, ¿qué sucede? "Esta sonda es neutral 
y no redirige la entrevista. Alienta al informante para continuar con la 
narración. 
 No se  debe  utilizar con demasiada frecuencia, ya que puede ser molesto. 
 Uh Uh  - fomenta  al informante mediante comentarios que afirman, es decir, 
uh -huh uh -huh 
Tenga cuidado de no utilizar éste con demasiada frecuencia y aque también 
puede ser molesto. 
 Diga me mas- la sonda más común delos entrevistadores experimentados es   
preguntar “digame mas” 
 Los encuestados le dan una respuesta y los entrevistadores solicitan ma s 
información diciendo " dime más" " ¿por qué exactamente dice eso " "¿por 
qué es exactamente que se siente de esa manera " 
 La pregunta larga es  cuando se  trata  de  preguntar lo mismo pero con mas 
palabras . En lugar de como se  puede preguntar “entonces, como me  decía 
usted”  
Esta técnica es  muy buena para romper el hielo y conseguir la entrevista. Se  
puede  utilizar al principio de la entrevista usando una pregunta “grand tour”, 
que  consiste  en una  historia  mas  o menos larga  con una preguntita  al 
final. 
Esto produce más información 
Puede construir una buena relación con el informante porque el entrevistador 
hablo un buen rato y demuestra su  interés en la entrevista 
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 El silencio- este silencio es la más difícil de aprender y desplegar. Usted sólo 
tiene que mantenerse tranquilo y esperar a que el demandado para continuar 
con su / su respuesta. Puede acompañar el silencio con un movimiento de 
cabeza o farfulló "uh -huh ", como usted se está centrando en su bloc de 
notas. 
 Esta manera de solicitar  información es muy  importante  en las entrevistas 
no estructurada ya que  el entrevistado puede  abarcar más temas y  el 
entrevistador tiene la habilidad de decidir  qué  tema explorar más a fondo.  
Esta técnica es  una técnica  que  puede  ser  de alto riesgo si  la persona en 
realidad ya  termino de hablar ya  que  puede producir un  “silencio 
incómodo”. 
 
 El Eco - sonda consiste en la simple repetición del ultimo pensamiento que 
alguien ha dicho y les pedimos que continúe. 
 Es muy útil cuando una persona está describiendo un proceso o evento. 
Puede repetir lo que dijeron (en más o menos sus propias palabras) y luego 
preguntar "¿qué pasa después?" 
 Esta sonda es neutral y no dirige la conversación de otra manera. 
 Esta sonda de muestra que usted entiende y está escuchando al informante y 
los anima a continuar 
  Sondeo de líder - también llamadas " sondas directiva " comienzan con algo 
así como " como yo lo entiendo ..... " o " esto puede ser obvio, pero .... " Y 
pidiendo al informante que aclara su comprensión. 
Estos pueden basarse en algo que el entrevistado acaba de terminar de decir 
o algo que usted aprendió de otro informante en días anteriores, semanas, meses. 
 
 
Otras cosas que deben de tenerse en cuenta 
• Los encuestados - Algunos verbales personas tratan de decir demasiado. 
o Usted puede darles una " falta de atención gentil " por poner en su pluma, mirando 
a otro lado , hojeando sus notas. 
o No ser reacio a cortar informantes - este tipo de informantes se utilizan 
probablemente para ser interrumpido. 
• Los encuestados - algunos no verbales de la gente simplemente le dirá " no sé " 
o Trate de usar las sondas listadas aquí , si no trabajar sólo tendrá que aceptar que 
lo que obtuvo de ellos y seguir adelante . 
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• La ética de sondeo 
o No hacer daño a personas inocentes que le han brindado información n de buena 
fe. 
o El mejor que podemos encontrar en hacer que la gente " se abren ", el más 
responsable te conviertes en que ni posteriormente sufren algún malestar emocional 
por haberlo hecho . 
o Se detiene a veces mejor que el informante de revelar información confidencial 
hasta que construir una relación de confianza mutua 
o Si usted siente que un participante se siente remordimiento por la divulgación de 
información sensible , poner fin a la entrevista con una conversación ligera y 
garantías sobre su discreción. 
 
 
Información tomada del libro de H. Russel Bernard: " Métodos de Investigación en 
Antropología: Enfoques cualitativos y cuantitativos (2006).  
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APPENDIX C  
IRB FORMS 
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Solicitud de permiso para comunidades  
Adquisición de alimentos en Los Altos, México. 
 
 
Soy un estudiante de posgrado bajo la dirección del profesor Marco Jannsen en la 
Escuela de la Evolución Humana y Cambio Social en la Universidad Estatal de 
Arizona. Estoy realizando un estudio de investigación para determinar donde se 
pueden adquirir alimentos en su comunidad;  la cantidad de comercios que  hay en 
la  comunidad, la cantidad de  productos que se venden en ellos,   los  programas de  
gobierno que  atacan la malnutrición y los intercambios de comida que se llevan a 
cabo entre barrios y comunidades.  
 
Estoy solicitándole permiso para llevar a cabo mu investigación en su comunidad. Si 
usted y los otros líderes de la comunidad ame autorizan realizar mu investigación 
aquí yo u otro estudiante vendrá entre los meses de marzo y abril a platicar con 
algunas amas de casa, lideres comunitarios y dueños de tienditas.  A las amas de 
casa se les preguntará acerca de donde compran los alimentos de su familia, a los 
líderes comunitarios se les preguntara sobre la variedad de frutas y verduras que 
vende en su tienda y a los líderes comunitarios se les preguntara acerca de las 
fiestas en las que se intercambian comida con otros barrios o comunidades.  A todos 
los individuos que decidan participar en esta investigación se les pedirá   su 
consentimiento verbal que indica que su participación es voluntaria. A nadie se le va 
a obligar a participar en el estudio incluso cuando las autoridades locales ya nos 
hallan dado permiso de estar aquí. Para proteger la privacidad de los miembros de la 
comunidad a ningún participante se le pedirán sus datos personales (nombre, 
dirección). De igual manera los datos obtenidos se manejaran de acuerdo a los 
procedimientos marcados por la Junta de Revisión  Institucional de la Universidad 
Estatal de Arizona. 
 
No preveremos que la participación de su comunidad o los miembros de su 
comunidad en este estudio le causen ningún riesgo o inconveniente. Tampoco hay 
ningún beneficio directo para su comunidad al participar en este estudio. Sin 
embargo, la participación de su comunidad en este estudio me dará oportunidad de 
entender como las comunidades de Los Altos de auto organizan para combatir la 
seguridad alimentaria.  
 
La participación en este estudio es voluntaria. Si usted tiene alguna pregunta sobre 
el estudio de investigación, por favor llámeme al (602) 4000188. 
 
 
 
  166 
Estimado residente de ____________: 
 
Mi  nombre es Sindy De La Torre y soy un estudiante de posgrado en la Universidad 
Estatal de Arizona. Estoy realizando un estudio de investigación para determinar  de 
que manera  las  personas  de su comunidad adquieren comida. 
 
La estoy invitando a participar, en  una entrevista acerca de como consigue usted 
comida,  donde compra, si  da o  recibe  alimentos. Usted tiene el derecho a no 
contestar alguna  pregunta, o  detener la entrevista en cualquier momento. 
 
Su participación en este estudio es voluntaria. Si usted decide no participar o 
retirarse del estudio en cualquier momento, no habrá penalización. Usted debe tener 
18 años o mas para participar en el estudio. 
 
No hay beneficios directos asociados con su participación en este estudio, pero sus 
respuestas y conocimientos nos permitirán tener una mejor comprensión de los 
cambios  en la alimentación en su comunidad. No hay riesgos previsibles o molestias 
causadas por su participación. 
 
Sus respuestas serán confidenciales, le asignare un código y ese código se utilizara 
en lugar de su nombre, nadie sabrá quién es usted. Si durante la entrevista nos da 
información que pueda conducir a otras personas para identificarlo el equipo de 
investigación sustituirá  la  información con un  alias o apodo, por ejemplo, si 
menciona el nombre  de la calle donde vive, vamos a cambiar el nombre de la calle. 
Los resultados de este estudio pueden ser utilizados en informes, presentaciones o 
publicaciones, pero su nombre nunca será utilizado. 
 
Me gustaría grabar  esta entrevista. La entrevista no será grabada sin su permiso. 
Por favor, hágame saber si usted no desea que la entrevista sea grabada, también 
puede cambiar de opinión después de que la entrevista comienza, sólo hágamelo 
saber. Las grabaciones de la entrevista se transcribirán y  luego se destruirán y 
como he mencionado antes, cualquier información personal en las transcripciones 
serán sustituido por un alias o apodo. 
 
Si usted tiene alguna pregunta sobre el estudio por favor póngase en contacto con el 
equipo de investigación: Marco Janssen (4807277067) marco.janssen @ asu.edu o 
Sindy de la Torre (6024000188) sydelato@asu.edu. Si usted tiene alguna pregunta 
sobre sus derechos como un participante  / en esta investigación, o si usted siente 
que ha sido colocado en situación de riesgo, puede comunicarse con el Presidente de 
la Junta de Revisión de Sujetos Humanos Institucional, a través de la Oficina ASU de 
Integridad en la Investigación y Control , al (480) 965 a 6.788. Por favor, hágame 
saber si usted desea ser parte del estudio. 
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CARTA DE INFORMACIÓN  
ENTREVISTA  A OFICIALES 
 
Adquisición de alimentos en Los Altos, México. 
Diciembre 6, 2013 
 
Estimada autoridad: 
 
Soy un estudiante de posgrado bajo la dirección del profesor Marco Janssen en la 
Escuela de la Evolución Humana y Cambio Social en la Universidad Estatal de 
Arizona. Estoy realizando un estudio de investigación para determinar los  cambios 
en los  niveles de  seguridad alimentaria  en Los Altos  en los últimos 20 años. 
 
Estoy invitando lo a participar, en  una entrevista acerca de los programas  
gubernamentales  que   combaten  la  malnutrición  en  Los Altos. Esta entrevista 
está diseñada para  recabar información acerca de las comunidades que usted cubre 
como parte de su empleo. Usted tiene  derecho a no contestar alguna  pregunta, o  
detener la entrevista en cualquier momento. 
 
Su participación en este estudio es voluntaria. Si usted decide no participar o 
retirarse del estudio en cualquier momento, no habrá penalización. Usted debe tener 
18 años o mas para participar en el estudio. 
 
No hay beneficios directos asociados con su participación en este estudio, pero sus 
respuestas y conocimientos sobre este tema nos permitirán tener una mejor 
comprensión de los efectos de la liberalización comercial en la seguridad alimentaria 
de su comunidad. No hay riesgos previsibles o molestias causadas por  participación. 
 
Sus respuestas serán confidenciales nosotros le asignaremos un código y ese código 
se utilizara en lugar de su nombre, nadie sabrá quién es usted. Si durante la 
entrevista nos da información que pueda conducir a otras personas para identificarlo 
el equipo de investigación sustituira  la  informacion con un alias, por ejemplo, si 
menciona el nombre  de la calle donde vive, vamos a cambiar el nombre de la calle. 
Los resultados de este estudio pueden ser utilizados en los informes, presentaciones 
o publicaciones, pero su nombre no será utilizado. 
 
Me gustaría grabar  esta entrevista. La entrevista no será grabada sin su permiso. 
Por favor, hágame saber si usted no desea que la entrevista sea grabada, también 
puede cambiar de opinión después de que la entrevista comience, sólo hágamelo 
saber. Las grabaciones de la entrevista se transcribirán y luego se destruirán y como 
he mencionado antes, cualquier información personal en las transcripciones serán 
sustituido por un alias. 
 
Si usted tiene alguna pregunta sobre el estudio por favor póngase en contacto con el 
equipo de investigación: Marco Janssen (4807277067) marco.janssen @ asu.edu o 
Sindy de la Torre (6024000188) sydelato@asu.edu. Si usted tiene alguna pregunta 
sobre sus derechos como un participante  / en esta investigación, o si usted siente 
que ha sido colocado en situación de riesgo, puede comunicarse con el Presidente de 
la Junta de Revisión de Sujetos Humanos Institucional, a través de la Oficina ASU de 
Integridad en la Investigación y Control , al (480) 965 a 6.788. Por favor, hágame 
saber si usted desea ser parte del estudio. 
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Dime todas las formas mediante las cuales se puede conseguir comida en la 
comunidad sin que uno la compre.  
1. Dime todas las razones por las que alguien puede darte o regalarte comida.  
2. Dime si alguna vez en tu vida haz intercambiado comida con alguna persona de 
____________ comunidad.  
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Local authorities in Pajaltón, Tenejapa.  
 
Local authorities in Cañada Grande, Tenejapa. 
Comite de 
educacacion 
President
Treasurer
Secretary
1st vocal
2nd vocal
Comite de 
mejoras 
materiales
President
Treasurer
Secretary
1st vocal
2nd vocal
Comite de agua
President
Treasurer
Secretary
Vocal
Comite de luz
President
Treasurer
Secretary
Vocal
Comite de 
carretera
President
Treasurer
Secretary
Vocal
Comite de 
educación
President
Secretary
Treasurer
1st vocal
2nd vocal
Comite de obras 
materiales
President
Secretary
Treasurer
1st vocal
2nd vocal
Patronato de 
electrificacion
President
Patronato de agua
President
Patronato de 
carretera
President
Bankilal
1st fiador
2nd 
fiador
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Local authorities in Balun Canal, Tenejapa. 
 
 
Local authorities in Mesbilja, Oxchuc. 
  
Comite de 
Primaria
Education 
president
Secretary
1st vocal 
(judge)
2nd vocal 
(judge)
police
police
Comte de 
secundaria
President
Secretary
Treasurer
1st vocal
2nd vocal
Patronato de luz
President
Patronato de 
agua
President
Patronato de 
obras materiales
President
Comite de 
educación
President
Secretary
Treasurer
1st vocal
2nd vocal
Comite de 
obras
President
Secretary
Treasurer
1st vocal
2nd vocal
Comite de 
luz
President
Secretary
Treasurer
1st vocal
2nd vocal
Comite de 
agua
President
Secretary
Treasurer
1st vocal
2nd vocal
Comite de 
secundaria
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APPENDIX F 
ANTHROPOMETRIC MEASUREMENTS OF PARTICIPANTS IN ENSANUT 2012 IN STUDY 
COMMUNITIES. 
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Community HH ID Adults Teenagers School 
aged 
Preschoolers 
  BMI BAZ BAZ WHZ HAZ WAZ BAZ 
Mesbilja 70773 25.44 0.39  -0.54 -3.46 -2.63 -0.75 
Mesbilja 70774 28.75   2.1 -1.63 0.48 1.92 
Mesbilja 70774 25.34       
Mesbilja 70775 26.85  0.23 -0.56 -1.41 -1.15 -0.4 
Mesbilja 70776 30.40  -1.18     
Mesbilja 70776   -0.02     
Mesbilja 70777 26.48 0.95 0.67 1.1 -2.23 -0.21 1.55 
Mesbilja 70779 32.14         
Mesbilja 70780 28.05  -0.06       
Mesbilja 70781 24.77         
Mesbilja 70782 28.34  -0.02 1.07 -1.51 -0.03 1.27 
Mesbilja 70783 29.94         
Mesbilja 70784 28.49        
Mesbilja 70785 25.89       
 Pajaltón 71225 28.78  -0.14 -0.18 -2.49 -1.4 0.11 
 Pajaltón 71225    -1.08     
 Pajaltón 71226 28.12 -0.37  1.54 -1.39 0.54 1.83 
 Pajaltón 71227 23.11  1.02      
 Pajaltón 71228   0.79 0.98 -2.24 -0.65 1.12 
 Pajaltón 71229 32.66  0.72 -0.36 -2.14 -1.43 -0.09 
 Pajaltón 71230 27.64  0.41 0.05 -3.62 -2.2 0.45 
 Pajaltón 71230   0.09     
 Pajaltón 71231 26.17  0.34 -2.14 4.8 0.6 -2.81 
 Pajaltón 71232 27.17 0.55 0.45     
 Pajaltón 71233 25.96   0.41 -1.76 -0.82 0.51 
 Pajaltón 71234 26.31 0.42 2.14     
 Pajaltón 71235 24.91  0.82 0.07 -5.27 -2.93 0.92 
 Pajaltón 71235   1.59     
 Cañada Grande 71237 25.01  1.3 1.16 -3.37 -1.22 1.48 
 Cañada Grande 71238 31.70  -0.21 0.4 -2.91 -1.42 0.73 
 Cañada Grande 71239 25.38   0.52 0.4 0.66 0.59 
 Cañada Grande 71240  -0.08      
 Cañada Grande 71241 26.74 -0.18      
 Cañada Grande 71243        
 Cañada Grande 71244 23.49       
 Cañada Grande 71245 21.61       
 Cañada Grande 71247 28.85  -2.25 -0.27 -1.33 -0.91 -0.12 
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 Cañada Grande 71246  -0.21      
 Cañada Grande 71248  0.44  0.53 -1.96 -0.72 0.77 
Balun Canal 71213 21.93  0.1 -0.19 -3.04 -1.67 0.39 
Balun Canal 71215    0.36 -1.97 -0.75 0.55 
Balun Canal 71216  1  0.04 -2.57 -1.42 0.43 
Balun Canal 71217 29.35  -0.48     
Balun Canal 71217    0.18     
Balun Canal 71218 25.54  0.14     
Balun Canal 71219 26.21 0.78 0.08     
Balun Canal 71221 28.84 0.04 0.86     
Balun Canal 71222 23.34 0.67 0.07 0.53 -3.44 -1.8 0.83 
Balun Canal 71223 29.46  -0.95     
Average Mesbilja 27.76 0.67 -0.06 0.63 -2.04 -0.70 0.71 
Average Pajaltón 27.08 0.2 0.59 0.04 -1.76 -1.03 0.25 
Average  Cañada Grande 26.11 -0.00 -0.38 0.46 -1.83 -0.72 0.69 
Average Balun Canal 26.38 0.62 0 0.18 -2.75 -1.41 0.55 
 
BMI stands for Body Mass Index; BAZ stands for Body Mass Index by Age valid Z 
score; WHZ stands for Weight by Height valid Z score; HAZ stands for Height by Age 
Valid Z score. Anthropometric measurements of participants in ENSANUT 2012 in the 
study communities are shown by household ID. The table is color coded to reflect the 
nutritional status of the participants. Scores that denote stunting are presented in 
red, scores of underweight individuals are shown in orange, normal scores appear on 
gold, overweight scores are shown on green and blue scores denote obesity. 
Household with more than one individual per age group in the sample are shown in 
two rows.
  
  
